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documentation and  information In  addition  to  the  official  acts published  in  the Official 
Gazette  of  the  European  Communities,  the  activities  of 
the European Communities  are reported on  in publications 
appearing  at regular  intervals. 
Thus, the Commission  of the European Communities publ-
ishes a  Monthly Bulletin on  the activities of the Communi-
ties  while  the  European  Parliament  issues  a  periodical 
Information Bulletin on its own activities. 
The Council of Ministers issues a  press release after all 
its sessions. Its activities are also reported on  in  a  spe-
cial section  of the Bulletin of the European Communities. 
The Survey of European Documentation is intended to serve 
as a  supplement  to  the  above publications.  It deals with 
salient  features  of  the  process  of  European  integration 
taking place outside Community bodies. I. 
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PE-i-666 Part 
DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
at the National Level 
, I.  GOVERNMENTS AND  PARLIAMENTS 
Austria and the EEC 
Introduction 
Austria applied for negotiations to be opened with the EEC as far 
back as 1961.  Five rounds of negotiations were held in 1965 and the sixth in 
February 1966,  when the 'negotiating mandate' given to the Commission by the 
Council of Ministers expired.  It was only at the beginning of December 1966 
that a new mandate,  which did not,  however,  yet cover all the subjects of ne-
gotiation,  was  granted by the Council of Ministers. 
1.  Problems and viewpoints 
On 11  November 1966,  a few days before the official visit to Austria 
of President Podgorny of the USSR,  Federal Chancellor Klaus gave an assur-
ance in Linz that Austria would not sign any treaty with the EEC incompatible 
with the State Treaty and Austrian neutrality.  The substantial balance-of-
payments deficit was,  however, forcing the Austrian Government to seek a 
special arrangement with the EEC.  In many sectors Austrian exports were 
becoming increasinp.;l:y  Sf'nsitive to tariff discriminations.  The enormous im-
port surplus could  :I•_;t  be riealt with only through government planning; what 
above all else was needed was to improve the competitive capacity of Austrian 
exports.  In an interview with the Parjp journal 'Combat
1
,  Dr.  Klaus again 
pointed out that Austria ain:ed at concluding a special treaty 'vith the Common 
Market which would take Austrian neutrality fully into account. 
- 1-Prior to Preslderct Podgorny'  s  arrival in  Vienna ,  Soviet papers 
renewed tlwir attacks on any association of Austria 1vith the Common Market. 
In the past the Kremlin had on a number of occasions made it quite plain to 
Vienna that it 'vould regard Austrian entry into the Common Market as an 
'indirect econornic link 'Yith Gyrmany' contrary to the provisions of the Aus-
trian State Treaty.  The argument that a  link ·with the EEC \vas economically 
vital to A.ustri<t :md 1vould threaten neither its nelltrality nor its political inde-
pendence had not been accepted b~r Moscow.  The Kremlin in particular refer-
red to the 'Atlantic character' of the Home Treaty and to Germany's strong 
po::;i.tion in the Common l\Tark.et. 
In the talks between Dr.  Klaus and Mr.  Podgorny,  Russian opposi-
tion to an association of Austria with the EEC played a  crucial role. Podgorny 
warned ag<Jinst  any link \Yith the EEC,  which \\·as an  alliance of six NATO Sta-
tes.  In Moscow's  e~·es,  Austrian neutralit~v' could not be reconciled with an 
organization ·whose 1nembers were bound b~, military ties.  lVTr.  Podgorny, 
h'l'Ve\·e r,  hintul that Russia might tolerate a trade agreement between Vienna 
anr:~ B:::ussei .s.  Hf'  referred to Article 4 of  the State Treaty which forbade 
Ausvia tn establish any link,  i.n  \vhatsoe·,·er form,  with Germany. This Article 
would have t0 be crmsidt'rer1.  b~· the Austrian GoYernment in the event of any 
agreemt~nt. in B··llSEc"ls.  since Germany was clearly the leading member of the 
EEC. 
At the close of  hi;:3  visit ?llr.  Podgorny warned against any approach 
b~, Austria to the Comnw·l  j\J<Jrket.  In a  radio and television broadcast on the 
eve o±  his departure,  he pu1  forward the Russian view that any arrangement 
with ~he ELC "-()uld result in Austria's being bound not only by economic but 
also by certain political obligations; this \V01.1ld  amount to a departure from the 
Austrian State Treaty and I''Om the course of neutrality.  This out-of-hand 
rejection of any form of arrang-ement ,,·itb  l.he  Common ::\larket  aroused all 
the more r<: sc•1tmuai  in Vienna because President Podgorny did not even any 
longer lea\.\:'  tht:<  door· 0pen for a trade agreement between Vienna and Brussels. 
Alter Mr. Podgor:1y's departure,  Dr.  Klaus announced at the Carin-
thian Indust  ~·ia1  Conference in Klagenf'Jrt on 24  November 1966 that Austria 
would go on  a~ before seeki.lg an arrangement with the EEC because its very 
existence depended on it.  Austrian exports to the EEC had already dropped 
from 50 to 4:5  per  cent,  and trade with Eastern Ev~·one provided no substitute. 
nr·,  Klaus emphasized that President Podgorny's remarks had altered nothing 
as far as Austl'ia's neg;otiations witb Brussels were concerned.  'We shall 
always.  and wHh great patience,  discuss  the EEC arrangement with the Soviet 
Union,  but wt..'  shall not enter into negotiations with l'viosco\v on the subject. 
The negotiations  are strictlybetween Benssels and Vienna and nobody else.' 
In  an intel'Yiew ',vith the  'Inc1ustrif'knrier' Dr. Klaus repeated that the statements 
- 2  ·-:_t.l  j 
,r  i
that had been made on T. V. and on other occasions by the Russian visitors re-
garding Austria's efforts to reach an agreement with the EEC were devoid of
any intluence.
On 7 December 1966 the EEC Council of Ministers  handed  the EEC
Commission a fresh mandate to negotiate with Austria; this covered  guidel.ines
for tv,'o-way tanff. cuts, trade with the Eastern countries,  and agriculture.
Before the discussions, French Foreign Minister Couve de Murville
had briefed his EEC colleagues on the talks held with Mr. Joncic, theAustrian
Foreign Minister,  when the latter met Mr.' Cbuve de Murville in Paris in the
interval between Mr. Podgornyrs State visit to Austria and Mr. Kosygintsvisit
to Paris. As one of the three signatories to the Austrian State Treaty, Franc€
reminded its EEC partners that in any negotiations with Austria, that coun-
tryts obligations  in respect of neutrality  would have to be considered at every
phase.
The fresh mandate granted to the EEC Commission  was warmly
we1comedinAustrianGovernrnentandindustria1circles.TheA.trstrian
Peoplers  Party, which carries the responsibility  for government, dwelt on thel
fact that France had approved  the mandate; France was the only EECsignatory
to the 1955 Austrian State Treaty and had therefore undertaken to supervise
compliance with the provisions of that treaty, In Government circles it was
underlined that French consent had made it quite clear that the tspecial arrab-
gementr with the EEC which Austria was seeking  was reconcilable with the
State Treatv.
At the end of the first phase of the new rouncl of the Bnrssels nego-
tiations on 16 December 1966, the EEC and Austria conJirmed the need for a
rlarge degree of autonomyt for Austria in developing an independent  commer-
cial policy towards Eastern  Europe in order to restablish  a harmonious devel-'
opryent of tradet with East European countries. The second round of the new
phase of negotiations between the EEC and Austria began in Brussels on
30 January  L967 with a discussion  of agricultural questions. Two-way tariff
reductions, Austriars alignment on the EBC's external tariff and the special
case of Austria's trade with the Eastern countries  were among the subjects
discusseC,
Austria  was prepa..;eci, in the event of a future agreement with the
EEC, to ',dopt the conr.mon externai tai:iff .vithin two 5iears. Once the agree-
ment came into effect Airstria" wrruld bring i.ts external tariff towards non-
member countries clrrser by 25 per cent tu that of the EEC, by a further
'i. ,, ..*1'':t rt  -.










-3-35 per cent a year later,  and by the  remaining 40 per cent in the following 
year.  This proposal was put forward by the Austrian delegation in the round 
of negotiations with the EEC Commission concluded on 2 February 1967. 
Austria is thus prepared to approximate its external tariff towards non-mem-
ber countries to that of the EEC more rapidly than the Community expected. 
The EEC had suggested that the process be spread over a period of three 
years in four stages. 
At this point the  negotiating  mandate  received by the Commission 
from the EEC Council of Ministers therefore expired.  As,  however,  the 
Council of Ministers is already preparing a  'partial mandate' covering ques-
tions of  economic policy,  it appears possible that negotiations will be re-
sumed at a fairly early date. 
Following the end of the second phase of the negotiations and before 
leaving for Vienna,  Dr.  Bock,  Vice-Chancellor and Economics Minister, said 
that he saw no insuperable difficulties in the way of the 'special arrangement' 
sought with the EEC by Austria.  He felt that the will to conclude such an 
arrangement existed in the Community. 
In an address to the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe 
at Strasbourg on 25  January 1967,  Dr.  Bock  said that Austria wished to con-
clude with the European Economic Community an agreement relating purely 
to economic problems.  Austria's permanent neutral status.debarred it from 
sharing in the EEC's political decisions.  Dr.  Bock also mentioned that his 
country would expect to have the right to give notice.  Customs duties between 
Austria and the EEC should be eliminated over a four-year period; Austria 
itself would like to approximate its tariff to the EEC's common tariff over a 
period of two years. 
On  15  December 1966 Austria applied to the ECSC for the speedy 
opening of negotiations on a  special agreement between Austria and that 
Community.  As stated in Vienna,  an agreement with the ECSC would have to 
be concluded alongside of the negotiations for Austria's arrangement with the 
EEC since the EEC Treaty would upset the conditions of competition for 
Austria without simultaneous provision for the products of industries produ-
cing and using iron and steel. 
Austria's interests in the ECSC sector lie mainly in special and 
high-grade steels.  In 1965 about 40  per cent of Austria's iron and steel 
exports went to ECSC  countries from which,  in turn,  it imported some 56 per 
cent of i~ requirements of iron and steel products.  Austria purchased 26 per 
- 4-cent of its hard coal and 53 per cent of its coke on the Community market.  In 
addition,  77 per cent of Austria's total imports of machinery and vehicles 
were from ECSC countries.  Dr.  Bock referred to the ECSC's importance for 
Austria,  reflected in these figures,  in a letter to the ECSC Council of Minis-
ters in which the Austrian Government conveyed its official application for 
the opening of negotiations between Austria and the European Coal and Steel 
Community. 
In an interview with Austrian journalists in May 1967 Dr. Klaus 
explained that the EEC remained the key to integration for Austria,  which 
saw no other way of avoiding discrimination against its external trade. Trade 
with the Eastern countries offered no alternative for Austrian industry. 
Austria,  however,  must realize that events in Brussels would not move as 
rapidly as the Austrian~ imagined.  In further negotiations on the  special 
arrangement with the EEC desired by Austria,  political factors would come 
more and more to the fore. 
2.  Italy vetoes Austrian association with the EEC 
It is a circumstance of great political importance that Italy had 
decided to oppose Austrian association with the ECSC  and the EEC.  This is 
Rome's answer to the outrage at Cima Vallona in which four Italian soldiers 
were killed close to the Austrian border. 
It was realized in Rome that this form of sanction was the one 
Austria feared most of all.  Austria had been asking for association with the 
Common Market for a very long time; its trade and industry and its develop-
ment programme were completely geared to this prospect. 
A section of the Italian press attributed the veto against Austria's 
association with the E esc to an initiative of Mr.  Fanfani,  the Foreign Minis-
ter. 
The Austrian public is greatly dismayed to find that Italy has offi-
cially linked up the problem of South Tyrol with the Austrian request for an 
arrangement with the EEC and ECSC and is trying to exert pressure on 
Vienna via Brussels and Luxembourg.  Vice-Chancellor Bock,  the Minister 
responsible for integration policy,  issued a statement to the effect that up till 
now the attitude on both sides had been that the problem of South Tyrol should 
- 5-have no influence on any other relations between Austria and Italy.  It would 
be a very great pity if any link were established between the reprehensible 
events in the  Sextental and Austria's negotiati0ns with the EEC and the ECSC. 
The Austrian Federal Government is determined to put up strenuous 
resistance to the Italian policy of blocking Austria's negotiations with the EEC 
because of terrorist activities in the South Tyrol.  Austria has fully briefed 
all friendly governments on its attitude in this matter.  Vice-Chancellor Bock 
summoned the Ambassadors of Italy's five EEC partners and argued against 
any link between the South Tyrol problem and Austria's hopes of integration. 
It is understood that it was made plain that Austria would never accept the 
coupling together of these two problems,  which had nothing in common,  and 
that it looked to the Governments of the other five EEC countries to adopt the 
same attitude. 
The Federal Government of Germany continued to maintain a posi-
tive attitude towards Austria's efforts to secure a  special arrangement with 
the EEC.  An assurance to this effect was given to Dr.  Bock by Foreign 
Minister Brandt on 3 July 1967.  Dr.  Bock has asked Mr.  Brandt,  who from 
1 July 1967 had presided over the Council of Ministers of the European Com-
munity,  that negotiations between the EEC and Austria be speeded up.  During 
the conversation,  reference was made to the Italian Government's intention 
to permit a link between Austria and the EEC only if the Government in 
Vienna showed signs of good behaviour on the question  of South Tyrol.  As 
announced by the spokesman of the Federal Foreign Office on 3 July 1967 to 
the press, the Federal Government intends to exchange views with the Italian 
G'Jvernment in the near future.  The fact that the German Foreign Minister 
largely supports Austria's interest in the EEC means,  in the view of political 
observers,  that the Federal Government does not consider the link-up of the 
EEC problem with the South Tyrol question reasonable, 
Asked by Mr.  Ertl (F. D.P.) in the Bundestag whether the Federal 
Government was prepared to support the admission of Austria even if Italy 
applied its veto on the grounds that Austria's conduct in the South Tyrol issue 
was open to criticism,  Mr.  Brandt, the Foreign Minister,  replied that his 
Government would back Austria's application for association with the EEC and 
ECSC to the hilt.  He  expressed the hope that the difficulties raised by the 
Italian statement at the end of June on the incident in South Tyrol and relations 
between Austria and the European Communities would soon be disposed of so 
that negotiations with Vienna could be continued. 
Since the visit of Mr.  Pompidou,  the French Prime Minister,  to 
Vienna iR  mid-September,  Austrian ideas about the course of integration, 
- 6-long entertained by the public in Austria and carefully nu,rtured by Dr. Klaus' 
Government, had become somewhat irresolute.  What the repeated attacks 
from Moscow and the Italjan veto had not achieved,  the marked reserve dis-
played by Mr.  Pompidou to Austria's hopes of integration had jn part brought 
about.  The Austrian public had had to admit that it had underestimated the 
obstacles standing in the way of a  'special arrangement' between the EEC and 
Austria.  · 
A process of reappraisal has now begun in Austria.  Alternatives to 
such an arrangement are being sought,  or - since these do not present them-
selves - at least intermediate solutions. 
An interesting discussion on integration problems,  in which Dr. Bock 
and Dr.  Kreisky, former Foreign Minister,  took part,  was recently shown on 
Austrian television.  Both these gentlemen had for years backed the integra-
tion policy during the Grand Coalition but today faced each other as bitter op-
ponents.  Dr.  Kreisky called for immediate alternative arrangements from the 
Government.  He  suggested that Austria should first seek a preliminary ar-
rangement with the EEC which,  while leaving all doors open,  would take the 
edge off tariff discrimination against Austrian exports in the EEC.  Kreisky 
still feels that agreements must be entered into in the foreseeable future be-
tween EEC and EFTA countries,  and that these could be bilateral and neednot 
necessarily be regional in character.  This would leave more room for an 
arrangement between Austria and the EEC.  A further step towards the Com-
mon Market could follow as a third stage,  but only if tension in Europe was 
substantially eased. 
In his reply,  the Austrian Chancellor stated that the 'special arran-
gement' with the EEC sought by Austria was the bare minimum of anything 
approaching integration.  A great deal had been achieved in the Brussels nego-
ciations and it would be wrong to allow this to be jeopardized by the political 
difficulties that always arose in international negotiations.  Austria. should 
follow the example of Britain which was not allowing itself to be put off by 
France's negative attitude. 
(Die Welt,  12 and 22  November 1966,  4 February 1967; 
Le Monde,  13/14 November 1966,  5/6 February 1967,  29  June 1967; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  16,  17  and 26  November 1966, 
3 February 1967,  29  June 1967,  5 July 1967,8August 1967; 
Combat,  17  November 1966; 
Industriekurier,  6 December 1966; 
Neue  ZUrcher Zeitung,  13  December 1966; 
Europa No.  1,  15 January 1967) 
- 7-Belgium 
1.  The celebration of the Tenth Anniversary of the Treaties of Rome 
On 24  May 196 7,  Mr.  Radoux {Socialist) addressed two urgent ques-
tions to the Prime Minis.ter and to the Minister for Foreign Affairs. 
a)  'Are they determined to take advantage of the opportunity of the Rome 
summit meeting to propose that a vigorous effort be made to bring about 
a monetary union and a  common policy for energy, these being essential 
to the establishment of the European Economic Union ? ' 
b)  'Is the Belgian Government determined to propose that the quarterly meet-
ings of the Foreign Ministers,  which were discontinued at the beginning of 
1961,  should be resumed, without prejudice to improving the consultation 
arrangements on the Western European Union ? ' 
In reply to the first question,  Mr.  Harmel,  Foreign Minister, 
stated: 'It goes without saying that on this occasion every member State, or 
at least Belgium,  will indicate what further steps appear to them to be neces-
sary and possible, particularly in the economic sphere, to which you referred 
by mentioning energy, transport, taxation,  company law, monetary problems 
and in short the whole range of questions that are on the drawing board but in 
relation to some of which progress is slow.' 
From Mr.  Harmel's reply to the second question, the following 
passage may be quoted: 'We believe that this unification of foreign policies 
-and our views in this matter are certainly the same -must be effected with-
in the Treaty framework and with all our partners.  The normal context for 
progress with regard to the political Europe is the Treaty of Rome because 
this Treaty established the setting - which is not a political one - for the 
construction of Europe. 
This being the case, we believe that this political unification is the 
final stage and that one important aspect of it is the integration of foreign 
policies.  This does not mean it must necessarily be regarded as remote. It 
is our intention that it should be as close as possible,  but it is the final stage, 
as I was saying,  in European integration. 
- 8  -On this long road, this road of Euro· ean integration - which seems 
to several of us to have been so long already - we believe'  that it would be de-
sirable at the Rome meeting for the Foreign Ministers to be asked at least to 
determine,  at subsequent meetings,  how discussions between them might lead 
to a greater harmony between the policies of the member States. 
We believe that informal meetings can be of great value.  We believe 
that if we wish to give a  certain solidity to the means employed in unifying 
foreign policies, the Foreign Ministers should begin by discussing hovv uni-
fying foreign policies can be made to progress in an organic manner and we 
believe that this would be a valuable point for discussion at their future meet-
ings.' 
(Chamber of Representatives,  Parliamentary Records, Session of 24 May 196 7) 
A month later, on 29 June 1967,  Mr.  Moreau de Melen (Christian 
Democrat) put an oral question to Mr.  Harmel concerning what was said at the 
Rome meeting.  Indeed the Belgian Senator referred to the official Gazette of 
the French Republic,  quoting the reply of Mr. Couve de Murville to Mr. Pleven; 
this called into question the attitude of Belgium.  The French Minister stated, 
inter alia,  in the  National Assembly : 
'I am sorry that Mr.  Pleven was not present at the Rome meeting; 
perhaps he would  have been convinced after hearing the statements made by my 
Dutch and Belgian colleagues : in reality these countries do not want political 
co-operation.  They do not want it because they fear it for the very reason which 
Mr.  Pleven gave and that is the fear of being obliged to fall into line with the 
opinion of powers greater than they are.  So  they take cover behind the United 
Kingdom.  This it,  in fact,  invoked as an alibi for refusing to make a start on 
this political co-operation and we are told : accept the United Kingdom and the 
political Europe will become possible. ' 
The Belgian Foreign Minister thanked the Senator for giving him this 
opportunity of giving a precise definition of Belgium's attitude: 
a)  ; The Belgian Government is deeply attached to the ideal of political uni-
fication and would support any move which would make it practically pos-
sible to ach]eve this end. ' 
b)  'Would this co-operation which would spring from the initiative of the six 
Governments be open to other States? We would add in this connexion that 
without prejudice to the accession to the Rome Treaty  of those countl'ies 
- 9-which have recently made their applications,  we feel it is necessary to 
have prior consultations with them on these matters,  so that they should 
not subsequently find themselves a party to political deliberation arrange-
ments - for which there is, furthermore,  no provision in the Treaty of 
Rome - which they would subsequently be obliged to accept simply because 
they had acceded to this Treaty. ' 
c)  'How would such deliberations be prepared ?  Who would take the chair ? 
Would there be a permanent Secretariat or not ?  These are procedural 
questions that require to be answered. ' 
Lastly,  with reference to enlarging the Economic Community, 
Mr.  Harmel stated :  'Europe will continue to be incomplete if it does not in-
clude the United Kingdom which appears to us to have been one of the "original" 
instruments of Europe . . . .  this, because of its parliamentary tradition and 
its geographic position in the world.  This concept, however,  does not mean 
that we cannot look into political co-operation on the present bases on the 
conditions to which I have referred . . . .  we believe that it will only be pos-
sible to build a political Europe by recourse to the method of Community 
endeavour and deliberations.  This Community concept implies that we should 
have the greatest respect for one another,  whatever the size of our country, 
and that there is no tendency for any one State to be predominant in these in-
stitutions - this will certainly not be the case as regards Belgium and I hope 
it will not be the case for any other country'. 
(Senate,  Parliamentary Records,  Session of 29 June 1967) 
Mr.  Tindemans (Christian Democrat) addressed an oral question to 
the Government to ask what was its position with reference to the crisis in the 
European Atomic Energy Community, particularly with reference to its budget 
In his view 'energy supplies and the cost price of these will become an in-
creasingly decisive factor in the economy.  Events in the Middle East have 
clearly shown how much Europe depends on oil.  This vulnerability can only be 
overcome by developing the other sources of energy and,  for the future,  by 
generalizing thL  industrial applications of nuclear energy' . 
- 10 -In reply Mr.  De Clercq,  Deputy Pri  l'Yle  Minister and Minister. for 
the Budget,  replied : 'It is true that Euratom is at present in a critical situ-
ation.  Belgium has put forward several compromise proposals but unfortuna-
tely there has been no favourable sequel to the.se so far; they were designed 
to resolve the whole problem of Euratom's budget for 1967 and at the same 
time to allow for a start to be made on drawing up Euratom's future program-
me. 
We  have to admit that,  in future,  the position of nuclear energy 
will no longer be something that can be dealt with separately from the other 
energy sectors,  such as coal,  gas and oil.  As the honourable member so 
rightly stressed,  recent efforts in the near east have shown how far the eco-
nomy of Western Europe depends at present on oil resources. 
We  can only hope that the merger of the Executives (on 1 July) will 
enable us to revive the Community spirit so that it may be possible to achieve 
a comprehensive energy policy which will allow Europe to determine its eco-
nomic future itself.  We  cannot,  however,  fail to recognize that the realiza-
tion of an independent European policy for energy will oblige the member Sta-
tes to make major sacrifices to acquire the basic raw materials.' 
(Chamber of Representatives,  Summary of Proceedings,  Session of 22  June 
1967) 
On  16  May 1967 Mr.  Perin (Walloon Party) put a question to 
Mr.  Vanden Boeynants,  Prime Minister,  on the treaty on the non-prolifera-
tion of nuclear weapons.  When Mr.  Humphrey,  Vice-President of the United 
States of America,  visited Belgium,  the Prime Minister was thought to have 
spoken of almost complete agreement between the viewpoints of the two coun-
tries on this issue.  Mr.  Perin could not accept that Belgium should assume 
an attitude of resignation with regard to the power of the USA.  The treaty 
could only be prejudicial to its economic development and to its technological 
future. 
The Prime Minister replied : ' .......... I am glad to hear you 
say that pacifism must not mean stupidity.  I must make it clear that the 
treaty concerns the use of nuclear weapons and does not cover the peaceful 
use of nuclear energy.  The Americans and the Belgians were furthermore in 
- 11-agreement concerning the need to set up international control on all sides,  so 
that the states signing the treaty could not subsequently get out of their obli-
gations.  Lastly.  wh::tt  is of capital importance is to ensure that nuclear disar-
mament  c~oeP not - using control as a  pretext - curtail the economic potential 
and the production pot~ntial of the European countries.  We  stated this formal-
l~· :md with the greatest clarity. 
Moreover,  we formally stated that as regards Belgium and Europe, 
we had decided t!1at  the prerogatives of Euratom and the nuclear development 
of Europe could not be prejudiced. 
\\'e  s~-..id that we did not wish to be reduced to begging either for in-
formation or for assistance from the two great powers.  1\Ir.  Humphrey gave 
an assu·ance that the supplies of nuclear fuels would be maintained and that 
i.i1is  would go through Euratom,  thus quickening the pace of its operation .....  ' 
(Chamber of li,eprcsentatives, Summary of Proceedings, Session of 16 May 1967) 
_Ibe Belgian Government and the United Kingdom application for 
_!Ut.:mbership of the European Communit\' 
Speaking for the Belgian Government.  ·which met' in Council on 
19 May 1967.  i~Ir.  Vanden Boeynants,  Prime :\Hnister.  told the press about 
the position uf Belgium concerning the request for accession submitted by 
several countries to the European Community 
'With the forthcoming summit conference in Rome in prospect,  the 
Council dise:ussed the applications for membership of the European Communi-
ties submitted by the United Kingdom.  Ireland and Denmark. 
The Belgian position with reference to these applications is well 
known : the Government is making ever~- effort,  in conjunction with its part-
ners,  to bring about the creation of a  Europe which is strong,  which has a 
solid structure and which is based on solid institutions. 
In so far as the essential conclitions are respected.  the Council is 
in favour of enlarging the Community in compliance with the terms of the 
Hum':'  1~re~1ty.  It considers that.  bearing in mind the statements made by the 
- 12  -Heads of these Governments.  particularly Mr.  \Vilson,  the conditions obtain 
for initiating negotiations.  For its part.  the Belgian Government will parJici-
pate in the firm resolve of finding  Communit~r solutions to the difficnlties 
arising.' 
(Le Soir,  20 May 1967) 
3.  Statement bv Mr.  Harmel on Britain's application for u_ccession to 
the Common l\'Iarket 
In a  statement to a  French Ne\vspaper.  }Ir.  Harmel,  Belgian 
Foreign Minister,  explained Belgium's attitude to Britain's application lor 
accession to the Common Market.  In his view.  this application had tq iw .seell 
in relation to the fresh efforts that had rleen made to unite the E E C  member 
states politically :  the Six ought therefore not to begin tr~'iug,  in an 
underhand manner,  to create a  political union only :1  fe\V  moments after london 
has made known its desire to sign the Treaties which founded tbe European 
Communities.  A  resumption between the Six of the talks on the subject, wb.ich 
were broken off in April 1962, could not take place - this is the leaF:t  we  can 
do - without talks being engnged with the British at the same time. · 
The Belgian Minister was in favour of BritiRll accession fn1·  several 
reasons 
a)  the EuropeanCommunityis open.  The countries which f<yt::cJed  thls 
Community expressed their desire - at the outset - to 1rekome 
other European countries to their nnmher.  The possib1 e  enlarge-
ment of the Community therefore raises no new political issue: 
b)  the Europe of the Six is liable to become too smaH  ]~ onP  of ii:-: 
members tends.  by the action iL takes to carve out for itself ;J  ~Fe­
dominant position and if another endeavours to .to11uw  Hs example: 
c)  it would be almost incomprehensible if the United Kingdom,  \\ hich 
ls drawn both to the Cnited States and to Europe.  were tiwown back 
from the latter to t!1e  former: 
d)  the economic and social situation in the TJnitcd Kingdom cannot be ...tsed 
as an argument for rejr.;cting its applicatinn. 17 years ago such ;tn al·-
gument \Vould have made it impossible to create the Commmlit\· Europe. Mr.  Harmel, therefore, felt that talks should be initiated.  He could 
not accept the argument, based on Article 237 of the EEC Treaty, that the 
opinion which the Commission had to express at the request of the Council 
should necessarily precede the opening of negotiations which  would then be 
decided upon by the Council. If they were placed in such a  situation, the Com-
mission and the Council would not be able to pronounce with a full knowledge 
of the facts or give a reasoned opinion.  It would be preferable for the  Com-
mission's Opinion and the Council's Decision to come at the end of the  nego-
tiations.  Under the Treaty, the member States had a 'legal obligation' to begin 
negotiations the moment an application was made,  in so far as the States 
applying, 
1.  accepted the ultimate political objective of European unification laid 
down in the Treaty of Rome, 
2.  endorsed what had already been achieved without calling into ques-
tion the guiding principles underlying the regulations and decisions 
that had come into force,  and 
3.  accepted the Community institutions. 
(Le Monde,  25-26 June 1967) 
- 14  -France 
1.  Statements by General de Gaulle on European problems 
a)  at his press conference on 16 May 1967 
' ••• It is not the first time, it is the third time that the six States 
of the European Community are to hold a summit meeting.  At the instance of 
France, summit meetings were held in Paris and then in Bonn in 1961. At that 
time our view was that since the Six had been able to organize their economy; 
to begin to organize their economy, it was conceivable that they would agree 
to make arrangements between themselves to make a start on political co-op-
eration.  It is also well known that this attempt was unsuccessful because our 
partners as a whole did not at that time envisage that Europe could exist on 
its own or that it could deal with questions concerning defence and politics 
outside the NATO framework,  that is to say, independently of the United States 
and the United Kingdom. 
Now the Italian Government has taken the initiative to bring together 
in Rome the six Heads of State or Government, firstly to celebrate the tenth 
anniversary of the Treaty of Rome and also to discuss subjects they will 
choose,  including political issues.  France will go  willingly to Rome. 
I will not of course prejudice what might be dealt with at this sum-
mit meeting; I would simply say that it would appear that an impression of 
solidarity between the Six has for some time now been emerging.  I am speak-
ing of the solidarity vis-:1-vis the world at large.  This stems perhaps partly 
from the large-scale tariff confrontation which finished last night and at which 
an agreement was reached by reciprocal concessions and which showed that 
the Atlantic States, the most Atlantic States, I mean the United States, the 
United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries, have interests which differ 
essentially from those of the continentals. 
This was perhaps also due to the very strong pressure which the 
Americans and the British brought to bear on Europe to accept the creation of 
artificial monetary reserves, which were described as liquidities, at the ex-
pense of Europe and to the benefit of the Anglo-Saxon deficit balances. 
- 15 -These liquidities would in fact no longer have to be backed by gold 
and would constitute a new source of inflation and of inexhaustible inflation 
which add to that which already stems from arbitrary and excessive issues and 
exports of dollars under the cover of the Gold Exchange Standard.  Lastly this 
strengthening of the European spirit among the Six  stems perhaps  also from 
the threat with which they are faced in the technological sphere from the 
s\veeping advance of the Americans. 
Yet it is above all in the political sphere to be seen of course in 
conjunction with defence that the attitude of the United States,  supported by 
the British, has shown the Six what purely European reason they could find 
for acting together whether in regard to Europe's security or easing tension 
or to finding an agreement and in co-operation \Vith  the East European coun-
tries so as to open the door to a  settlement of the German problem.  Or again 
in regard to the war vvhich is ravaging and getting worse in Asia or again to 
the assistance to be given to the third world by the developed countries etc. 
In short, it would appear that a favourable juncture for new and, if 
I may say so, less formal contacts, has now been reached between the Si~. 
France will once again willingly accept the invitation to  go to Rome 1vhile 
fully understanding just up to what point and for what reason the clear truths 
and realities with which we are faced may still appear to be complex and eli-
verse to each of the partner States. 
I would now like to reply to you on the question of the United King-
dom in relation to the Common Market. 
You asked me this question some months ago. Well,  nO\\' I am going 
to tell you what I think.  Naturally I  should not like to prejudge what might pos-
sibly - I say possibly - ensue in regard to negotiations.  I am not referring to 
this, I am simply referring now to general ideas and to an overall review of the 
subject.  And I believe it is necessary to make things clear.  I should like to 
begin by saying that the trend in the United Kingdom which appears to be im-
pelling it to form links with Europe instead of keeping well a'\·ay,  is one that 
can  onl~· satisfy France; and this is why we note sympathetically 1dwt W'Juid 
appear to indicate the intention  manifested by and the approac.i-: macle bv the 
British Government. 
For our part, there could be no  question of ::1  veto; nor has there 
e'·E-r been any question of a veto. It is simply a matter of deciding whether a 
successful conclusion is possible within the framework and under the  ~ondi­
tions ot. the present Common Market without introducing a destructi,Tc distur-
bance.  Or else under what other conditions and in what other case this COltlcl 
- 16  -be so.  Unless 1vc  al'C'  '\.·ming to safeguard what has just been built until one 
day it appears concei rahle to welcome a Uuitecl Kingdom ·which had for its part 
and on its own account undero;one a  profound transformation. 
I have referred to destructive disturbances in the Common Market, 
We all know that a ten year gestation period has been necess:.try Lo  build it and 
that it has required a sustained effort in the field of co-operation on the part 
of the Six.  No  one has forgotten how critical for example the cliscusssions 
were which resulted ir..  the agricultural community,  for indeed, it was not just 
a qu.estion of the Treaty of Hume; it was above all a matter of adding a  great 
many regulations to the  Tre~Lty wtlich involved a  scrupulous babnce between 
the various interests of the member States. 
\Vith reference to the agricult1.1ral community,  an extraordinary 
adjustment '.\as made which affected production, prices, trade, financial con-
ditions,  etc.  Then again,  thE'  SL-x  have not completed their construction v:ork 
for they now have to deal \dch some very tough problems: en•-:·rgy,  taxation, 
social charges, transport,  etc.  And then,  when they have completely con-
structed the edifice they must live together, that is to say, that from year to 
year they will submit to the regulations,  compromises,  and sanctions which 
are and which will be established.  In short, the Common Market constitutes 
a kind of prodigy. 
To introduce,  at this stage, massive and new factors into the mjdst 
of those that we have had such difficulty in bringing into unison, would obvious-
ly be calling into question '1oth  the whole and the details and it would raise the 
problem of a totally differ-ent enterpris0. If it has been possible to build this 
famous edifice,  it is because the countries involved were continental States 
which were the immediate nei9:hbours of each other, which were different 
from each other in size but whicL were complementary in the structure of 
their economy and ~vhose territories together formed a  compact geographic 
and strategic whole. 
It should be added that despite and perhaps because of their great 
battles of former times -I am natural]y speaking mainly of France and 
Germany - they came to give each other mutual support instead of opposing 
each other.  They realized, they also realize now, the potential of their material 
means  ~'nd th~ir lm:man ya1 ue and they all wish at every level,  that they may 
one day tc,gdhrr et,n;;-;i:\_.lttu  :J.  factor 1vhieh could be a balance to any other 
power j·· th  ·sort.-•. 
In con~nlst to the reasons which led the Six t0 organize their G'.m 
group) it is very easy to understand t:he  reasons why the United Kingdom, 
- 17 -which is not continental, and which, because of its Commonwealth and its own 
insularity, is committed beyond the seas, and which is linked with the United 
States by all sorts of special agreements,  should not have been able to merge 
with a  community of definite dimensions anrl strict regulations. 
As the Community began to get organized we saw that the United 
Kingdom was refusing to be a party to it,  even assuming a hostile attitude be-
cause it thought that it constituted an economic and political threat.  Subse-
quently,  the British Government endeavoured to negotiate membership of the 
Community but under conditions such that the Community would have been 
smothered by Britain's accession. 
Subsequently another British Government stated that it no longer 
wanted to enter into the Community and endeavoured to strengthen its links 
with the Commonwealth and with the other countries grouped with it in a free 
trade area. 
Now the United Kingdom appears to be in a different state of mind 
and states its reaqiness to subscribe to the Treaty of Rome, provided it is 
accorded exeptional and very eA.-tended time-limits and that essential changes 
be made in its application as far as Britain is concerned. 
There are many reasons for thinking that to reach this end the ob-
stacles to be overcome are formidable,  as was indeed the view stated by the 
British Prime Minister, because of his profound experience and great perspi-
cacity. 
Thus, it is for the agricultural regulations.  It is  well known that 
these regulations are designed to ensure that the Community feeds off what it 
produces and to compensate by what are known as financial levies, the advan-
tage that one or other might gain by importing cheaper foodstuffs from else-
where.  Now the United Kingdom is to a large extent - to a very large extent -
supplied with food which it buys cheaply everywhere in the world and particu-
larly in the Commonwealth. If it were to submit to the regulations of the Six, 
its balance of payments would be shattered by levies and it would be obliged 
at home to increase the price of foodstuffs to the price level adopted by the 
Six and it would therefore be obliged to increase the wages of its workers and 
to sell its products at correspondingly higher prices with correspondingly 
greater difficulty. 
Obviously,  Britain cannot do this but to bring Britain into the Com-
munity without its being obliged to accept the agricultural dispensations of the Six 
-- 18 -would be to destroy this regulation,  to shatter it completely; and consequently 
lt would be disrupting the balance of the whole Common Market.  As far as 
France is concerned, this would take away one of her main reasons for be-
Jonging to it. 
Another essential difficulty stems from the fact that in Britain the 
rule is that capital should  circulate freely to promote expansion.  How could 
this problem be solved? How could the United Kingdom abolish the locks which 
stem the outflow,  the movement of capital out of Britain and conversely how 
could the Six bring into their organization a partner which would be isolated 
in such an exhorbitant system? How indeed is it not possible to see up to what 
point and for what reasons the position of the pound sterling alone prevents 
the Common Market from incorporating the United Kingdom? Indeed,  if the 
Six abolish all trade barriers, this will naturally imply that their currencies 
shall have a  constant relative value and that if one of these currencies were 
threatened, the Community would re-establish it at once.  But this is only pos-
sible because the European currencies are in a solid position. 
Without t.:1ere being any need to despair about the pound holding its 
own, the fact is there will be no assurance, for a long time to come, that it 
will do so.  There is even less of an assurance to be found in the fact that in 
relation to the curreLcies of the Six,  its special feature is that it is a reserve 
currency which means that an enormous number of countries in the world and 
notably the Commonwealth hold enormous credit balances in sterling. 
How should we approach this subj8ct? I know that it is sometimes 
said that a distinction can be made between the position of the pound as a 
national currency and that of the pound as an international currency. It is 
sometimes also said that once the United Kingdom,with the pound sterling, 
were in the organization,  the Cmnmunity would not be obliged to answer for 
what happened to its currency.  This cannot be taken seriously.  Monetary soli-
darity is one of the essential rules, one of the essential conditions of the Com-
mon Market. It cannot be extenJ~?d to our neighbours across the Channel un-
less one day the pound sterling is in quite a different situation in which its de-
fined value appears secure, unless it ceases to be a reserve currency and un-
less the debit sterling balances of the United Kingdom within the sterling area 
are liquidated. 
But vhe.n Jni.now will this co~e  to be the case? What is true at present 
from tht:.:  ..:cm1omic standpoint could also come to applv politically.  The idea , 
the hope \v hich no doubt led Europeans to c;r it-) was the idea,  ~he  hope of constitut-
ing an entity whicn would be Euro1·.c·:ln  from every point r,f -,rj ew, that is to say~ 
that it would not only carry its own weight: jn Lerrn2 of trade and production, hut 
'V0uld also be able politically to act  for itself  and by itself in rolation to ~n  come.cs. 
- 19 -In view of the: special relationship between Britain and the United States and 
its dependencies and the resulting benefits for them and in Yiew of the existence 
of tho  C0m1~:onwealth and Britain'::: privileged relationship with it,  and since 
the British still assume or bclimTe they must assume special obligations in 
various :::n"us  of the world,  whicb is where they are fundame11c,:lly different 
from rhe concinentals,  it is easy to see ho'.V  the policy of the Six,  on  condition 
that t!1ey k-..,-e  c,ne,  could in certain cases,  in many cases, be associated with 
that of the Bdtish. But it is not possible at all to see how the one policy could 
become identified with the other. 
Lastly,  it is true that the British - aud this is quite natural - en  vis-
age that their participation in tbe Community would have tho effect of inducing 
the EEC gradually to become something quite different from what it is at 
present.  And in fact when their representatives were seated in the directing 
bodies, the Council of Ministers, the Council of Deputies,  the Committees, 
the Assembl)",  representing in its ranks the wbole range of economic obliga-
tion.s  'lncl  intr::rests and the policy of their O\vn  countries; i£ the United Kingdom 
·.\ ·: l'1..  immediately joined within this context by the delegation~ from a certain 
numi ,er of other countries which ::tre \Vith  Britain in the free trade area, and 
'"·.rhic:h had an equivalent status in terms of numbers and influence,  as soon as this 
came ::tbout, it goes without saying that the inspiration, the dimensions and the de-
ci:3i01ls of ,.-l~.1.L is today the Community of the Si.'\:  would g·i.ve  way  Lo  a comple-
tely clifferer:~. inspiration and to competely different dimensions and decisions, 
T~Je British furthermore do  not conceal the fact that if they were in 
the Community tLcy would emteavour to obtain changes, particularly in agri-
Clllture.  But t1le  c011clitions under  which France is at present in the Common 
M:'l.rk~t,  botL a;; ns:ucls its industry,  its agriculture,  its trade,  its currency 
and  1a.nn~,- its policy,  woulcl11C8T  no relation to those it would find in the new 
or·:;m·,ization to which 1 :1m  referri11g . 
In fact it \\·onlcl appear that the position uf the British in relation to 
the Sb:  - if one envl.3aged changing it!  if one were in agreement in enYisaging 
changing- would iEvolve, for both sides,  one or other of tb1·ee arrangements. 
Either one could accept the United Kingdom's accession with all the 
exceptions that would be hound to accompany it, with the introduction of new 
factors both in kind and number that this would inevHably imply and with the 
participation of l1f'\V States ·which would certainly be a  corollary to this -this 
vvoulct  ln fact ec•,r.pel  ',lS  to construct :1  quite ne\\' edifice ::mel  raze what has just 
been built.  Vv'hnt  then ·would be the end result,  if not perhaps the creation of a 
free trade area of Western Eurnpe,  pending an Atlantic area which would de-
prh·e o~T continent of i.ts  mvn  persc·n~1  ity; 
..  20  -Or else, we could create between the Community on the one h~md 
and the British and the EFTA States on the other, an association system for 
which,  furthermore, provision is made in the Treaty of Rome which would 
multiply and facilitate the economic relations between the contracting parties. 
Or else we could wait,  in order to change the present state of af-
fairs,  until the internal and external development of which the United Kingdom 
appears to be showing signs is b-rought to its conclusion.  In other words,  when 
this great people which is so magnificently endowed in fact with ability and 
courage, has accomplished by itself and for its own account the profound po-
litical and economic transformation which \Vould  enable it to join the Sb: on 
the continent. 
I believe that this is what is wanted by many of those who would like 
to see Europe acquire its natural dimensions and who have the profound ad-
miration and sincere friendship for the United Kingdom. If one day this stage 
were reached, how wholeheartedly France would welcome this historic con-
version. 1 
(Le Figaro,  18  May 196 7) 
b)  in his speech of 10 August 1967 
1  However powerful may be the attraction which the United States 
has for Europeans, our work is to ensure that the Community 'Jf the Six be-
comes for its part on its own account a political reality and hence an essen-
tial factor in a peaceful international balance. 
. . .  The fact that France, without in any way repudiating its friend-
ship for the Anglo-Saxon nations,  but throwing aside the out-of  -date and absurd 
conformism of standing back,  is assuming a strictly French attitude about the 
war in Vietnam, or the conflict of the Middle East, or the construction of a 
Europe that is European or of the upheavals for the Community of the Six fol-
lowing the accession of the United Kingdom and four or five other States, or 
relations with the East European countries, or the international monetary 
que&tion or -no later than yesterday - the unanimous and indescribable de-
termination to be free expressed by the French people in Canada around the 
President of the French Republic, stupefies and angers the apostles of decline. ' 
(Le Figaro,  11 August 1967) 
- 21 -c)  to the Polish Diet on 11 September 1967 
'  It is our conviction that Poland must be for us a partner of the 
first water in the great world game of the second half of this century, where 
what is at stake is either peace and progress for all or war and complete de-
struction. 
It is first of all  the case, naturally enough,  in Europe where eve-
rything induces Poland and France to concert their respective efforts with a 
view to security -their own and that of others.  Yet true security for each 
State in our continent is obviously not going to he the result with two armed 
blocs facing each other or when there is a  confrontation between rival pacts. 
On the contrary, let there be between all of us, from the Atlantic to the Urals, 
a deliberate policy and practice of detente, understanding and co-operation 
for then there would be a chance for everyone, under the new conditions and 
in the new atmosphere that would ensue, for every one of the European peoples 
jointly to tackle and themselves to settle the questions that concern them, the 
main one of which is the future of the German people. 
France which like Poland is a neighbour of this great country, and 
which has throughout history and particularly in this century,  greatly suffered 
as a result of German ambitions,  should however undertake,  following the 
collapse of the Reich and now that Germany condemns its misdeeds, to have a 
frank relationship of reconciliation with its neighbour beyon,d the Rhine.  At 
the same time, it is endeavouring to consolidate its friendly and constructive 
contacts in every sphere with the East and Central European States as it has 
done with those of Western Europe.  Is it not reasonable to hope that gradually 
a  European order is gradually coming into being for the common security, in-
volving all the countries of the continent and guaranteed jointly by them all? 
Yet to achieve such an objective must not Poland and France take the road 
leading to this goal side by side? 
After all a  Europe that was no longer divided • • • •  what an influence 
it would be able to exert to uphold and maintain peace in every part of the 
world. If there were a war in Asia, if there were one in the East,  if our con-
tinent had organized its co-operation •••  As for the impetus which our conti-
nent, if it were united,  would be able to impart to the economic,  technological 
and scientific progress of the whole human race and as for the assistance to 
the development of peoples that stand in need, it only remains for our two 
countries, by concerting their efforts in these fields,  to give the lead. 
·  To provide a  reciprocal support in their national development,  to 
contribute to the union of Europe, to promote peace and progress for al1  man-
- 22-kind,  it would seem that fate is offering Poland and France a unique opportuni-
ty for joint action.  Ladies and Gentlemen, we,  the French, are ready to take 
such action with you, the Polish. ' 
(Le Monde,  12 September 1967) 
2. 
a) 
Debates in the French Parliament on the Government's policy with 
regard to the Common Market 
The National Assembly 
During the debate on the Government's policy, which took place in 
the National Assembly on 20 April, several speakers raised the question of 
Europe. 
Mr.  Jean de Lipkowski (Union for the New Republic) was the first 
to make a major  speech,  stressing in particular that as regards foreign poli-
cy the disagreement between the majority and the opposition was,  to a large 
extent, based on a false controversy. 
Are we going,  with reference to Europe,  to continue to clash during 
this session over problems that no longer exist, he asked? To build the Com-
mon Market or not to do so? Ten years after the signature of the Treaty of 
Rome,  the construction of Europe has progressed further than its initiators 
predicted.  Ten years ago Mr.  Giscard d' Estaing spoke in support of the Trea-
ty but asked that an economic and financial recovery policy be applied as a 
matter  of urgency.  Mr.  Mendes France ( •••••• ) said that France could not 
implement the Common Market at the date laid down.  Yes, it may be said, but 
there is Europe and Europe and you have compromised that which gave the 
enterprise its real meaning, that is to say that you have ended by braking up 
the machinery by impairing the principle of integration.  This criticism is 
without foundation. 
Now  Europe has reached a point of no return at the level of economic 
integration, the cement for which is the common agricultural market.  Commu-
nity solidarity exists. It has already manifested itself, As time goes by the 
question that will arise to an increasing extent will be whether we wish to 
create a  Europe of responsibilities ••••• ' 
- 23-The path of the agricultural Europe leads to such an overlapping of 
interests that the freedom of manoeuvre of governments is bound to get smal-
ler. 
But to record the progress made by the economic Europe should not 
lead us to evade its natural extension, that is to say the problem of political 
Europe. 
Mr.  Bernard Destremau (Independent Republican) then took the 
floor to speak of the political construction of Europe.  He said: 
'I \vould recall that in 1961,  at a time when the economic construc-
tion of Europe was a long way from having the stability that it has today,  the 
French Government was already beginning to try and find the appropriate 
framework for its political construction ••••• 
The recent rapprochement between the six European powers, with 
reference to certain diagnostics and certain orientations,  should induce us to 
resume talks on political Europe. It would in fact be neither logical nor appro-
priate for us, after  acce  :~[
1:ing with the economic Europe, to put the brake 
on the political Europe by '-'L'-r  silence, our passive attitude,  our lack of con-
viction ••••• 
It is also desirable,  and this is as true for our partners as for our-
selves, not to use the entry of the United Kingdom -which is so desirable but 
which is so hesitant - into the European Community as a pretext for postpon-
ing our enterprises. 1 
Lastly Mr.  Paul Balmigere (Communist) asked if 'the Common 
Market has measured up to the promises made to the farmers.  Germany was 
to absorb our agricultural surpluses but it is continuing,  to a large extent,  to 
obtain its supplies from third countries. Italian competition with regard to 
fruits and vegetables is something that no longer needs proving .•••• 
Mr.  Edgar Faure has confirmed to us that it will only be with dif-
ficulty that we shall be able to change existing trade habits and the present 
flow of trade.  This has always been our answer to those who sought to present 
the Common Market to the farmers as "the great chance for French agricul-
ture!!.' 
- 24-In reply,  Mr.  Pompidou,  French Prime Minister, pointed out: 'And 
Europe? Heaven knows that we have been accused of wanting to kill Europe, 
of being the enemies of Europe!  Today even though everyone says he is Euro-
pean - everybody • • • • •  or nearly everybody - it seems that the subject is no 
longer of current interest.  Could it be that the completion of the Common Mall-
ket, the most recent conferences in Brussels and Munich and the announce-
ment of the Rome Conference, have, to some extent, discouraged the critics 
on the point? ' 
(French Official Gazette,  National Assembly Proceedings, 21 April 1967  -
Le Monde,  22 April 196 7) 
b)  The Senate 
On 18 April,  Mr.  Pierre Dumas, Secretary of State, stated in the 
Senate: 'France intends to pursue the construction of Europe and has demon-
strated this by its initiatives, whether it is a  question of finalizing the Eco-
nomic Community, merging the Communities, the action to be taken with re-
gard to harmonizing policies on taxation, energy,  etc  •••••• It was in this 
spirit that the President of the Republic willingly accepted the invitation of 
the Italian Government and will go to Rome • • • • •  This summit meeting of the 
leaders of the six countries should provide an opportunity for a general, frank 
discussion which should make it possible to determine the present prospects 
for political co-operation between the Six.  It is equally true that the economic 
construction and, a fortiori,  the  political construction of the Europe of the 
Six still calls for sustained efforts and a great deal of careful consideration. 1 
The debate on this statement opened on 25 April. 
Mr. Antoine  Courri~re, President of the Socialist Group, was the 
first to speak; he regarded as suspect 'The sudden European fever which the 
Government seems to have caught.  Your  Europe is only that of the nation 
States, that of safes.  The Europe we must have is the Europe of the peoples. 1 
Mr.  Jacques Duclos,  President of the Communist Group,  was the 
next to take the floor. He said that the Common Market was now appearing 'in its 
true light ' bee  ause now unemployment was  1 rightly attributed  to the exacerbated 
competition caused by the opening of customs barriers 
1
•  Mr.  Pinton of the 
- 25  -Democratic Left,  felt that ttH?  EUJ"Ope  \\·ith which l ne Governmeut was satisfied 
wa:s  a  'simple customs union  ;  ·.ve  \fant,  1H~  :suid,  a political union based on 
universal suffrage ', 
A.  different opinion was expressed by  :\Ir.  Bou::.;e:h  (Union for the 
New Republic) who said 'the Europe  arc  cusi:oms union J-,;  advauci11g mo·re 
quickly than the economic uni:m and VJe  regrEt tl1is,  TLe  hunnonizzction of 
fiscal and so-::ial  burdens is still pending,  as ls thr.:  ci.2tlmlion of an en<:;rgy po-
licv,  On these points \'.'f' arc expecting· mucl1 fro111  Ill;..·  1orthcoming Rome meet-
ing ancl \\·e  shall judge the European spirit of our partners by tlle:1· pn1ctical 
p1·oposals. 1 
Replying ve1·y  brietly, 1\Ir.  Bettencourt,  '-;ecTetary of State for 
Foreign Affairs,  couducicc1: 'The Government Y,llll•ltrsue ns task,  its desire 
being to ensure the  prosperity  of all,  the const-ruction of Europe,  a  ntp-
prochemcnt bet\recn people.s and peace.' 
{French Official Gazette, Senate Proceedings,  2.)  Ar11·il  1967; Le Moncle,  27 
April 1967) 
:3.  Extracts from a Government statement U1l  foreign policy 
On 15  June l!:Jtil,  Mr.  Couve cle  1\Iurdllc made a  statement in the 
National Assembly lH1 the Goyernn1ent's foreign polic~·. 
The situation in Europe offers a striking contrast with the 
violence unleashed m Asia,  in the Et1st as  i>.1  the West.  For the first time for 
a long time it is not in our continent that there lies a  risk that the germ of a 
world conflict will :lvpear. 
'It is true that nor all the problems ari  ..;:mg  i"!J tms counexion have 
been resol;;ecl.  There is still at least one of them \Yhose ultimate solution do-
mmates the future of all of us: the German problern,  which others describe as 
the proiJlem of European security,  r>;en if in this respect nothing is settled,  at 
least a jirst step has b<:.'en  taken: it is gener8-lly  ~·2cognized that a  solution can 
only be iound hy  me~tllE, of ~m ~tg;re0mem to be·  di.:;c-uss~cl heely bet\\·een all in-terested parties.  The cold war is in no way tlw right context for the negotia-
tions which v\'ill have to take place one day; the correct context is a  d~tente, 
which we have often said should lead to co-operation and understanding. 
This has been the position taken by the Federal German Government 
since tl1e  constitution of Chanc.;ellor Kiesinger1s  Government.  We  attached im-
pvrt8J1Ce to -thJs  statement which is in line with our own view; we also wel-
~unwd Honn1s deternnnation to try and normalize its relations with all the 
.Last  F~~n·opean countries.  The Government knows that it can only be a ques-
tim.~. of th~: beginmng of a long process.  But it IS important that the process 
.should be s tartelt. 
France sees this as a further reason for pursuing with renewed 
vigour the application of the Franco-German co-operation Treaty of January 
1963.  We have been very pleased at our contacts with Mr.  Kiesinger and Mr. 
B1·andt and we are looking forward with interest to the next meeting,  which 
will  be a :-;ummit meeting, to be held on 12 and 13 July. 
'Such co-operation, if it is based on parallel views concerning in-
teruational realities, is in no way inconsistent,  quite the contrary, with 
.l:<'rance1s policy in its relations with the USSR  and the other East European 
countries; this policy is also to a large extent that of our West European 
partners and it is recognized by them as being the only one that is at once 
desirable and possible. 
It has become commonplace to say that our relations with the East 
European countries are satisfactory and are developing steadily.  In support 
of this ,  there is the evidence of figures,  which are still very inadequate but 
which are growing ail the time,  of our trade and the efforts made with regard 
to teaching and using the French language; lastly there is the complex of com-
mittees and regular meetings which we have instituted with Russia to work to-
gether in every area of industrial, technical and scientific co-operation.  This 
is a  comprehensive operation which will bear fruit in the long-term because 
in fact everything still had to be done or done again; but the start we have 
made holds out serious prospects. 
After the visits made last year by General de Gaulle to the USSR and 
by  Mr.  Kossygu.ine to France, the President of the Republic will go to Poland 
early in the Autumn and a little later to Rumania; these two nations are united 
with France by particularly friendly links in many respects.  The Prime 
- '27  -Minister will, furthermore,  go to Russia in July. It is in this way that we are 
pursuing the contacts which bear witness to the renewal of our relations with 
the East European countries. 
The Common Market as a whole :ls  a success  -----------------------------------------
'The third aspect of our policy in Europe is the European construc-
tion, that is to say the close association, initially at the economic level, of a 
certain number of States of Western Europe. 
For the moment this involves the Common Market, which is on the 
whole a success.  On the eve of the complete opening of the frontiers between 
the Six and the creation of a single agricultural market,  France is beginning 
to realize what a revolutionary cycle it entered into in 1957. 
· · · · ·  The major international tariff negotiations, known as the 
Kennedy  Round,  which have just ended in Geneva will, because of its outcome, 
accelerate the trend towards economic modernization and an eve~increasing 
participation in international trade.  The only condition we had the right to lay 
down -and we did this -was that nothing should be concluded except on a basis 
of strict reciprocity.  On the whole -and this is why the Government gave its 
approval - what was agreed was well balanced; at the same time our sensitive 
production sectors were afforded adequate protection •••• ·This was without 
a doubt a happy outcome with respect to their first steps in international life. 
'It is for me a duty to add that we were represented by a member of 
their Commission,  Mr.  Jean Rey, whose ability, loyalty and hard work were 
to a large extent responsible for the ultimate success.  The Government is hap-
PY  to pay tribute to him in public.  These qualities are not !unrelated to the fact 
that Mr.  Rey was the choice of the six Governments when it came to appoint-
ing the first President of the single Commission which will, on 1 July, take the 
place of the existing Common Market and Euratom Commissions and of the 
High Authority of the Coal and Steel Commtmity. 
Political virtualities 
'How can one explain that these virtualities have not yet led to a 
start being made - I do not even mean in terms of action - but towards a form 
- 28-of organization, even if it were only to involve the consultations and discus-
sions that we outlined six or seven years ago' ••• ? 
Not all the Six have either the same tradi.tions,  the same orienta-
tions, or the same concerns.  France could easily reach an agreement with 
Germany and Italy on the value of trying to define a  European policy and to 
make the necessary arrangements for this purpose.  The Benelux countries 
have the feeling that this is neither possible nor even desirable.  They have 
traditional reservations here and their orientation is much less continental; 
in this they differ from their three main partners.  The fear of becoming in-
volved continues to make their attitude one of doubt if not of negation even 
though,  in the economic field,  all:their interests urge them to associate with 
us as closely as possible.  This is also no doubt why Belgium and the Nether-
lands are among the Six those who consider imperative the accession to the 
Common Market of a  United Kingdom in which many of the views of their own 
policy recur and which they regard as a factor for balance in their favour in 
relation to France and Germany. 
'I come to the problem with which we have been faced since the out-
set, that is to say since the Common Market was founded without the United 
Kingdom because the latter refused to join.  Many things have changed,  not 
only in the judgments of British Governments but also as regards the United 
Kingdom itself ••••• 
The British application raises formidable problems, to use Mr. 
Wilson's expression. In the first place the United Kingdom stands before us 
accompanied by other applicants -Ireland, Denmark and Norway and per-
haps others too.  The entry of this group of countries would make the Commu-
nity into something that is different from what it is now.  The number would on 
its own make the Community much more difficult to manage and it would there-
fore change it into an infinitely looser group.  The much greater diversity of 
interests would make it much more difficult to reconcile them and it would 
give a different turn to what we call the economic harmonizations.  Lastly, 
different political and economic orientations would bring the continental States 
into opposition with the other nations grouped around the United Kingdom.  In 
short, the relatively homogeneous system we have now would be completely 
changed, approximately to that of a free trade area. It would have its own me-
rits but we must recognize that it would be something quite different. 
Secondly there is the question  as to whether,  in the essential 
spheres  1  the policy of the Community can become that of the United Kingdom. 
- 29-f  L: 
,
It is first of ali a question of currency because the sterling area system would
appear difficult to reconcile with the operation of our Common  Market. Then
there is agriculture, for we cannot envisage  any change in the principles or
in the conditions of application  of a policy which constitutes  an essential  factor
in the whole scheme  and which it took so much effort to establish  and lvhich
France would never envisage  allowing to fall into disrepair.
Such are the basic factors which the Six have to study. The United
Kingdom has applied for membership  although in 1961 it simply asked that
discussions  should be'engaged to determine  whether the conditions for possi-
ble membership existed. Hence the procedure laid down in the Treaty of Rome
must be applied: the Council has to decide unanimously what reply shall be
given, after consulting the Commission.This is what we shall do. A first dis-
cussion will be held in Brussels at the Council meeting of 26 June. This will
be continued  and we shall have to ask the opinion of the new Commission  as
soon as it is constituted on 1 JuIy.
Nobody will fail to recognize that it will involve a proloriged and
complicated discussion  and that the decision to be taken by the Six is of great
importance. It is this importance  whieh should induce us to assess with the
greatest  care all the consequences or all the impliiations of our conclusions
t.
(Le Monde, 17 June 1967)
4.  Statement bv Mr. Couve de Murville on 12 September  1967 on
French Radio (ORTFI and on Radio Luxembourg
Summing up the results of General de Gaullets visit to Poland, Mr.
Maurice  Couve de Murville, Foreign Minister, stated, inter alia, in inter-
views on French radio (ORTF) and Radio Luxembourg:
rwith reference  to the German problem, which ic the major issue
in Europe, just as it has been for twenty years, this is not somethingwe  were
going to settle in a few weeks or in a few months. France h.as long since laid
down the conditions for re-unification.  We knew that there were divergencies
of view with the Polish Government just as we knew there were divergencies
with the German Government.  France was not called upon by anyone to bring
the Polish Government round to its point of view. We discussed  the whole range
of problems  arising in connexion with Germany frankly  and unequivoca.!.1y.  Tire
positions  were well-known. We noted once again that these have not changed.
But, maf I repeat, the purpose of this visit was not to change Poland's view-
point within a few days.'
-30-+- ,.rt).:f  I /l;:,J.:t,'a
'France is a friend of Poland and consequentf.y it would iike Poland'
to assert itself as a nation and as a State. This has nothing to do with a rever-
sal of alliances. It considers it normal that those European countries which
have for a long time been bereft of the means of expressing their national per-
sonality  should begin to do so.l
rThis appears  to us to be the beginning of a solution to Europets pro-
blems and it is one of the necessary conditions for agreement for a d6tente,
for co-operation  and finally, it is the main condition for a solution to the
European problem  and in particular the German  problem,  for it is only the
alert a.nd free European peoples which will together be able to achieve sorl€-
thing lasting.  r
(Le Figaro, 13 September 1967)
5.  Extracts from the communiqu6  published follcwing Mr. Pompidours
visit to Vienna
EIIROPE: The two heads of Government rexpressed satisfaetion at
the progress made towards normaLizing and consolidating  East-West relations.
They expressed  their confidence  in the result of the initiatives taken by France
and by Austria towards a d6tente and towards closer co-operation  between all
the countries  of Eur:ope, while respecting their sovereigntyr.
EEC: ?On this occasion Chancellor  Klaus again stressed the impor-
tance that this country attaches to establishing  close economic relations be-
hveen Austria and the Community, while bearing in mind Austriats  permanent-
ly neutral status and the obligations  stemming from its Treaty of State. The
Prime Minister  emphasized  that he understood  the Chancellorts  viewnoint,
bearing in mind the political conditions and the problemsarisingfromAustrid.rs
econornic  situation  and the needs of its development. In this spirit it was agreed
that the two Governments  would keep in close touch on thiS subject .'
(Le Monde, 17 September  1967)
-31 -Federal Republic of Germany 
1 .  The Bundestag discusses European policy 
On 22  February 1967 the German Bundestag discussed the chances 
of enlarging the European Economic Community. The debate arose from a 
question (1) put by the SPD Group in October 1966 on the statements regarding 
the EEC made in Oslo by Dr. Erhard, the former Federal Chancellor. 
Although the SPD regarded the question in that form as already out-of-date, it 
felt it desirable, following the visit of Prime Minister Wilson to Bonn, to hold 
a discussion on the general theme of Europe. 
In addition the Bundestag discussed the motion of the CDU/CSU, 
SPD and FDP Groups concerning the Federal Government's half  -yearly report 
on the activities of the European Community, the Council of Europe and West-
ern European Union (2),  and the written report of the Budget Committee 
(13th Committee) on the SPD Group motion concerning the effects which the 
EEC's arrangements for financing agriculture would have on the Federal 
Budget (3). 
During the debate Foreign Minister Brandt explained that German 
policy aimed at strengthening the unity of the European peoples so as to enable 
Europe to assume its rightful place in the world. The European Economic 
Community - the economic mainstay of European unification - would have to 
be built  up,  consolidated and widened and open its doors to all States that 
accepted this principle. 
Turning to the talks held with Mr. Wilson during his Bonn visit, 
Mr. Brandt stated that the Federal Government would welcome British entry 
into the European Economic Community. The Federal Government was ready 
to put forward this viewpoint in Paris within the context of Franco-German 
relations. Mr. Brandt pointed out, however, that the talks with Prime Minister 
Wilson and Foreign Secretary Brown had not been in the nature ofnegotiations 
but had been of a political and exploratory character. The British Government 
would not arrive at any decisions until after the visits to Holland and Luxem-
(1)  Question involving debate put by the SPD Group on Europeanpolicy, 
Publication V /1042 
(2)  Pub!ication V /1010 
(3)  Publication V /687, V /1383 
- 32  -bourg. Mr. Brandt added that the talks with Mr. Wilson had clearly indicated 
Britain's determination to enter the EEC as an equal partner. Another issue 
was that of transitional arrangements for British agriculture, for which Brit-
ish entry would mean radical changes. 
Mr. Brandt went on to say that the Treaty of 8 Aprill965 settingup 
a single Council and a single Commission of the three European Communities 
had now been ratified by all member Parliaments. The merger of the institu-
tions of the European Communities - which was the aim of that Treaty -would 
make for greater efficiency and already represented a first step towards the 
merger of the Communities. Nevertheless there was a long way to go between 
the merger of the institutions and the merger of the Treaties. The merger 
would, however, help to solve many problems at present facing the Communi-
ties. 
Mr. Apel (SPD) pointed out that the British Government sought full 
membership of the EEC and declined any alternative. The SPD rejected the 
'europeanization' of Britain's foreign and defence policies as a condition for 
its admission into the EEC. Dr. Apel added that it must be possible, given 
sufficient good will,  to smooth the way for Britain's entry. It was certainly 
clear to the British that,  as members of the  European Economic Community, 
they would have to accompany their partners on the road to full political inte-
gration. 
Dr. Apel pointed out that progress in the European Economic Com-
munity had not been uniform. The agricultural market was now almost com-
plete and the 'EEC Customs Union' would be in existence by themiddleof1968. 
So far, however,  no  economic policy instruments existed to ensure that the 
EEC would continue to operate satisfactorily, to organize it and thus shield it 
from critical situations. The absence of a common economic policy had two 
major consequences;  in the first place the EEC would become more prone to 
crises; secondly, distortions in the conditions of competition would be aggra-
vated. Dr. Apel went on to point to the lack of an energy policy, which was 
having an adverse effect on the steel industry and becoming apparent in other 
sectors where it was also tending to distort competition. What was needed was 
not a common external trade policy in the shape of uniform customs legislation. 
The EEC Treaty called rather for an external trade policy covering the stand-
ardization of export aids and of overall export policy,  as well as common 
safeguards against dumping and low-priced imports. In the external trade 
policy field it was also becoming clear to what extent external trade policy 
and foreign policy influenced each other. 
Dr. Apel said that the SPD Group welcomed the fact that the 
Kiesinger/Brandt Government had not in recent months held a discussion on 
- 33  -the ttrue European  creed', on questions of supranationality  or of the 'demo-
cratization' of the Community, or on the upgrading of the EuropeanParliament
but, instead, had discussed ways and means of makingrealprogressinEurope,
Dr, Apel welcomed  the Federal Goyernmentrs intention  to urge on
efforts to merge the three European Executives into a single European
Commission. The merger would bring advantages for Euroire, although it
rvould not automatically solve all problems.  The speed with which Europe
would become integrated  depended  far more on the political readiness  of
member States to shape the new Europe and to take common decisions. Above
all else, it rvas essential to speed up the geographical enlargement  of the EEC
and the adoption of a common  economic policy, so as to impartafreshimpetus
to the European  movement.
Mr. Furler (Christian Democrat)  was glad to see that the new
foreign Ministerts statements on European  policy did not clash with those
made on the subject by the former Federal Government.  He, too, stressed
that the difficulties which Britainrs admission to the EEC would entail were
not insuperable. He drvelt on the importance  of Britain for otherStatesconterrr
plating membership, a fact highlightpd  by the position  taken up by Norway.
He further urged the need for the closest possible  association with Austria
?nd an agreement  between Spain and the EEC. Turning to the merger of the
Executives, he hoped that the first President of the single Commission  would
be Professor Hallstein, Mr. Furler wound up by discussing the problems of
Euratom  and warned against the possible risks of the Treaty of the non-pro-
liferation of nuclear arms.
Dr. Mende, FDP Chairman, spoke of shattered hopes in European
policv, describingthe  Community of the Six as atorso of Europe. Now that
Britain was making its second attempt to enter the EEC, it was not enoughfor
the Governments  to say they would do all in their power to enable it to join.
The Federal  Government ought rather to do its utmost to prevent anewF?ench
veto. Mr. Brandt retorted that the Federal Government could not solve Euro-
pean problems  with resounding statements.  It had'to consider its French
partner; in any case the French Government had notyet said'No'. During his
last visit to Paris he and Foreign Minister Couve de Murville had arranged to
meet again in April when the British Government would hdve concluded its
exploratory talks in the six capitals.
Professor FritzBurgbacher (CDU) called for suitable instruments
for a common short-term economic policy, adding that the Federal Govern:
ment?s short-term economicpolicymeasures  could only be effective from the
external trade point of view if they had been agreed upon with the EEC. Trade
policy towards the Eastern bloc would also have to be co-ordinated  in an
-34-EEC context. The eustoms and agricultural  union could only survive in the
long run if parallel progress rvas made in economic and social policies,
Mr, Metzger  (SDP) pressed for an early and satisfactoryconclusion
of negotiations for Israelf s association. Israel could not,remain satisfied with
a relatively insignificant trade agreement.  Mr. Metzger  also expressed the
hope that the efforts of Austria., Morocco  and Tunisia to enter into association
i,vith the EEC would prove successful.
After a political and economic debate lasting nearly five hours the
Bundestag turned to agricultural  policy problems.  Mr. Riihner (CSU) spoke of
the heavy burdens that the Federal budget rvould in future have to bear. He
outlined the discussions of the Budget Committee  on an SPD motion in'which
the Federal  Government  had been asked to say whether its approval of the
financing of agriculture was based on.preliminary  estimates  of the future
burden on the budget. On this point Mr. Rbhner pointed out that the German
contribution  to the Agricultural Fund, whose total expenditure in 1968/69would
amount to DM 7,000m. , 'lvould be around DM 2,200m. , a-n increase  of about
DM 1,200m, over the figure shorvn in the current yearrs draft budget. Itshould
also not be forgotten  that settlement in Brussels in the form of refunds was
subject to considerable delays. Settlement for 1965 wa.s expected to take place
in7967; only after atime-lag  of three years would it be possible to establish
rvhether too heavy an economic burden  had been taken on.
Mr, Staratzke (FDP) dwelt on his partyts fears that Germany's  one-
sided concessions  in the common  agricultural  policy could not be honoured.
Mr. Dichgans (CDLT),  a member of the European  Parliament, retorted.thatthe
Free Dernocrats always feil into the eruor of cornparing what was achieved
with rvhat they wanted to happen instead of with the progress that could r€&sor=
ably be expected of the EEC. He requested the Foreign Minister to see that
after the abolition  of internal tariffs the following year, the Federal Govern-.
ment would set an example  by not levying the turnover equalization tax at least
in the tourist sector, He also urged the Federal Government to back the Euro-
pean Parliamentrs  proposal for the minting of European coins in the form of a
new Eurofranc  worth DM 4.
Mr. Richarts (CDU) warned  that German agriculture  rvas facing  a
very difficult year of transition, entailing  further losses of income owing tothe
entry into force of the new cereals price and the unreasonably large cuts intr.Le
agricultt.rai  hudget, In addition, transitionaldifficulties  would arise with
certain  processed  prod:lcts  when the Common  l-{ar:ket carne into force.
Mr. Riehar:ts stated that in spite of budget difficulties it was esseltial tostand
by the comnlon system of agricultural  financing to avoid acldihg yet anothtlr




-35-budget. Such a situation would be equally intolerable to German agriculture. 
He asked, however, that the massive sums going to and coming from Brussels 
should be subjected to the closest scrutiny. That this was necessary had been 
clearly sho\vn, particularly by  the scandals recently made public. 
At the close of the debate on Europe, the Bundestag called upon the 
Federal Government to submit in future half-yearly reports in writing on the 
activities of the European Communities, the Council of Europe and Western 
European Union. The Federal Government ought also to report on EEC agri-
cultural operations financed out of the Federal Budget. 
During a discussion on the Foreign Ministry budget held in the 
Bundestag on 8 June 1967,  several members expressed their views on Euro-
pean policy.  Mr. Metzger said that European integration had proved its worth 
since the European Economic Community had been able to speak with one voice 
during the Geneva Kennedy Round negotiations. It was to be hoped that the EEC 
would be able to do  so again at the next conference on world trade to be held in 
New Delhi in the spring of 1968, the Commission having been entrusted with 
the negotiations. The Commission's presence as a negotiating party would 
enhance its prestige throughout the world, particularly in the developing 
countries. 
On Britain's entry into the Common Market,  Mr. Metzger stressed 
the Federal Republic's interest in such a development. The EEC member 
States were expected to consider one another's interests. In this connexion 
Mr. Metzger referred to the Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund which 
collected substantial funds from which agricultural countries derived the bene-
fit. The Federal Government paid in DM 2, OOOm.  to the Fund, getting back 
only DM 1, OOOm.  In its turn the Federal Republic,  as an industrial nation, 
was keen to expand its trade, particularly with Great Britain and other EFT  A 
countries. It must be given an opportunity of earning the money which,  in turn, 
it gave out again for the purpose of balancing out interests within the Commu-
nity.  Although the Rome Treaties contained no legally binding provisions on 
the entry of new States, their sense and spirit implied that other European 
countries should be permitted to enter it. Article 237 of the EEC Treaty, for 
example,  spoke expressly of the need to permit adjustments for an applicant 
State, provided,  of course, that the State in question accepted not only the 
Treaty but also any regulations subsequently issued. 
With regard to the association of Israel, Mr. Metzger said that its 
people, who were fighting for their very existence, had a right to be associated 
with the EEC. The trade agreement that had been in force  to date was far from 
being sufficient. On the association agreement with Greece, he pointed out 
that the partners were obliged to do their utmost to serve the aims of the 
- 36  -agreement, for example,  a future entry. A prerequisite, however, was that 
the country should be a democratic one in which freedom to form a coalition 
existed. It was therefore essential from the European point of view that Greece 
restore a democratic system as soon as possible. 
In the same debate Mr. Schmidt (SPD) urged Economics Minister 
Schiller, Foreign Minister Brandt and Federal Chancellor Kiesinger to define 
more clearly the German attitude to Britain's application. It must be brought 
home to the French Government that Britain's entry,  and that of Denmark and 
Ireland, was necessary not only for European progress but also for German 
interests. 
Professor Furler (CDU)  made a brief reference to the results ofthe 
Rome Conference. Something has been achieved -including the merger of the 
Executives -but difficult questions still remained to be cleared up. He went 
in great detail into the position and authority of the Commission as a central 
institution of the European Communities. The Commission enjoyed the right of 
initiative and was the driving force behind the policy of the EEC . Whatever 
decisions had been made in the course of the past nine years had been arrived 
at on the initiative of the Commission. Professor Furler therefore urged the 
Federal Foreign Minister to issue constant warnings at ministerial meetings 
against any undermining of the Commission's position - a main pillar of the 
European  Treaties which, though it might be somewhat lacking in strength in 
a legal sense, was nevertheless substantial and a factor to reckon with in real 
terms. 
On British entry into the Common Market, Mr. Furler said that the 
Bundestag and all the Governments had always supported it. The fact remained 
that at the time the Treaties were ratified Britain had not wanted to enter. 
Britain had been invited to join at the Council of Europe, in the ECSC  and in 
Messina but British policy at the time had not been ready to accept a European 
policy such as was now embodied in the EEC. In the meantime the international 
scene had witnessed changes which now further complicated the problem. No 
effort ought to be spared to achieve the objective; it would be unwise, however, 
to look only for external effects. Today a realistic policy was necessary : 
Britain could only be admitted with the consent of all six States. It was there-
fore the task of German policy, in the course of long and calmly conducted 
negotiations,  to clear away certain objections and resistance to the entry of 
Great Britain. 
(German Bundestag,  5th Electoral Period,  96th Session, 22.2 .1967; German 
Bundestag,  5th Electoral Period,  lllth Session,  7. 6.1967 
- 37  -2,  Franco-German  cohsultatioos  in Bonn
The Franco-German  consultations held in Borun on 12-13 JuLy 1967
1ecl to practical arrangements for wider co-operation  betrveen the two Govern-
ments. On fS July 196?, at the end of the talks between Federal Chancellor
Kiesinger and President  de Gaulle, the Government spokesman  announcedthe
following decisions by the two delegations:
a) A joint committee  on economic, industrial and technological  co-operation
is 1o be set up. It will consist of members  of the Governments and of
leading public and industrial figures. Detailed proposals  as to the compo-
sition of the committee  are to be made by a minister on each side, in the
case of the Federal Republic by Professor Karl Schiller, the Economics
Minister.
b) A responsible  person is to be appointed  on each side to take charge of co-
operuiion in all sectors. For this purpose, both of these persons can en-
list the services of the interministerial  committee  provided for in the
Franco-German  Treaty of Friendship.
c) An investigation  is to be carried out into the political and strategic situa-
tion likely to exist in the seventibs, taking into account the needs of Euro-
pean peace and securitY.
Dr. Kiesinger described the results of the tenth series of Franeo-
German consultaiions  as encouraging.  The meeting of the two government
delegations was to be regarded  as a continuation of the revival of the Franco-
Gerian Treaty decided upon in January: 'the special and outstanding collabo-
ration between the German and Frenoh peoples  has proved a success and is
both beneficial ald necessary for Germany and France.'
The exchange of views held on L2 and 13 JuIy between Economics
Minister Schiller and Mr. Debr6, French Economics  and Finance Minister,
was described by political observers in Bonn as thorough and likely to serve
as auseful guide. The economic situation inthe Federal Republic and France
was discussed at the first meeting, and Mr. Debr6 showed particular interest
in the Federal Governmentf s new short-term economic programme,  The
French Government  thought that an upswlng in the economic situation in
Germany was of great importance for France, particularly  as on12 July the
French Government also had decided  on measures for putting new life into its
own economy.
The two Ministers announced  their intention to meet at regular inter-
vals in order to discuss economic co-operation. France and the Federal
Republiiwere aiming at continuous economic growth and stability'
-38-. Ihe talks between Dr. Schiller and Mr. Debr6 were not however
confined to economic  policy as such. Co-operation  in the fields of industrial
policy and international monetary policy was also discussed, and this rvas of
particular significance  in view of the fact that the Group of Ten were meeting
in London a rveek later.
As announced  at the end of the Franco-German  talks, discussions
on European policy had shown that the deep-seated anxieties  of President
de Gaulle about admitting Britain to the Common Market had not been lessened
in any way. President de Gaulle is understood to have told his German col-
leagues that the Europe of the Six should not be allowed to break up or the,
existing European order to expand into an Atlantic system. Great Britain would
have to undergo a radical transformation before it became a truly European
country. While General de Gaulle did not expressly oppose British entry, he
stressed that it would lead to the EEC's losing its present character.  The six
EEC member States must therefore realize that if Britain did enter, some-
thing other than the existing EEC system would emerge
Dr. Kiesinger and President de Gaulle also agreed that additional
ad hoc consultations would be held between Bonn and Paris should special
circumstances  arise, particularly in times of crisis. No further details were
issued on the subject.
It appears that these additional  consultations  were arranged  at the
request of Dr, Kiesinger who had complained of a lack of'contact  betweenBonn
and Paris, particularly during the Middle East crisis. During a discussion  on
the Middle East situation the two delegations agreed that joint action by the
Federal  Republic and France in that area was at present ruled out.
(Frankfurter  Allgemeine Zeitung,  1-4 Juty L967;BulletinderBundesregierung,
13 JulY 1967)
3.  Federal Finance Minister Franz-Iosef Strauss on European
integration
Speaking at the annual meeting of the German-Swiss  Ghamber  of
Commerce in Zurich on 3 April L967, Mr. Strauss said that only aunited
Europe  which could bring its full economic strength  to bear on the world market
would in the long run have any chance to share in technological progress,
,....
-39-Mr. Strauss dealt mainly with the harmonization of taxes in Europe, 
which he regarded as an important step in creating a unified European market. 
Only thus could tax barriers be swept away following the abolition: of customs 
barriers on 1 July 1968. The unification of Europe - and that of the Six - was 
the task of a generation that could not afford to slacken its efforts. Mr. Strauss 
regarded a vast European internal market - not indefinitely confined to the 
present EEC member States - as a permanent driving force for the political 
unification of Europe. 
So far different levels of taxation in the various countries had led to 
discrepancies in their terms of trade. Mr. Strauss thought that a compensa-
tory adjustment in exchange rates, though possible in theory,  would not be the 
answer because its incidence would be general, whereas the tax burden varied 
from case to case. Tax harmonization on the lines contemplated in the Com-
munity therefore held out the best prospects of success. Harmonization of 
turnover taxes, which accounted for a quarter of the tax revenues of the Six, 
had been merely the fitst step. Excise duties and direct taxes would also have 
to be brought into line. Mr. Strauss favoured uniform taxation of concentra-
tions and capital markets,  and harmonization of certain transaction taxes 
(capital, transport, insurance, motor vehicles). 
At the Tenth International Bodensee Conference of Christian Poli-
ticians held in Lindau,  Mr. Strauss earnestly advocated the welding of Europe 
into a really efficient unit. He urged the six EEC member States to negotiate 
without delay on British entry. 'It would be a tragedy,' he said,  'to cut off 
Great Britain from the Continent by force.' Referring to General de Gaulle's 
European policy, Mr. Strauss stated that the General's mistake -whether 
conscious or not -was that of believingthat a venerable past and tradition 
could take the place of something that was being forced upon Europe by the 
law of numbers. Even an efficient and respected country like France simply 
lacked the magnitude to enable it to press its claims.  This had been brought 
home forcibly to France in its Moscow negotiations when Russia had declined 
to accept it as an equal partner. 
Europe must be able to present to the world demensions that would 
earn it recognition and respect. He blamed the 'allotment-type' political set-up 
for the daily widening technological gap between the USA  and Europe. Unless 
Europe organized its scientific, research and technological activities on com-
munity lines, it would eventually be left standing. 
At the Fifth Symposium of the European Union of Free and Private 
Housing Enterprises in Hamburg on 26  May,  Mr. Strauss stressed the urgent 
need for industrial,  scientific and technological competitiveness to further the 
cause of European unity. No one European nation today had the financial, 
-40-industrial or individual resources to master the tasks of the present and the 
future.  Europe was lagging farther and farther behind the USA  and the USSR 
in ultrasonic flight,  space travel and electronics. It would vanish completely 
from the field of civil aviation unless it pooled its efforts. The drain of young 
German scientists to the United States was due to the pull not only of money 
but also of interesting work.  Mr. Strauss again spoke out for the admission 
of Britain to the Common Market and urged that Europe as a whole, including 
Eastern Europe,  should not be lost sight of. 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  4 April1967; Die Welt,  22  May 1967) 
- 41  -United Kingdom 
United Kingdom and the Common Market 
1.  Prime Minister Wilson's tour of the capitals of the Six 
On 16 January 1967 Mr.  Harold Wilson,  British Prime Minister, 
set out on a tour of the six EEC capitals.  The purpose of his visit was to 
sound the prospects for Britain's admission to the European Economic Com-
munity.  Before his departure Mr.  Wilson stated : 'This is no empty probe. 
We  mean business.  . • . .  We  are going into these talks to overcome pro-
blems if they can be overcome.'  Mr.  George Brown,  asked how public opin-
ion in Great Britain felt about the Common Market,  replied : There has been 
an enormous shift in recent times in public opinion and in Parliament. Ithink 
there are those who still have worries about it.'  Asked whether he expected 
the Rome talks to be easier than those in Paris, the British Foreign Secretary 
replied: 'I don't think one will be easier than another.  The same issues 
arise in all the capitals,  but there may be a difference of emphasis in the dif-
ferent countries.' 
(a)  Talks in Rome 
On 16 January  1967 the Italian  and British heads of Government 
reached agreement in principle on Great Britain's entry into the EEC.  Atthe 
opening of the talks Mr.  Wilson spoke of its being a historic moment,  not only 
for Great Britain but also for Europe as a  whole.  The problems that existed 
would have to be solved not only from an economic but also from a political 
point of view.  On the Italian side Britain's intentions were welcomed and an 
assurance was given that it could count on Italy's support. 
'The creation of a wider European Community is much more than a 
matter of totting up the debit and credit columns of our European  balance sheet, ' 
said the British Prime Minister at a  reception given by the ItaJ.ian head of 
Government,  'necessary and important though that is.  What we are trying to 
do is to make a practical reality of a vision - a  vision of Europe which, strong 
and united,  will be able to play an effective part in the world.' 
-42 -After the talks Mr.  Wilson stated that London was interested not 
only in the economic integration of Europe but also in its political integration. 
He  offered to bring into the Community the technological achievements of his 
country.  Mr.  Moro,  Prime Minister,  and Mr.  Fanfani,  Foreign Minister, 
pointed out that no-one in Europe could make as substantial a technological 
contribution as Britain. 
In a final statement after the close of the talks Mr.  Moro described 
the meetings as particularly friendly and constructive.  They had been con-
ducted with great frankness and cordiality and all problems had been thorough-
ly aired. 
The position of the Italian Socialists,  which was explained by 
Mr.  Pietro Nenni on 4 January 1967,  is quite clear.  IT  the French elections 
brought about no change in the situation - Mr.  Nenni had said - the Five and 
Great Britain,  as well as any other countries ready to accede to the Commu-
nity,  ought to go forward on the road to political and economic integration 
without allowing themselves to be held back by General de Gaulle.  In other 
words,  Europe would have to be created without Gaullist France but  with 
socialist Britain.  This attitude is shared by Mr.  La Malfa'  s  Republican 
Party.  It is echoed inthejournall'Avanti of  15  January which thinks itquite 
natural that Great Britain should seek to benefit from safeguard clauses si-
milar to those invoked by the Six during the original negotiations.  These are 
'marginal questions which do not effect the substance of the problem' and it 
would be 'glaring evidence of bad faith and political ill-will' to treat them as 
conditions.  For the socialist journal it goes without saying that Europe should 
give London the firm undertaking for which the British Prime Minister hopes. 
Domenico Bartoli sums up the situation  in the Carriere della Sera, 
in which he points out that 'Italian foreign policy is the fruit of corporate de-
cisions contributed to by the head of State,  the President and Vice-President 
of the Council,  and the Foreign Minister.  It is reasonable to assume that 
President Saragat's influence  and Mr.  More's real power will be brought into 
play somewhere between the more clearly defined positions of Mr.  Nenni and 
Mr.  Fanfani.'  Mr.  Bartoli concludes that 'Great Britain's accession to the 
Common Market will not consist in filling up a vital place left vacant by 
France.' 
(b)  Talks in Paris 
Prior to his visit to Paris,  Mr.  Wilson broke his journey at Stras-
bourg where he delivered before the Consultative Assembly of the Council of 
Europe an address which made a considerable impr.ession. 
-43-The Prime Minister opened with an avowal that his country formed 
part of Europe.  Mr.  Wilson went back in history to the time when Anglo-
Saxon,  Danish and Norman invaders from the European continent conquered 
the British Isles and,  together with the Native Celts, laid the basis of British 
national consciousness and democracy.  The great democracies across the 
Atlantic had sprung from the same European roots.  This common spiritual 
basis was the essential condition for today's efforts to create a united Europe, 
a great vision which dominated the history of our century. 
Mr.  Wilson referred to his speech in the House of Commons on 
10 November 1966 when he had announced the decision to open new talks with 
the EEC with a view to Britain's entering the Community.  He criticized the 
view that to enlarge the EEC was at the same time to weaken it.  Britain would 
bring a large number of assets with it into the Community,  so that there could 
be no question of inflicting a burden on the EEC.  Mr.  Wilson went on to point 
to the reduction in the deficit and the improvement in the balance of payments 
achieved by Great Britain in the last two years.  Progress had also been 
made in modernizing British industry.  Finally,  the United Kingdom would be 
bringing with it into the EEC the full potential of its scientific research and 
technology.  · 
As regards Britain's wishes and conditions for entry,  Mr.  Wilson 
did not go  beyond what he had already said in addressing the House of Commons 
on 10 November 1966.  Great Britain must be willing to accept the Treaty of 
Rome,  subject to the adjustments necessary for the admission of a new mem-
ber and to account being taken of Britain's concern over  points in which it saw 
difficulties.  Mr.  Wilson also spoke of Article 237 of the EEC Treaty which 
stated that the admission of a new member shall be the subject of an agree-
ment between the member States and the applicant State.  Agreement would, 
for example, have to be reached on the number of votes to be allotted to 
Britain in the EEC Council of Ministers.  In addition,  new arrangements would 
have to be made for sharing the budget of the European Economic Community. 
Provided these matters raised by Britain could be satisfactorily 
dealt with,  the Treaty of Rome would not form an obstacle to its entry.  Al-
though the Treaty presented a number of thorny problems for Britain,  the 
same had been the case with the original signatory States.  While Britain,  like 
these,  had to sign a document of which it could not foresee the ultimate prac-
tical results, it had the advantage that it had carefully studied developments 
during the ten years of the Treaty's existence,  and that its findings had been 
proved to be both satisfactory and encouraging. 
-44-At a press conference given on 25  January 1967 following his talks 
with President de Gaulle,  Mr.  Wilson stated that hi's visit to Paris had not 
been intended to bring about a decision on Britain's entry.  He  had not gone to 
Paris to put  questions that could be answered only by a Yes or a No.  It was 
only natural that the members of the European Community should want to con-
sult among each other before any decision was taken. 
Discussions in Paris concentrated mainly on two points : monetary 
questions,  into which Mr.  Wilson and Prime Minister Pompidou went in great 
detail together,  and the problems of agriculture.  The French view,  which is 
known far and wide,  is that membership of the EEC cannot be used as a  cure 
for Britain's economic and financial ills.  France  demands .that the pound be 
restored to health before the question of British entry is considered.  It does 
not share British optimism as to the likelih~d of the balance of payments 
being brought into equilibrium by the year's end.  Moreover Paris feels that 
sterling's claim to share with the dollar the privilege of a world reserve cur-
rency must be abandoned.  As. regards agriculture,  Paris was not alone in 
demanding that London should give up its system of guaranteed prices a!ld 
subsidies in favour of the EEC 's common agricultural policy and should ac-
cept increases of 10  - 14 per cent in the prices of farm products. 
Foreign Minister Couve de Murville displayed far more reserve, in 
a radio interview at the end of the talks,  than the British Prime Minister at 
his press conference.  Mr.  Couve de Murville stated that the talks had been 
extremely frank and misunderstandings between the two siqes would in future 
no longer be possible.  An investigation would hav~ to be  made into the obli-
gations and risks entailed for the Six in the event of a British application, 
since the pound sterling was an extra-European currency. 
Back in London,  Mr.  Wilson gave only a brief report on his Paris 
visit during Question Time in the House of Commons.  Despite the Opposi-
tion's wishes,  he declined to report in detail on the matter.  The Parliament 
merely learned,  therefore,  that the talks had turned out fairly satisfactory 
and better than expected.  Political questions had been aired at least as tho-
roughly as purely economic problems.  It "'ould have been out of place,  how-
ever,  to have discussed projects for the future political structure of Europe, 
such as the Fouchet Plan.  Defence questions and the problem of severing 
Britain's ties with the United States had played a smaller part than had been 
expected.  In reply to a question by Mr.  Edward Heath on the problem of ster-
ling,  Mr.  Wilson pointed out that,  despite his efforts,  misunderstandings 
still existed on the French side regarding the operation of the sterling area 
and the compatibility of the r6le of sterling as a reserve currency with British 
membership of the EEC. 
-45-On 1 February 1967 the French Council of Ministers,  presided over 
by President de Gaulle,  carried out a first,guarded review of the EEC talks 
with the British Prime Minister.  Acting as rapporteur,  Mr.  Couve de 
Murville emphasized that their purpose had been only to exchange views and 
not to discuss the opening of negotiations. 
(c)  Talks in Brussels 
Mr.  Wilson's two-day exploratory talks in Brussels came to an end 
on 1 February 1967.  As  expected,  contacts between Mr.  Wilson and the 
Belgian Government did not bring any tangible results.  Although the British 
Prime Minister encountered interest in Brussels,  it did not appear that he had 
already  secured firm promises from Prime Minister Vanden Boeynants and 
Foreign Minister Harmel.  The Belgian view,  which had already been made 
clear prior to Mr.  Wilson's visit,  was that a European Community must also 
be based on Great Britain,  This did not mean,  however,  that Britain's entry 
would be secured at any price.  Mr.  Wilson was carefully given to understand 
that Belgium did not wish to be isolated from the other EEC member States. 
The talks with the Belgian Government covered,  in particular, 
monetary,  financial  and institutional questions.  The rtJle of sterling was dis-
cussed on rather less dogmatic lines than in Paris, but the sweep of the pro-
blem was not played down.  Moreover,  it appears that during the Brussels 
talks Mr.  Wilson did not react on the subject of sterling as he had done in 
Paris, where he had stated that the fact that the pound was regarded as are-
serve currency had no bearing on membership of the Community. 
At the end of the talks Mr.  Harmel stated that the obstacles to 
British entry lay not so much in political as in technical factors.  Neverthe-
less the chances of succesful negotiations for Britain's entry were greater 
than they had been four years ago. 
Following the talks with the Belgian Government,  Mr.  Wilson and 
Mr.  Brown met the two EEC Vice-Presidents,  Mr.  Mansholt and Mr. Marjolin, 
as well as Commission member Mr.  Jean Rey.  The general problems thrown 
up by the enlargement of the Community and special treatment for the Com-
monwealth in the event of Britain's entry were discussed.  The Commission's 
conviction that the Community needed to be enlarged was again confirmed. 
Mr Mansholt pointed out that the procedures introduced and the decisions taken 
by the EEC in the agricultural sector could hardly,  if at all, be altered in the 
event of Britain's accession.  The same applied to the arrangements for finan-
cing agriculture.  Problems of monetary policy were not touched on during 
these talks. 
-46 -In the course of a press conference Mr.  Wilson stated :  'So far as 
the question of sterling is concerned,  there are no doubts at all in Europe. 
There are some deep regrets,  not among governments but among those specu-
lators who last July decided to sell short and now have to buy sterling back at 
a higher price.'  Mr.  Wilson said he believed he had dealt completely with the 
economic and sterling questions raised by the Belgian ministers.  Sterling 
balances were and had been particularly stable.  The sterling problem and the 
problem of management of sterling balances created no difficulty now and 
would not create any difficulty for the Common Market. 
As for the French Foreign Minister's remarks that the pound was 
not a  European currency,  Mr.  Wilson said :  'The pound is the currency ·of 
Britain; Britain is a  European nation; therefore the pound is a European cur-
rency.'  No  doubt,  he added,  the French Government's recent measures would 
lead to the French franc's being accepted over a  wider area than it was today. 
(d)  Talks in Bonn 
The Anglo-German talks held in Bonn on 15  an 16 February 1967 
were exclusively devoted t<D  the problems of Britain's entry.  According to 
diplomatic sources Britain's concern about its agriculture and foreign exchan-
ge position played a  major part in the talks.  Attention was drawn at an early 
stage to the difficult problems that would be raised for the British budget and 
balance of  payments  by an annual transfer of approximately £200m.  to the 
Community's Agricultural Fund. 
The Federal Government would continue to work for Britain's entry 
into the EEC.  This promise was given by the Federal Chancellor to the Bri-
tish Prime Minister shortly before his return to London.  Dr.  Kiesinger sta-
ted that his Government had been 'strengthened in its conviction' that it should 
continue to work for British entry into the ·European Economic Community. 
'We hope that future talks and endeavours will lead to positive results.' 
Another result of the Anglo-German talks is that the existing joint 
Anglo-German Economic Commission will in future meet more often.  It will 
discuss the economic problems raised by British entry into the EEC,  as well 
as questions connected with the Kennedy Round. 
Following the talks in Bonn Mr.  Wilson stated that the main purpose 
of his Bonn visit had been to make it  quite clear that Britain was determined 
to join the Community,  provided that its vital interests were safeguarded. 
-47 -Certain problems and difficulties naturally existed.  The point of the talks had 
been not only to explain the difficulties on the British side,  but also to hear 
'what our friends. had to say. '  Mr.  Wilson added that the Federal Government 
had been 'very helpful'  in this respect. 
Asked whether the Federal Government had made a definite sugges-
tion as to when Britain should put in an application for entry,  Mr.  Wilson said 
this question would only arise at the end of his exploratory tour of EEC capi-
tals.  The British Governm£:-nt would then establish further contacts with the 
EEC member States and with the EFTA countries. 
Mr.  Wilson went on to say that his talks in Bonn had been just as 
'outstandingly useful'  as all other soundings  in Europe -this in answer to the 
question whether the Bonn talks had given Britain more encouragement to put 
in an official application for entry into the EEC.  Mr.  Wilson confirmed 
Britain's determination to co-operate with the other European countries in the 
political field,  too,  with a view to integration.  In Bonn,  as in the other EEC 
capitals,  he had spoken 'in the same spirit and with the same words' as during 
the address on Europe he had delivered in January before the European Par-
liament in Strasbourg.  Mr.  Wilson emphasized that he had not perceived any 
differences in attitude in the capitals of the Six.  During the talks with 
Dr.  Kiesinger  and Mr.  Brandt neither side had tried to change the other's 
standpoint in the matter of a British entry.  The talks had served for an ex-
change of views. 
Speaking in the House of Commons on 16 February 1967,  Mr. Wilson 
stated that the Bonn talks had confirmed the identity of views of the two coun-
tries,  'which was demonstr<.>ted by the German Government's prompt and 
friendly response to my statement of 10 November'.  British views on the Ger-
man position  in the matter of British entry,  said Mr.  Wilson,  were proved to 
be fully justified by the talks. 
Mr.  Ahler$,  deputy spokesman of the Federal Government,  stated 
at a press conference in Bonn that the Federal Republic would endeavour, 
within the context of Franco-German consultation,  to dispel French misgivings 
about British entry into the Community.  . In a report to the Cabinet on  1\'!r. 
Wilson's visit to Bonn,  Dr.  Kiesinger advocated,  according to Mr.  Ahlers, 
patient efforts to achieve a  swing-round in the French attitude in favour of 
Britain.  On  17  February 1967 the Federal Government informed the French 
Government of the subject-matter of the talks with the British Prime Minister. 
- 48 -(e)  Talks at The Hague 
The exploratory talks held at The Hague on 27  February 1967 
brought no indication as to whether and when Britain would apply for EEC 
membership.  Neither Mr.  Wilson nor Dr.  Luns,  Netherlands Foreign Minis-
ter,  gave clear-cut answers when these questions were put to them by the 
press. 
Mr.  Wilson stated at a press conference that after his next visit 
- to Luxemburg - the British Government would pursue its soundings among the 
EFTA countries.  Foreign Minister George Brown would report to EFTA on the 
talks with the EEC countries. Mr. Wilson added that Great Britain would not be 
presenting definite decisions.  No decisipn would be taken until the discussions 
were over. He  added: 'With every talk we held with the EEC member States, the 
picture became clearer. We  were able not only to explain Qur own standpoint but 
also to learn by the experience gained by the EEC member States from the 
Common Market.  We  know now how the EEC works. '  He  would not and could 
not,  however  ,yet commit himself as to when a British decision would be taken. 
Foreign Minister Luns,  speaking on the same question,  said that he 
did not think of the likelihood of entry either in months or in years.  As to 
Britain's chances in view of France's attitude,  he was no prophet.  Since 
France's first rejection,  Britain's position had substantially improved,  both 
as regards the support of the other member States and the climate of opinion 
in Britain itself. 
The British Prime Minister,  who flew back to London on 28  Febru-
ary 1967 after the press conference,  in a reference to the rene of sterling as 
a reserve currency for the international monetary system,  stated that as the 
state of the British economy improved,  the pound would prove to be a  means 
of strengthening rather than an obstacle to the Common Market.  The question 
of a unitary monetary system had not cropped up during the exploratory talks. 
Back in the House of Commons,  Mr.  Wilson retorted to Conserva-
tive criticism that British support for the Treaty for the non-proliferation  of 
nuclear arms was damaging Britain's chances of admission to the EEC by 
pointing out  that this Treaty was of outstanding importance and that it would 
be dangerous not to go ahead with it.  The Common Market and non-prolifera-
tion were two entirely separate issues.  Moreover,  the European governments 
were anxious a·bout thP inspection procedure contempiated and not about  going 
,,,-ithout nuclear arms.  As a  member ;Jf the European Communities Britaitl 
crmld help in finding an answer that would strengthen '·':1ratom. 
- 4S-(±)  Talks in Luxembourg 
The visit to Luxembourg formed the last lap of the tour of EEC capi-
tals made by Mr.  Wilson and Mr.  Brown. 
Prime Minister Werner stated that the Grand Duchy believed that 
the European Communities would acquire strength and greater political and 
economic influence through British membership.  The talks in Luxembourg 
centred on institutional questions,  agriculture,  Commonwealth trade,  the 
freeing of capital movements and monetary problems in general.  It was 
learned that the question was raised whether Britain should not undertake, in 
a special protocol to an agreement for entry,  to abstain from resorting to the 
provisions of the Rome  Treaty on reciprocal monetary aid in the event of pay-
ments difficulties where balance of  payments  problems arose specifically 
from sterling's key r<He.  As regards Commonwealth problems,  the hope was 
expressed that an international cereals agreement to be concluded within the 
context of the Kennedy Round would go far towards reducing difficulties that 
might result for Commonwealth producers from Britain's entry.  The question 
of association of African and Caribbean Commonwealth countries with the en-
larged EEC was also touched upon.  Mr. Wilson once again confirmed that he 
was ready to accept the institutional procedures of the EEC Treaty. 
On the subject of the steel industry,  Mr.  Wilson stated that Britain 
also wished to join the European Coal and Steel Community and that this, in 
his view,  presented no major difficulties.  This applied irrespective of the 
proposed re-nationalization of the steel industry in Great Britain.  One got the 
impression that the High Authority today saw the main difficulties in the steel 
sector rather than in coalmining.  Britain's exports to the Common Market 
had dwindled to insignificant proportions.  It was indeed felt that Britain, 
which this year would produce rather more hard coal than all the ECSC  coun-
tries put together,  would have to decide upon a more liberal imports policy, 
and this not only towards the Six but also at the international level,  along the 
lines planned for a future common energy policy.  Moreover,  coal subsidies 
would no doubt have to be made subiect to  the common rules of the ECSC.  In 
addition,  British participation in the ECSC's financial equalization scheme 
for the reduction of coking-coal prices,  recently decided upon,  appeared to be 
essential. 
-50 -2.  Problems and attitudes 
Britain's entry into the European Economic Community has long 
been under discussion, particularly since the formal application was handed in 
in Brussels.  The objections against Britain's entry - particularly those of 
France - are familiar to all.  The problems and difficulties also have been 
clearly spelled out in the EEC Commission's report on the enlargement of the 
Community. 
On 4 July 1967 Great Britain again announced before the Council of 
Ministers of Western European Union at The Hague its wish and readiness to 
become a  member of a Europe economically and politically united,  The 
British declaration on Europe presented in the form of a document by Foreign 
Secretary George Brown at The Hague was subsequently published in London 
as a  White Paper.  The British Government regarded Mr.  Brown's address at 
The Hague as an introductory statement to negotiations for entry into the EEC. 
Speaking before the WEU Assembly at The Hague, 
1Mr. Brown stated 
that his Government would accept the Treaties of the European Communities 
without reserves and wanted to work with the six EEC member States in the 
continued development of the Community not only in the economic  but also in 
the political and military fields.  He  proposed that the first year of the tran-
sitional period should be a standstill period for mutual adaptation.  The neces-
sary measures of adaptation could to a large extent be taken in Britain imme-
diately at the end of the standstill period.  But some of the changes,  particu-
larly in the agricultural field,  would require an adequate period of adaptation, 
the length of which would have to be discussed with the Six.  As regards the 
Commonwealth,  Mr.  Brown mentioned two special problems : the sugar mar-
ket and New Zealand.  Britain had an agreement with Commonwealth sugar 
producers which would not expire until 1974.  During their visits to the capi-
tals of the Community he and Mr.  Wilson had found general recognition that 
New  Zealand's case was of an altogether special kind.  As regards Britain's 
dependent territories, association would no doubt be the most appropriate 
arrangement.  Britain was prepared to negotiate on exceptions such as Hong 
Kong. 
Turning to the capital market,  Mr.  Brown stated that Britain was 
ready to accept the obligations of membership of the Community subject to a 
transitional period dt:ring which it could bring its policies into line with those 
of the Community.  So far as tariffs were concerned,  Britain would be prepa-
red to accept the common external tariff as it would stand after the Kennedy 
Round reductions  had been made.  It would,  of course,  be necessary to dis-
cuss how Britain's tariff structure would be adjusted to that of the Community 
withi11  the~transitional period. 
- 51  -No  individual European country,  said Mr.  Brown,  was today big 
enough to provide all the resources needed under present-day conditions. 
With 300 million people,  the future Community market would be bigger than 
that of the USA.  Europe  had made a remarkable recovery since the war but 
had not played a big r6le in recent political crises.  There was no alternative 
to a large market in which European enterprises could work unhampered by 
customs barriers.  Mr.  Brown added :  'The fundamentals of the Communities 
will remain unaffected,  for we shall be accepting precisely the same treaty 
aims and obligations in letter and spirit as yourselves. 
1  Britain wanted to 
keep the negotiations as short as possible so that it could start work in the 
Communities at an early date.  The questions to be settled before entry - he 
said - were few.  All Britain needed was a transitional period for mutual 
adaptation,  with at first a one-year period of standstill.  During this time 
Britain could make the necessary adjustments and other EFTA countries seek-
ing membership or association would have time to conclude their negotiations. 
Mr.  Brown went on to state that his Government would be perfectly 
ready to discuss any questions that member States of the Community might 
wish to raise.  His own list of issues which he believed  required attention in 
negotiations was not a formidable one.  It presented no questions to which 
reasonable answers could not be found.  He  hoped that,  when the Community 
came to respond,  it would be as full and frank as he had been and would men-
tion any additional points which it felt should be covered by the negotiations. 
Mr.  Brown  wanted to avoid a  situation where,  after the points raised had 
been finally settled, fresh requirements would be successively imposed on his 
country.  Finally,  he expressed the hope that the statement he had made would 
help the Community in its consideration of the British application and enable 
negotiations to open as soon as the opinion of the Commission had been sub-
mitted to the Council of  Ministers. 
Mr.  Brandt,  Federal Foreign Minister,  hailed Mr.  Brown's state-
ment as an event of an historic importance which should not be underestimated. 
Mr.  Bettencourt,  French Secretary of State,  spoke of an important decision 
by Great Britain.  The European Community should now deal with the British 
application in accordance with the Treaties and take the appropriate action. 
At the meeting of the Council of  Ministers of the European Commu-
nities on 10 July 1967,  Mr.  Couve de Murville,  French Foreign Minister, 
reaffirmed the French Government's view that enlarging the Community by 
four or five members would change its character.  It would change the political 
setup in Europe and would not be without consequences for East-West relations 
and for the German question. 
-52 -.. 
After referring once again to the state of the pound and the problems 
of agriculture,  Mr.  Couve de Murville stated that enlarging the circle of 
African associated States by admitting English-speaking countries would 
create fresh difficulties,  all the more so because the Latin American coun-
tries would feel discriminated against.  In the EEC itself the  development of 
a  common transport policy and of a common energy policy would be still further 
complicated by British entry. 
In an interview published in 'France Soir' on 31  July 1967,  Mr. 
Debre,  French Foreign Minister,  stated that if Britain and other European 
countries were allowed to join in the near futurt:l,  this could substantially en-
danger the French economy.  Britain's entry would carry with it a great risk 
unless that country was prepared to accept the development of the Common 
Market in its present state without exceptions or reserves of any kind.  Over 
the last ten years EEC member States had reached agreement on currency 
questions and capital movements; the current situation ruled out British entry 
on a basis of equality. 
In an article published in 'Le Monde' Mr.  Callaghan,  Chancellor of 
the Exchequer,  hailed the successes scored in the International  Monetary 
Fund,  adding that his country was ready to negotiate on the role of sterling as 
a reserve currency.  This role  was a practical matter and not one of pres-
tige.  An enlarged Community could lead to the creation of a European cur-
rency incorporating all currencies,  including sterling. 
In a  radio interview Lord Chalfont,  the new 'Minister for Europe', 
spoke of the possibility of an Atlantic free-trade organization as a  counterpart 
to the European Economic Community,  in the event of a breakdown in the ne-
gotiations for Britain's entry.  'We could picture a kind of Atlantic grouping, 
and we could even stand on our own.  Other countries in the world do this, and 
we are strong enough to do the same.  We  do not,  however,  desire anything 
like that.' 
In August Mr.  Wilson reshuffled  his Cabinet.·  It is significant that, 
in doing so,  he himself took over the Department of Economic Affaires. A ma-
jor change was the discarding of Mr.  Douglas Jay,  till then President of the 
Board of Trade and the bitterest opponent of British entry in the Cabinet. 
Mr.  Jay was replaced by Mr.  Anthony Crosland,  previous Secretary of State 
for Education and Science,  who is regarded as a  convinced European  • 
Following the Cabinet's reshuffle,  the opposition to Mr.  Wilson's 
European policy - daily growing more and more insistent in the Labour party-
found in Mr.  Jay an eloquent and well-informed spokesman.  In two articles 
-53 -published in the  'Guardian'  he  argued,  on  the basis of a  wealth  of  facts 
and figures,  that British entry would step up  foreign  exchange  require-
ments. Agricultural arrangements in the EEC, the foreign exchange needed 
for contributions to the EEC Agricultural Fund,  and the loss of markets ex-
pected in EFTA, the Commonwealth and the rest of the world,  seemed likely 
to bring up the burden on the British balance of payments closer to £  1, OOOm. 
than to £  500m. a year, the estimate given by the Labour Government. The 
ability of British goods to compete on world markets  would be reduced as a 
result of the increases in the cost of living,  wages and production costs to be 
expected following British entry. Mr. Jay thought it  unnecessary for Britain 
to join the EEC because, by virtue of Commonwealth preferences and the 
EFTA Stockholm Convention, Britain could already draw on a free trade area 
of 250 million people. A lengthy transitional period prior to a possible entry 
into the EEC would be of no use as it would not only leave tl).e  problems un-
solved but would at the same time put a severe strain on the balance of pay-
ments and entail the loss of markets in the Commonwealth,  EFTA and the 
world as a whole. 
On 12 October 1967 General de Gaulle discussed with Mr. Jean Rey, 
President of the European Commission, the problems posed for France and 
the EEC by the British application. It is understood that the FrenchPresident 
once again voiced his now familiar misgivings. A week earlier, on 6 October 
1967, he  had already suggested,  in talks with Sir Patrick Reilly, British 
Ambassador, that association with the EEC might be a more appropriate solu-
tion. The farthest President de Gaulle now appears to be ready to go would 
be some loose form of association with the Common Market,  a suggestion 
which the Labour Government has already rejected outright. 
(The Guardian, 16, 26,  27  and 30 January,  21  February, 7 March, 
The Times, 
Le Monde, 
11 July 1967; 
17  and 26 January,  8 and 17 February, 8March, 5 July 1967; 
26,  27  and 28 January,  5 and 18 February, 3 March, 
9,  10 and 12 July, 12 August 1967; 
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  2 February 1967; 
Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,  3 and 28 February, 10 March,  30 August 1967; 
Industriekurier, 21  September 1967) 
-54-1.  Mr.  Saragat, President of the Italian Republic,  celebrates the Tenth 
Anniversary of the Rome Treaties 
The lOth anniversary of the founding of the EEC and Euratom was the 
occasion of formal ceremonies in Rome on 29 May; these took place in Campi-
doglio and were attended by President de Gaulle and the Heads of Government 
of the six member States. In his address,  Mr.  Saragat, President of the Ital-
ian Republic, outlined the historical and political undercurrents which had, 
since th.e  end of the second world war, found expression in various significant 
initiatives which had led the six countries of the Community to the signing of 
the Treaties of Rome.  He stated: ' •••• the balance sheet of the Communities 
after ten years has surpassed the most optimistic predictions by a long way. ' 
President Saragat then went back over the achievements of the Com-
munity; ' .••• these results were evidence of the emergence and  affirmation 
in the minds of our peoples of the idea of European unification; this idea is 
bound up much more with our Greek, Latin, Germanic and Christian traditions 
than with any geographical concept; the ideal which it postulates among our 
peoples is of a man fashioned by Roman law, by Christianity, by the Renais-
sance, by the age of Enlightenment  and by the  political and social revolutions 
of the last three centuries; a man eager for freedom,  truth and justice and who 
rejects oppression.  We  are aware that the causes which may lead us to have 
differences of opinion are nevertheless numerous but we are, at the same 
time, convinced that the reasons which unite us are of even greater moment 
and this should encourage us to turn to advantage our previous experience to 
initiate new contacts and to move with prudence and a sense of proportion but 
also with faith and with a clear purpose, towards our objective. ' 
Going on to discuss the problems still awaiting solution, President 
Saragat stated: 'New problems await us, including that of the geographic and 
historic dimensions of Europe, with the accession of other countries and, 
first of all, the United Kingdom whose name is almost synonymous with poli-
tical freedom: we hope that it will soon be possible to begin the negotiations. 
It is in fact a question of an application for accession not only from one party 
but from a whole nation.  Socialists, conservatives and liberals are united in 
supporting the application and the House of Commons approved it by a majority 
that verged on unanimity. 
A further problem is that of community relations with the United 
States, on the one hand,  and with the other European countries, particularly 
Eastern Europe, on the other.  There is also the increasingly urgent problem 
of relations between industrialized and developing countries. 
- 53  -Let us not lose sight, I would ask you,  of the historical origins of 
the EEC and the political goal it is our intention to achieve by pursuing a lat-
eral, economic course.  As the years have gone by it has perhaps become 
clear to many that economic progress is not enbugh of itself to take us all the 
way on the path to European political unity.  For this to be achieved,  what we 
need above all is a strong, common political resolve.  Even if the political 
goal is common to us all, there are still many difficulties to be overcome in 
the choice to be made in terms of implementing machinery and in the order of 
priorities. And yet I think that the experience of this last decade should have 
taught us .all something,  including the fact that the point of departure is not 
the point of arrival and that gradualness is sometimes an appropriate method 
for overcoming difficulties  which appear at first sight to be insurmountable. 
We  are aware that there exists no incompatibility between the Euro-
pearl ideal and the ideal of the mother country just as there can be no incon-
sistency between freedom,  the rights of the individual and the latter's duty to 
serve his own country. Another lesson, to be learned from our past experien-
ce is that any order on this continent that is founded on the idea of power  is 
an illusory one, encouraging antagonism between states, causing anarchy and 
ending in a betrayal of the spiritual heritage, the very structure, of our coun-
tries. 
1 believe, therefore, that we should pay a tribute to the prime mov-
ers and promoters of the European idea and express our sincerest good wishes 
to those who,  today, have taken up the torch and are carrying on with this un-· 
dertaking.  These wishes are particularly addressed to those taking part in the 
summit conference tomorrow, following today's formal ceremonies; I should 
stress, however, that the six Governments have come to Rome not only to ce-
lebrate the successes they have achieved together, particularly in the econ-
omic field,  but also to resume, full of goodwill,  the political dialogue which 
was broken off in the spring of 1962. 
The  pace  of our forward progress can be maintained to the extent 
that we are able to preserve that spirit of renewal, that grasp of the essential 
and that faith in Europe which we have learned to have and which the habits 
which have grown up through what has happened have fostered in us.  Our suc-
cess could constitute a decisive factor in world peace and make a decisive 
contribution to the balanced development of our international life provided we 
do not forget that only a united and democratic Europe, which fully realizes 
that its future is bound up with the other great democracies ofthe Atlantic area, 
and primarily the United States - which has, twice in this century,  made a de-
cisive contribution towards saving the freedom of Western Europe -only a 
Europe that is open to all peoples having ideals, values and principles in com-
mon and mindful of the urgent need for Europe to inake its presence felt in the 
world once again. 1 
-56 -At the close of his speech, President Saragat st~ted that the meeting in.Rome 
of so many leading politicians  to celebrate  the tenth anniversary  of the 
Treaties was also bound to have a decisive influence on the future of Europe. 
He added : ' .•... In this Assembly indeed are represented at the highest level 
all men of goodwill in the Six countries in agatheringwhichmakes us realize, 
in view of the immense value of what has been achieved, the still greater 
range of work that awaits us and which will remain, for all those who have 
lived through this moment in time,  as evidence of the moral cultural and po-
litical greatness of Europe;  of a Europe we look to as an independent power 
which will indeed maintain its links of friendship,  co-operation and alliance 
with the United States but which will pursue its own course of action  in the 
conduct of international affairs.' 
(Relazioni Internazionali, No.  22,  3 June 1967) 
2.  A motion by the Italian Senate for reviving European integration 
A group of 70 Senators, including Messrs. Angelini, Battino Vittorelli, 
Battaglia, Carboni, Gronchi, Micara, Moro,  introduced on 11 April 1967  in 
the Italian Senate a motion for reviving European integration.  This motion 
urges the Government to promote and support an organic plan for the gradual 
achievement of a supranational and democratic Europe in the conviction that 
only such a Europe can serve not only 'deep European interests but also the 
truest Italian interests '. 
The proposed plan should include : 
A,  in the institutional field 
an invitation to the European Executive to : 
a)  consider the broad lines of a commerci:;U policy aiming at and 
open to non-member countries which the Six undertook to 
achieve before 1970; 
b)  foster a common monetary policy with a view to the rapid intro-
duction of a European currency; 
c)  give a vigorous impulse to the Community's social policy in 
respect of social security,  assistance and health protection; 
-57-d)  ensure that this \vork should be of benefit to European integration. 
- a truly common energy policy based on the principle of competitivity and 
the luwesi pvs~ible price for energy sources; 
- a  common policy for transport and basic structures relating thereto. 
This plan should also provide for: 
- early transformatiOn of Euratom in accordance with Italian p:coposals on 
the subject.  Euratom should be changed into a new structure with wider 
powers in the whole field of scientific and technological research_  as well 
as in the space sector, to which the United Kingdom will bring the indis-
pensable contribution of its own achievements and its own capacity; 
- the direct election by universal suffrage of the European Parliament, 
with increased powers.  Until such time as appropriate conditions obtain 
for the unanimous approval by the Council of Ministers of the Communi-
ty of the draft convention approved by the European Parliament, the Sen-
ate requests the Committees concerned (1  and 3)  which have been made 
responsible for draft law No.  989 concerning the election of Italian dele-
gates to the European Parliament by direct universal suffrage, to take 
this into account; 
-the immediate setting up  of the European University in Florence to which 
the United Kingdom should be associated from the very beginning and 
which will testify,  in a tangible manner, to the resolve of the Six, meeting 
on the occasion of the tenth  anniversary of the Rome Treaties, to pursue 
the work undertaken. 
B.  As for the political aims, the plan should provide for the gradual 
introductionot-acoi"nmon"i-urop-e-an defence and foreign policy'  entrusting the 
task of drawing up precise proposals to the single Executive of the three Com-
munities whose powers for this task should be adequately increased.  The Exe-
cutive should make practical suggestions concerning the reform of the Atlan-
tic Alliance and the achievement of an equal partnership, as well as proposals 
for organizing European defence,  as repeatedly suggested by European par-
liamentary bodies and in particular by Western European Union Assembly. The 
single Executive,  in addition, put forward proposals for a common European 
policy vis-a-vis the United States, the East and the developing countries,  as 
well as on the problem of German reunification, bearing in mind, here again, 
suggestions made by European assemblies and in particular the Council of 
Europe.' 
- .)8  -3.  Italv reaffirms its support for the :c  _-;ession of the United Kingdom 
to the Common Market 
Mr.  Aldo Mora, Italian President of the Council, paid an official 
visit to London from 27  to 29  June; he was accompanied by Mr.  Amintore 
Fanfani,  Italia..11  Foreign Minister. At the close oftheirtalkswithMr. Wilson, 
British Prime Minirter and Mr.  Brown, British Foreign Secretary, a  joint 
communiqu!3 was issued in which,  inter alia, it was stated:  'Mr.  Mora and 
Mr.  Wilson discussed the question of the United Kingdom's accession to the 
European Economic Community.  They reaffirmed that Britain's entry would 
strengthen the political and economic unity of Europe and would enable the 
west European States to act more effectively to preserve peace and to improve 
East-West relations.  Mr.  Wilson stressed the importance that the British 
Government attached to an early opening of negotiations with the EEC concer-
ning Britain's application. 
Mr.  Mora and Mr.  Wilson particularly emphasized - bearwg in 
mind the proposals already put forward on various international occasions by 
Mr.  Fanfani and the warm support given to the idea of European technological 
co-operation which had been repeatedly expressed by the British Government 
-that it \vas a matter of importance and urgency for the European countries 
to make a  co-ordinated effort in the field of technological co-operation.  Indus-
trial developments of this type,  if they were to be pl'ofitable and effective and 
keep Europe in the  vanguard of technological progress, could only be achieved 
on a  European scale.  The two Prime Ministers agreed that co-operation in 
this field was essential to strengthening Europe, not only industrially but also 
politically.  They pointed out that is was in the very best interests of the EEC 
to take advantage (through British accession) of the major contribution Britain 
could make in terms of advanced technology.  To this end,  it had been agreed 
that bilateral contacts between the two countries should,  in the meantime, be 
stepped up ••••  Mr.  Mora and Mr.  Wilson discussed the problem of the nu-
clear non-proliferation treaty.  They agreed that the conclusion of this treaty 
would be a contribution to world peace and stability of the greatest importance, 
provided that adequate steps were taken to ensure that it won acceptance by  the 
greatest possible number of States.  They also hoped that the negotiations now 
in progress in Geneva would be brought to an early and satisfactory conclu-
sion •••• ' 
4.  A memorandum from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in connexion 
with Austria's association with the EEC 
.  With regard to Italy's vew on negotiations between the European 
Community and Austria following terrorist attacks in the Alto Adige region, 
- 5!::1-the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a memorandum in reply to the 
statement by the Austrian Minister of Foreign A~fairs complaining on 29 June 
1967, before the Austrian Parliament, about the lack of enthusiasm on Italy's 
part for the co-operation offered by the Vienna authorities for arresting the 
terrorists.  The memorandum reads as follows: 
'In connexion with the statement made in Vienna by the Austrian 
Minister of Foreign A:fifairs,  Mr.  Toncic-Sorini,  in reply to a parliamentary 
question concerning the offer made by the Vienna Government that the Italian 
Government should take part in enquiry committees and other initiatives of 
that kind with a view to looking into the circumstances under which terrorist 
attacks were made in the Alto Adige area, Italian official circles pointed out 
that our Government has always maintained that the co-operation of the Vienna 
Government is essential to prevent terrorist attacks originating in Austria. 
The suggestions made so far in connexion with the memorandum 
issued by the Italian Embassy in Vienna on 6 October 1966 are rather evasive. 
The Italian Government had requested the Austrian Government to take prac-
tical measures for putting an end to the terrorist aggression in the Alto Adige 
area.  Vienna only replied on 19 June 1967, merely refuting the Italian allega-
tion concerning the Austrian Government's responsibility for terrorist acts in 
that area and making a further offer of participation in an enquiry committee. 
In official circles, it is pointed out that this is not a matter of set-
ting up joint enquiry committees or establishing the responsibility for crimi-
nal acts in the Alto Adige area. It is essential that the Austrian authorities 
responsible for security,  should take adequate steps and police action in res-
pect of Austrian terrorists and give full support to the Italian police.  To 
achieve this, there is no need for further Austrian offers or suggestions for 
bilateral negotiations through diplomatic channels.  What needs to be done is 
to arrest and prosecute terrorists on Austrian soil.' 
(Relazioni lnternazionali,  8 July 1967) 
5.  Mr.  Zagari, Italian Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, 
discusses the larger Europe and its world-wide responsibilities 
In an article in 'Relazione Internazionali' Mr. Z agari, Italian Under-
Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, began by analizing the international si-
tuation,  in the light of which he emphasized that Europe must acquire the 
strength to make its voice heard on world problems on which peace between 
peoples was contingent. 
- 60-'Europe was absent at Glassboro and absent at Yalta, thus demon-
strating its inability to take a leading part in world affairs.  This is not the 
first time that this has happened and we might even say that this is the basic 
characteristic of the Europe of today.  If,  in the past, some pretended that far-
off conflicts such as  the war in Vietnam were alien to Europe,  such an excuse 
fell clattering to the ground when it came to the Middle East crisis.  The war 
knocked at our gates and,  close at hand,  the balance of the world threatened 
to crumble and Europe stood and stared, a non-participant today as it was 
yesterday.  And once again the solution to the crisis - if there is going to be a 
solution in the near future - will be based on a direct agreement between the 
two powers which hold the world in balance.  What we need is a power that can 
straighten the rudder and to couple the great powers to an international policy 
embracing all today's problems, from nuclear non-proliferation to disarma-
ment, from collective security to a plan for giving the third world a new lease 
of life and such a comprehensive policy could only be promoted by a new pow-
er, that is one at the level of a  Europe strengthened in its structure, integra-
ted politically and widened, first of all, to include the United Kingdom ••••• ' 
' ••• The central issue is thus the accession of the United Kingdom. 
Only with the United Kingdom will Europe be able to strengthen its democra-
tic structure, achieve political and economic dimensions commensurate with 
its history and face up to the problem of the technological gap.  We are, there-
fore,  at a stage in the development of international relations when solving the 
problem of Europe's political and economic unity cannot be deferred any lon-
ger; and this can only be solved by enlarging the Europe of the Six to take in 
the United Kingdom  •••..  .''' 
Mr.  Zagari refuted arguments wholly opposed to this and he refuted 
the arguments of those who supported British exaction to the Community un-
conditionally.  He went on: '. • •  we should go forward boldly and perseveringly 
to achieve the aims laid down in the Rome Treaties which the United Kingdom 
has accepted unconditionally; we should discuss the individual problems that 
will come up in negotiations; we should wholeheartedly demonstrate that we 
have the political will to overcome the technical obstacles that may still stand 
in the way of British entry ••••• In conclusion, we stand at one of the major 
turning points in history. If Europe succeeds in overcoming the passive resig-
nation with which it has opted out of the sphere of international affairs in the 
post-war era, it will then be able to play a decisive part in solving the basic 
problem of our time which is to promote economic development and social 
progress, not in a vacuum or in a desert oasis but in thewhole world  by 
means of long-term peHce strategy.' 
(Relazioni Internazionali,  No.  29,  22  July 1967) 
- 61-.,!,"r.
.;.
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg
The foreim oolicy of the Luxembourg qgvernment
On L3 July 1967 , Mr. Pierre Gr6goire,  Minister for Foreign Affairs,
made a statement tm the Chamber concerning the foreign policy of his Govern-
ment; this was ln answer to a parliamentary  question.
Among the problems which he discussed, it is worth quoting those
concerning security and the $uropean Communities.
'As far ag we are concerned,  European  security could not in any
way be taken to irnply aunilateral dismantlement  of our defences, or thewith-
drawal of Europe from the forces assigned to the Atlantic Alliance at a time
when we are still oonfronted wlthin a very close radius lvith a considerable
military poten{ial, which is endowed  with the most modern and the mostpower-
ful technical resources. Not could there be any question of swapping, as it
were, the diesolution  of the Warsaw Pact for the dissolution of NATO.Indeed,
we are well aware that the Warsaw Pact is backed up by a close network  of
bilateral agreomente, to which one must add the close links behveen the poli-
tiaal parties in power in the East European countries, sothatthedisappearance
of an apparent  auperstructure would not necessarily change th.e reality of. a
solidly establlshed politioal and military situation.  There are some who are
attempting, with reference  to European security, to reach a settlement
between the European States, leaving the United States out; in our opinion no
balance ts possible in Europe  urlegs we remain firmly grounded on Atlantic
solidarity.
Hence European  security could not rnean either aunilateral a.bandon-
ment, however it were dressed up, nor negotiations entered into on unequal
conditlons. It mugt involveatwo-wayeffort  designed to eliminate the cleep-
seated political snd military causes for the present  tension.
To begin with the political causee, this means firsi of all a just
solution to the German  problem or, in more concrete terms, that progress
chould be made towards the rewrification of this artificially divided country
Only by eliminating this quite abnormal situation  left over from the second
world war will it be possible,  once and for all, to consolidate the Eastern
frontiers of Germany and thus make it possible to create within central Europe
a etable territorial situation which is recognized  by everyone . '
-62-Our own relationships with the East European countries also 
need to be liberalized, both \Vith respect to tlw movemenl of persons and to 
economic exchanges. Much has already been done to this end but any further 
progress predicates a modification by the East, of a whole range of ideas and 
practices which are inconsistent ·with the development of free movement and 
of trade. 
This normalization of political and economic conditions in Europe 
should be accompanied by  a disarmament \Vhich will only be meaningiul if it 
goes all the way,  involving every category of armaments, \Vhether conventional 
or nuclear.' 
The Minister then recapitulated the broad outlines of the French 
theory on the weakening of the Six through the accession,  to the Treaties of 
Rome and Paris, of other European States,  which Mr.  Couve de Murville had 
put forward at the meeting of the Councils on 10 July 1967. 
Mr.  Gr~goire explained the reasons why his Go\Ternment could not 
endorse this theory: 'For my part,  although I recognize the validity of some 
of the arguments of the French Government, I stated in the Council that we 
now have to make a  choice behveen the present Europe and what \Ve  regard as 
the "best Europe", taking care only to apply economic,  monetary and agri-
cultural criteria. I further stated in the Council that the problems raised witl1 
Mr. Couve de Murville could, in my vie-w,  be overcome if they were set in the 
context of the Community's general policy and future objectives. It should not 
be forgotten,  first of all, that the European Treaties are open agreements 
because Article 237  of the EEC Treaty, for example, provides for the acces-
sion of other European cotmtries. These countries must naturally accept the 
Treaties as they are and the regulations issued in pursuance of the Commu-
nities constitutional texts. In my opinion the only changes acceptable \\'Ould 
concern the institutional provisions such as, for example, the balance of 
votes and the budgetary and financial stipulations, notably the different contri-
bution scales. 
Any further derogation from the Treaties and the way they are 
applied should be transitional in character. In relation to the number cmr1 degree 
of such transitional derogations, the member States could judge whether the 
applicant should be admitted at once or if that State had to have a provisional 
period before its complete accession.' 
In the opinion of the Luxembourg Go\'E!rnment,  a Community 
comprisiJ1g ten or eleven members would be more difficult to operate theu1  one 
of six, but we believe that the real difficulty lies in an extensive application of 
- 63  -the unanimity rule. If, on the other hand,  the qualified majority rule was 
strictly applied in the Community with referrence to all but vital issues, then 
the latter would,  in our opinion, be able to operate perfectly satisfactorily.' 
' ..... Our Government also recognizes that the present Community 
of the Six will find it difficult to assimilate three or four new States at the same 
time but cond.itions could be envisaged, for example, for a phasing of the 
accessions or else in the first stage for creating a free trading area between 
the Community and certain of the applicant States.' 
(Bull~tin de documentation du service luxembourgeois d'information et de 
presse, 15 July 1967) 
- 64-Netherlands 
1.  Government investiture statement on Dutch foreign policy 
On 18 April Mr. de Jong, the Dutch Prime Minister, delivered a 
Government statement of which extracts follow : 
'In the field of international relations Government policy continues 
along the main lines followed by previous Cabinets in close collaboration with 
the States General. This applies in particular to the important issue of Euro-
pean affairs. The policy pursued for years by the Government in the European 
Communities and in Western European Union will be continued as before. The 
Cabinet hopes to be able,  jointly with other countries,  to take advantage of the 
increased scope for easing tension between the East and West. With this in 
view,  and in order that the problems existing at the heart of Europe can be 
progressively solved, the Government will continue to treat a powerful Atlantic 
Alliance - adapted to any changes in the situation and capable of pursuing an 
effective common policy - as an important positive factor. 
The Government attaches great weight to the early conclusion of a 
world treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear arms. It does not feel that 
such a treaty would necessarily hamper the objectives of the Euratom Treaty 
or the prospects it opens up. This is why it will negotiate with confidence both 
in Euratom and in any other alliance. In this field the Government has taken 
initiatives -particularly in the context of Benelux - which should help to 
smooth over the differences that still exist. 
In its programme the Cabinet accords a high degree of priority to 
the expansion of development aid and closer co-operation with the developing 
countries. Development aid should be still further increased in the years to 
come, both in an absolute sense and in terms of national revenue. The best 
way of doing this would be to bring aid up gradually to 1 per cent of the national 
income. 
The Govr·rnmurt i3 going to submit to the States General afour-year 
plan covering deve! opment aid from the Nether  lands . This will allow for greater 
support for the anti-hunger campaign in Asia and Mrica. 
- 65  -Wi~l1 a vie\\' to 12ncouraging Dutch industry to sh:.we in these efforts 
v.  ours, the Government intends as soon as possible to introduce a Bill for the 
C'I)Vering  of the political rit:ks attendant on investment in the developing 
countrieR,  It  ~lopes that such a  system of guarantees will stimulate the flow of 
}Jrivate  investment to  t~1e developing countries. 
I_h~_:  ·i~~·engthening  .s?L~.9.2_~gm.:0, str~~~res  is the object of an overall 
policy, This means: 
a)  creating 0  f<tvourable climate of investment and the encouragement 
of national savings with a view to maintaining :::thigh level of 
investment: 
b)  anti-inflatiomlry measures and keeping a watch on our country's 
competitive position: 
c)  :1ccepting foreign undertakings likely to strengthen the structure 
of our economy. 
The Government will also strive to improve economic structures by 
continuing to rlevote Rttention to research and development. 
The Government also recognizes the value,  both in the regional 
sphere and in certain other sectors,  of more specific policies to supplement 
its overall policy.' 
(Debates of the  Seconci  Chamber,  extraordinary session 19G7,  r.1eeting of 
18 April 19n7) 
2.  ExLracts from the speech from the throne at the opening of the 
States General  -----A------
On 17 September,  b  a speech from the throne at the traditional 
O}Jening  of the session of the States General, Queen Juliana sketched out the 
broad outlines of the policy the Netherland<> Government intended to pursue. 
With regard to Europ(~an and international problems, the Queen said: 
'Our country is co-operating fully in the work of completing the 
C •)mmon Market and constructing the European economic union. In the meantime 
the Government 0-ttaches prime import3llce to the manner in which the appli-
caUons for entry into the EEC submitted by  the United Kingdom,  Ireland and 
- 66-the Scandinavian  cor.rntries are handled,  A further barring of these accessions,
which will maintain the existing division in Western Europe, would srouse
g.::e:rt concern iir the Government and, without doubt, adr.'ersely  affect the
i)rogress of European integration.
The Government looks to the next Benelux Conference  to usher in a
period of even closer co-opeiration.
The position of the developing countries calls for closer and closer
attention by the Government in framing its policy. The Government intends in
1968 to make a substantial  increase  in the Netherlands' contribution  to aicl for
the developing countries.  Moreover,  it rvill make better use than in the pastof
the resources and t,alent.s of our people. Assistancewillbeallthemoreeffective
for being concentrated on a smaller number of countries.
In the international sphere - for example, at the forthcoming  Second
World Conference  on Trade and Development - the Government will press for
measures to ensure social andeconomicgrowthinthedevelopingcountries. . . . .'
(Joint meeting of the trvo Chambers for: the opening of the 1967-68  session
of the States General)
3. !p-eggi1-!:,_.![ir._iJe  Jong, Prime Mini_ster of thp Netherlands,
before the Congress of the European  Movement
In the introduction  to a speech made in Nijmegen on 20 May 1g6?
Congress  of the European  Movement,  Mr. De Jong briefly outlined
that had been made to achieve European  integration.
before the
the efforts
Despite all shortcomings, he thought there had been real progress.
'1968 will see the completion of the customs union and of the common  agri-
cuJ.tural market; in L970 we should have a harmonized turnover-tzur  system;
;ilore than twc:ntv crr:ntries  a.r'e associated with the EIIC, and a single supra-
nationai Exi'i-:...rtirre r',rill occupy itself rvith the running of thethree Communities.
As to the future, the Goi.'r i"nrnent considers that Sui:opean  integration
oughi. to extend to al'l free Europe and not merely to the Eulope of the six.
Integratibn  must be rooted in democracy.Tilismeansendolvii',gtheComrnunities
_;r' 
.
-67-with a highly democratic constitutional structure. It follows that the position 
of the Executive must be strengthened to the utmost. Finally it is essential to 
interweave the economies of the European States as closely as possible, 
customs union being only a first step; in the field of transport, energy and 
social and commercial policy little progress has so far been made. 
The Kennedy Round negotiations have shown how the Commission can 
serve as the driving force.  The merger of the Executives can go a long way 
towards strengthening this Community  institution. However,  as decisions 
affecting the fortunes of European citizens are taken more and more in Brussels, 
the more pressing will become the need for greater parliamentary control at 
European level, this having lagged far behind the process of integration as a 
whole. The Government attaches great importance to a rapid strengthening of 
the powers of the European Parliament, even if, because of the views held in 
certain European countries of the duties and position of national Parliaments, 
the necessary agreement cannot be reached in the near future as it should be 
in the view of the Netherlands.' 
As regards the outward-looking character of the European Commu-
nities, the Prime Minister said: 'The basic principle of European integration 
has always been that a united Europe should embrace the greatest possible 
number of democratic countries. Only six States signed the European Treaties 
in 1957. Following the example set by the United Kingdom a number of Euro-
pean countries went their own way. Today, ten years later, Britain can be 
considered, from the political point of view, to have made at that time a serious 
mistake. The EEC Treaty lays down that any European country may apply for 
membership of the Community. The Netherlands Government has always urged 
the Six to take a  constructive attitude to requests for accession. The virtual 
refusal to admit Britain in 1963 therefore came as a  shock to our country. 
Today almost the entire population of Britain supports its Government's new 
application,  a circumstance that gives it all the more force. Obviously there 
are a number of difficulties to be overcome before Britain can be admitted to 
the Community,  and on these the President of the French  Republic has not 
failed to dwell at some length. Unlike the French head of State, we believe 
that,  given sufficient political will among all the Six,  it should certainly be 
possible to find a technical answer to these problems within the context of the 
Treaty of Rome. 
It is said that the character of the Communities would be changed if 
other countries join it,  and that these new members would act as obstacles to 
European integration. We have no idea as to how these obstacles would arise. 
Inasmuch as the new member States wish to take part in the work of European 
integration, their accession can only strengthen the Communities and impart a 
fresh impetus to European affairs. It is also argued that the accession of 
several members would hamper the taking of decisions in the Community. 
- 68-The Netherlands does not regard this risk as so great, provided all are willing 
to apply the procedure laid down for the purpose in the Treaties. In the insti-
tutional field,  the United Kingdom is ready to accept everything which  the Six 
themselves at present accept. 
We  can look to Great Britain and the other applicants to support 
balanced relations between the members of the European Communities,  and 
this will have a stabilizing effect on European co-operation. 
The policies of the Netherlands and of the United Kingdom with 
regard to the Atlantic Alliance run on parallel lines; and,  finally,  there exist 
between the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and the Scandinavian countries 
striking similarities of approach towards a number of political and adminis-
trative problems.' 
Turning to the Community's policy on co-operation with the devel-
oping countries, and in view particularly of the fact that the  Yaound() Convention 
is due to expire in 1969, Mr. de Jong asked whether, in view of Europe's 
world status, it would not be desirable to abolish any discrimination between 
the developing countries and, for the sake of fairness,  to extend the tariff 
preferences accorded by the industrialized countries to all developing countries. 
In his view,  the position of the developing countries had not been given suf-
ficient consideration during the Kennedy Round negotiations. Greater attention 
would therefore have to be paid inGATT,  too,  totheinterestsofthesecountries. 
'European federation and the Atlantic Alliance,' concluded Mr. DeJong, 
'are, I am firmly convinced,  complementary rather than opposite. They 
strengthen each other and are both needed for the vigorous and peaceful de-
velopment of our continent. This is why I oppose the tendency to see an insuper-
able contrast between them and therefore to segregate European countries in 
an Atlantic and a continental camp. Europe will indeed have to put its house in 
order before it can become an equal partner in the Atlantic Alliance. But this 
does not mean that in order to get over Europe's internal troubles we have to 
move away from the Atlantic Alliance - still less that we should make a foolish 
retreat into a helpless and dangerous isolationism. In that way we would 
tarnish the  ideal of a united Europe - a Europe united not only in itself but 
also with the other countries of the free world,  a power in the world serving 
the cause of peace and stability and the preservation of freedom, and dispensing 
aid to the needy peoples of the earth.' 
( Nieuw Europa ,  No.  5, May 1967) 
- 69-On 5 May 1967 Mr. Luns, the Dutch Foreign  Minister, \Vas .. warded 
the Charlemagne Price by  the city of Aachen. On this occasion he deliverecl 
an  !lcldress in which he stated that the main shortcoming of the European 
Community \vas its limited membership and that the accession of Britain and 
coWltries like Denmark and Norway would help to overcome this. 
Admission of those countries was such a glaring necessity for 
European unification that it could not be further delayed. 
Mr. Luns went so far as to speak of the limitations of the existing 
set-up and dwelt on the inadequacy of a Community that comprised only half of 
Western Europe. 
'A further weakness,' he went on to say, 'is that the powers of the 
Parliament have clearly not kept pace with general progress in the Community, 
a fault which will make itself felt more and more as integration progresses.' 
'The lag, particularly at institutional level, underlines the danger 
of marking time, but there is yet another danger - that of Europe being so 
engrossed in its own problems as to neglect its vitally important relations 
with the rest of the world. All the efforts made will serve no purpose if Europe 
turns in upon itself and encases itself in a shell of isolationism. To escape 
into isolationism in the world of today would in any case be as illusory as to 
believe that from a position of isolation - that is, without the help of the 
United States -Europe could solve its major problems. We want to be not 
only Atlantic Europeans but also world Europeans.' 
Finally Mr.  Lw1s  said he saw political unity coming to Europe in 
the more distant future.  'The ultimate goal is the political union which will 
bring us to the threshold of the United States of Europe. We should therefore 
not allow ourselves to be sidetracked but move forward along the highway to 
integration we have so far followed.' 
'As to my ovm country,  I can tell you,' woWld up Mr.  Luns,  'that  we are 
ready to take part  in a European federation not in the distant  future but tomorrow, 
even today. We are not losing sight of this objective and all our efforts are directed 
towards it.' 
(Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant,  5 May 1967) 
- 70-5.  Standing Committee on External Affairs 
During the Commission's public d8bate on the report concerning the 
implementation of the EEC and Euratom Treaties in 1966,  Mr. Luns, the 
Dutch Foreign Minister, spoke of the meeting held in Rome on 2 9 and 30 May 1967 
to commemorate the tenth anniversary of the signing of the two Treaties. In 
the course of that meeting Mr. Luns made the following remarks on political 
co-operation: 
'In the field of political co-operation in Europe,  which we regard as 
essential for real European unity,  we can achieve far more by not confining 
ourselves to the narrow scope offered by the Six. A truly European voice can 
never,  in the opinion of my Government, be the voice of the Six alone. This i.s 
why the Dutch Government has always believed that it would be useless to open 
political consultations in which the United Kingdom did not take part from the 
outset. That the United Kingdom is ready to do this you all know.' The Dutch 
Government starts off with the assumption that such co-operation ought to be 
intergovernmental. Within the Six, the Netherlands is prepared to co-operate 
at political level only on the basis of integration. 
During the ensuing discussions the Netherlands representative 
stressed that to resume consultations between the Six would be a step towards 
a divided Europe and would draw the European countries still further away 
from their ideal of a united Europe and from the principles on which co-operation 
should have been based. This was all the more unacceptable.to the Nether  lands 
because Britain has signified its intention  of  signing the Rome Treaties and of 
abiding by all the rules. 'I should like to point out that there is not the slightest 
need to create a special forum for political discussions between the Six, 
because we have regular meetings in Western European Union and whenever 
such a discussion is necessary,  we also come together constantly in Brussels. 
To institutionalize these meetings would be to accept the French concept of 
political union in a restricted Europe,  something which runs absolutely counter 
to our own views . 
We have,  after  all,  agreed to a new meeting of the Heads of State or 
Government, probably in the course of 1967 .  This summit conference will not 
be prepared by the Ministers, following the Netherlands' express request that 
even the faintest suspicion of "institutionalization" should be  avoided. ' 
Mr. Luns confirmed that Mr. Moro had stated during the' conference 
that an 'institutionalized' meeting of the Heads of Government could widen the 
range of  instruments available to the Community. According to Mr. Luns, it 
could do so only if the Six as a whole wanted to strengthen the Community 
through this type of consultation. 
- 71-The original text of the communiqu~ tended towards the 'institution-
alization' of political discussions. In the end the Nether  lands representatives 
agreed,  as a final concession, that the possibilities could be explored.  '1  can 
certainly state before this Chamber', went on Mr. Luns,  'that these pussibi-
lities are extremely limited. I cannot see much being achieved in that direction. 
Months may pass before we realize that there is still a paragraph 5 in the 
communiqu~.' Mr. Luns gave the following reasons for rejecting institution-
alized political discussions: 'We  are undermining the importance of the Com-
munity institutions and,  in addition, the chances of their gradual transforma-
tion into political bodies,  although this has always been our aim and what we 
had in mind when we signed the Treaties of Rome.' 
If, against all exoectations, Britain's entry was blocked by the 
obstinacy of one member of the Community, Mr. Luns foresaw not only a 
crisis in the Community but even more determined opposition from the Dutch 
Government to political consultations. 
Mr. Luns recalled his Government's attitude during the discussions 
of what it had been agreed to can the secmid Fouchet Plan.  I At that time we 
had gone a long way towards accepting the institutionalization of political dis-
cuss  ions on the basis of the sovereignty of member States. However,  we stipu-
lated a condition which would undoubtedly be put forward again today - namely, 
that at a given moment intergovernmental co-operation must give place to co-
operation at supranational level. We succeeded then in winning over the other 
countries to our way of thinking. Nevertheless - and I still think it was a mis-
take -the French Head of State rejected this proposal on 23  April 1962.' 
In answer to a question regarding the possibility of political consul-
tation between the Seven in Western European Union,  Mr. Luns said that such 
discussions would be of no real use because his French colleague, for example, 
never attended them. The fact remained that Mr. Luns was in favour of 
extending political discussions to the Seven. 
Finally Mr. Luns expressed his readiness to co-operate closely 
with the Parliamentary Committee regarding any proposals that might be made 
on political consultations among the Six. 
The question of British entry was also raised at the summit confer-
ence. At first an attempt had been made to make this the main item on the 
agenda, but the Nether  lands had resisted it on the grounds that the procedure 
for studying a request of this sort was quite clearly laid down in Article 237 of 
the Rome Treaty. It could therefore be regarded as a step forward that the 
Six agreed to follow the procedure specified in Article 237  and to refer the 
question to the Council of Ministers in Brussels. 
- 72-The Dutch Government did not share the concern felt in Paris about the 
position of the pound or about the commitments theE  EC would have to take over in 
view of the pound's role as a reserve currency. Opinion in Paris was not, indeed, 
opposed to an analysis of how Article 108 came to be inserted in the EEC Treaty. 
General de Gaulle was considering the possibility of an association be-
tween Britain and the EEC. Neither the United Kingdom nor the Governments of 
theN  ether  lands ,  Belgium and the Federal Republic saw any advantage in that. 
As to whether the Community's economy might be slowed down by 
Britain's entry/ Mr. Ltuls stated that Britain would have to accept the EEC as 
it was - a view which was indeed shared by that country. Even if Britain was 
not at the moment economically one of the strongest countries, this had been 
just as true of France in 1958.  Mr.  Luns therefore did not regard the situation 
of an applicant country as a sufficient reason for barring its entry. 
Merger of the Executives 
As regards the rotation in office of Presidents of the European 
Commission,  Mr. Luns said that at one time an attempt had been made to have 
a  single President for the Benelux countries. This proposal was again raised 
when the President of the new Executive was appointed; but the Netherlands 
had turned it down  in both cases. 
With regard to 'democratizing' the Community and,  in particular, 
strengthening the powers of the European Parliament, the Government promised to 
do all in its power to that end. 'I must, alas, repeat at this meeting of the Commis-
sion that, although the Federal  Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, Belgium and, 
to a lesser extent, Italy, are in favour of democratization, the Parliaments and cit-
izens of these countries show no marked enthusiasm about it, at all events far less 
than we.' 
Mr. Westerterp (Catholic People's Party) reminded Mr. Luns of 
the promise he had made two years previously to try, during the preparation 
of the Council's new rules of procedure-which have to be adopted by a simple 
majority - to insert an article providing for publication of the minutes of that 
institution. Mr.  Lu..'ls  took note of this. 
The question of the association of third countries with the Commu-
nity was also discussed at the meeting. The Foreign Minister stated that his 
Government had informed the· Council that he saw no point,  under existing 
circumstances,  in going ahead with the association of Algeria and other 
Maghreb countries. 
- 73-As regards Algeria,  Mr.  Luns said it was unfair always to treat 
that country as a French Department; this situation was devoid of legal foun-
dation and some other arrangement ought in fact to be found. 
In general, like Mr.  Berkhouwer (People's Party for Freedom and 
Democracy),  Mr.  Luns felt that it was unreasonable to set up as special phi-
losophy of association.  Each request for association should be judged on its 
particular merits. 
The Committee decided to submit to the Chamber a motion presented 
by Mr.  Oele (Labour Party) regarding the action to be taken on the association 
agreement between the EEC and Greece.  The Committee considered that the 
absence of democratic and parliamentary standards in Greece had blotted out 
an essential factor in the implementation of the agreement.  It requested the 
Government to use its influence to suspend negotiations on the application of 
the agreement so long as restrictions were placed, for political reasons,  on 
the freedom of movement of the elected representatives of the Greek people 
and parliamentary democracy could not function (1). 
In a motion tabled by Mr.  Berkhouwer (People's Party for Freedom 
and Democracy) on relations with Israel, the Committee called for an asso-
ciation between the EEC and that State (1).  The Government saw in that motion 
support for its policy. 
As regards harmonization in the social sector, the Minister for 
Social Affairs,  Mr.  Roolvink,  replied to questions on the Council meeting of 
5 June.  'It is an open secret,' he said,  'that France is trying, not unskilfully, 
to restrict the Commission's freedom of movement to a minimum and even to 
suppress it entirely.'  The Dutch Government had opposed this attitude.  The 
views of the other members of the Council lay somewhere between these 
extremes.  In particular, the Dutch Government has tried,  with backing from 
Luxembourg,  and,  to a lesser degree,  from Italy, to oppose procedural ar-
rangements for consultations between workers and employers which,  in prac-
tice,  could have narrowed down the Commission's powers. 
Mr.  Berkhouwer advocated introducing a  'European passport' which 
could replace national passports.  This would bring 'Europe' home to the man-
in  -the  -street. 
In reply to a question by Mr.  Westerterp (Catholic People's Party) 
on the primacy of Community law over national law,  Mr.  Polak,  the Minister 
of Justice said that in this respect Italy presented a problem because no 
(1)  Both motions were carried on 28  June by the Second Chamber. 
- 74  -uniform body of case-law yet existed there.  H  ..  added that he would refer the 
matter to the Council of the Ministers of Justice.  Because he was not very op-
timistic about the possibility of his Italian colleague modifying his country's 
basic law, he felt that the matter should be referred to the Court of Justice of 
the European Communities,  which had delivered a number of judgments some-
what on the lines suggested by the Netherlands. 
Referring to the European Parliament's resolution on the primacy 
of Community law,  the Minister of Justice  said he shared the  view  of  Mr. 
Westerterp whohad- without success- arguedinStrasbourgforwideruseofthe 
facilities for delegating the powers of the Parliaments to the national Govern-
ments once the European Parliament's powers had been increased.  The need 
for greater delegation of powers would be used by the Minister in support of 
his plea for widening the powers of the European Parliament. 
Finally, discussion turned to the lack of progress in Euratom.  A 
motion tabled by Mr.  De  Goede (Democracy '66),  suggesting that Euratom 
should be transformed into a  European technological Community in which 
Britain would have a place and which  - through a widening of its powers -
could become the instrument for pooling activities,  was then carried. 
Mr.  De Block thought that the motion ought to be rejected because 
Euratom had reached a state of deadlock and no progress had been made to-
wards solving the general problems of technology,  one of the major tasks 
which Euratom had set itself in 1965. 
Moreover,  Mr.  De Block asked whether it was really advisable to 
seek the answer in Euratom rather than in the wider context of the OECD. 
(Second Chamber, Permanent Committee on Foreign Affairs,  Extraordinary 
Session of 1967,  meeting of 7 and 8 June 1967) 
6.  Parliamentary questions 
a)  Apvlication of Article 235 of the EEC Treaty 
Mr.  Vredeling (Labour Party) put a number of questions to the 
Government on the application of Article 235  of the EEC Treaty.  He wanted, 
in particular, to know its views as to the legality of the following agreements 
- 75  -entered into by representatives of the Governments of EEC member States 
meeting in Council: 
i,  Agreement of 9 July 1961 on the measures and the procedure to be fol-
lowed to give effect to the agreement setting up an association between 
the European Economic Community and Greece; 
ii.  Internal agreement of 20 July 1963 on the measures and the procedure to 
be followed to give effect  to the association agreement between the Euro-
pean Economic Community and the Associated African and Malagasy States; 
iii.  Agreement of 12 September 1963 on the measures and the procedure to 
be followed to give effect to the agreement setting up an association be-
tween the Economic Community and Turkey. 
Mr. Luns, the Foreign Minister, replied that these should all be 
considered as agreements within the meaning of the constitution. This was why 
the Government had submitted them to the States General for approval. No 
article of the EEC Treaty prohibited member States from entering into such 
agreements or laid down any condition as to what form they should take. The 
Government therefore believed that the agreements had been lawfully entered 
into. 
The same applied, for example, to the agreements concerning the 
financial protocol annexed to the agreements setting up an association with 
Turkey and with Greece, 
Mr. Vredeling also asked the Government to say whether it con-
sidered that the agreement concluded between the member States to give ef-
fect to Articles 95  to 97  of the EEC Treaty were binding as far as the Com-
munity institutions were concerned. The agreement had not been published 
and the European Parliament had not been consulted on it, 
Mr. Luns replied that the procedure adopted by the Council on 
21  June 1960 concerning a standstill arrangement for the refund of internal 
taxes on  exports to an other member State and the levying of compensatory 
taxes constituted merely a policy agreement between the member States. It 
was not therefore binding on Community institutions. According to Mr. Luns 
the agreement in question could not be published because the minutes of  Coun-
cil meetings in which it was embodied could not be disclosed. 
- 76  -Mr. Luns added that the Government view was that member States 
were free to enter,  among themselves,  into policy agreements which did not 
necessarily have to satisfy the formal requirements of the EEC Treaty. An 
appeal could always be made to the Court of Justice in respect of the agree-
ments first menti Jned but not in respect of policy agreements entered into 
between the member States. 
(Second Chamber, Extraordinary Session 1967, Annex,  17 9) 
b)  Tariff situation of  Algeria vis  -~-vis the European Communities 
The following statement was made by the Dutch Government in reply 
to a question by Mr. Westerterp (People's Catholic Party) on the non-appli-
cation to products from Algeria of reductions in import duties which had been 
made in the course of intra-Community trade: 
'Since Algeria acquired its independence, its status vis-~-vis the 
EEC has not been regularized. During the preliminary talks held in the Coun-
cil of Ministers on 29 and 30 November 1965 on the subject of changes to be 
made in import duties with effect from 1 January·1966,  a discussion took 
place as to the extent to which reductions in internal EEC tariffs should once 
again be accorded to Algeria. The Benelux countries pointed out that the situa-
tion then prevailing, in which Algeria received the treatment of a member 
State, lacked any legal basis, was contrary to the provisions of GATT and 
could only be accounted for in terms of historical and political factors.  The 
Benelu.x countries  have  however, never wanted to confront Algeria suddenly 
with the import duties applied to non-member countries. 
In this connexion reference is made to the request addressed by the 
Algerian Government to the President of the EEC Commission on 28 Decem-
ber  1962 for the opening of talks on economic relations between the EEC and 
Algeria. Algeria also asked that, pending the results of these negotiations, 
the existing situation should be maintained. A similar request had been made 
in the letter addressed by the Algerian Foreign Minister to the President of 
the EEC Council on 18 December 1963. 
The ensuing exploratory talks between the European Commission 
and Algeria have not yet led to negotiations. 
- 77  -The EEC Council of Ministers has not taken a formal decision on 
the tariff system to be applied to Algeria because the EEC member States 
have not reached agreement among themselves. Member States consequently 
decided to act as each individually thought fit , pending a definite arrangement 
with Algeria. Italy and the Benelux countries decided to continue to levy on 
Algerian products duties identical to those in force on 31 December 1965 on 
products imported from member States . 
As regards agricultural products subject to the system of levies, 
Algeria is treated as a non-member country. 
Germany applies to Algeria the same treatment as to EEC member 
States. 
In France the existing system is maintained. With the exception of 
wine,  Algerian products are free from any kind of duty and agricultural prod-
ucts to which the levy system applies benefit from a duty-free quota.' 
(Second Chamber, Extraordinary Session 1967,  Annex,  453) 
c)  Draft trade agreement between the EEC and Spain 
In reply to a question by Mr.  Nederhorst (Labour Party) regarding 
the draft trade agreement between the EEC and Spain and the priority to be 
granted to Israel, the Foreign Minister stated that the Government was in 
principle ready to collaborate in an agreement between the EEC and Spain on 
the basis of which each would accord the other preferences, taking account of 
the economic development of Spain. 
The Netherlands had always thought the scope of the existing trade 
agreement between the EEC and Israel to be inadequate.  In the meantime 
Israel itself had announced that the agreement did not offer it sufficient advan-
tages and had therefore asked for association with the EEC.  The Government. 
felt that every effort should be made to meet Israel's request. 
- 78  -The Minister was ready to ask that priority sh9uld be given to 
Israel's plea for association. 
In Brussels the Netherlands had always championed the view that 
the advantages which could be granted to Spain in respect of products which 
were also major items of Israel's exports to the EEC,  should not be allowed 
to harm Israel's export trade.  The Minister readily confirmed that this atti-
tude would continue to be maintained in the future. 
(Second Chamber,  Extraordinary Session 1967, Annex,  267) 
- 79-Scandinavian countries 
The Scandinavian countries and the Common Market 
Introduction 
Great Britain's attempts to gain admission to the European Economic 
Community have had a marked influence on the policy of the Scandinavian 
countries. Although Denmark,  Norway and Sweden today 0i.splay a more posi-
tive attitude tov.rards the Common Market than five years ago, their basic an-
xieties remain the same.  The keenest champion of rapid entry into the EEC is 
Denmark; Norway follows somewhat hesitantly, while Sweden continues to be 
as concerned as ever about its political neutrality,  and Finland, now associ-
ated with EFTA,  is waiting on the sidelines. 
Since 1961/62 the situation has been changed by the progress made 
in EFTA.  Trade between the Nordic countries, in particular, has expanded 
beyond expectations.  The long-desired Nordic customs union has,  with the aid 
of EFTA, been practically achieved.  Trade between the four Nordic countries, 
for example, has been stepped up by 170 per cent since EFTA came into being, 
and among members of the Free Trade Area as a whole by 110 per cent.  To-
tal exports from EFTA countries have risen by about 70 per cent. 
Sweden today is for Norway a more important market than Western 
Germany and far and away the biggest outlet for its industrial products.  With-
in EFTA the 'Nordic market' is acting as a steadily growing counterweight to 
the Common Market.  Swedish imports from Norway and Denmark alone 
reached Skr.  713. 2m.  (625. 4)  and Skr.  592. 8m.  (537. 8)  respectively, while 
Swedish exports to Denmark increased to Skr.  908. 7m.  (794. 2)  and to Norway 
to Skr.1, 117m.  (904. 6).  Imports from Great Britain fell slightly (Skr. 1, 570.3 
as compared with 1, 57 2m.), while Swedish exports to Great Britain increased 
to Skr.1,274. 2m.  (1, 064. 8)  (1).  Sweden itself had a surplus of Slc ..  J. 0m.  in 
trade with its Scandinavian neighbours. 
(1)  Source: 'Industriekurier',  22  June 1967,  ~5 July 1967; 'Neue ZUrcher Zei-
tung',  17  May 1967 
- 80-Attitudes of the individual Scandinavian countries 
1.  Norway 
In October 1966 Prime Minister Per Borten stated that his country 
rejected the Danish proposals for a  common Scandinavian approach to entry 
into the EEC.  In a speech before Danish students he explained that  Norway 
was interested only in a  joint approach by the EFTA States; it would not there-
fore lend its support to any move that might threaten the solidarity of the 
EFTA countries.  Joint Scandinavian negotiations with the EEC would merely 
lead to the erection of new customs barriers in Europe. 
On 20 October 1966 the Norwegian Minister of Trade, Kaarl Willoch, 
also warned against the threat to the solidarity of the EFTA countries entailed 
by individual approaches to the EEC.  He rejected the Danish proposal that the 
Scandinavian countries should seek association with the EEC without Great 
Britain.  He put forward the same arguments during talks held in Brussels in 
1966  with the EEC Commission and the Belgian Government. 
Britain's new application for entry had a positive effect on Norway's 
European policy.  On 13  July 1967 the Starting approved by  136  to 13 votes the 
Government's proposal to put in a new application in Brussels for entry into 
the EEC.  Whereas the first Norwegian approach to the EEC in 1961/62 had 
been preceded by heated debates,  on this occasion the crucial problem - that 
of surrendering sovereign rights -was very soberly dealt with.  Mr.  Lyng, 
the Foreign Minister, argued that,  in exchange,  greater influence would be 
gained by Norway in an enlarged Community. 
Characteristic of the change in attitude were the statements of 
Prime Minister Borten, whose Centre Party (Agrarians) put up very stiff re-
sistance and who himself five years ago vigorously opposed Norwegian entry 
into the Common Market and pleaded for association.  He now argued,  in con-
tradistinction to his own party, that as part of Western Europe Norway ought 
to help in overcoming the present economic division.  Moreover,  Norway had 
to follow in the wake of Britain and Denmark in order to avoid the consequen-
ces of a possible break-up of EFTA. The Social Democrats showed themselves 
to be particularly keen on an approach to Brussels,  \','hereas among the anti-
labour parties making up the Government some preoccupation with the anxieties 
of~. :.>ters was discernib)e. 
- 81 -On 24 July 1967 the Norwegian Government expressed its desire to 
enter the EEC under Article 237  of the Treaty in a letter addressed to the 
President of the EEC Council of Ministers.  In this formal application Norway 
refrained from going into details ,  thus demonstrating its conviction that indi-
vidual questions could be solved in subsequent negotiations. 
2.  Denmark 
In a speech at Aarhus on 7 October 1966, Anders Andersen, Presi-
dent of the Danish Agricultural Council, put the case for Denmark's making an 
isolated approach should a  joint application with Britain, or with the other 
Scandinavian countries, not soon prove possible.  He emphasized that he had 
nothing against a  joint entry by Denmark, Britain and the other Nordic coun-
tries; indeed that was the solution he preferred.  Should it, however, turn out 
to be impossible, then Denmark would have to enter into negotiations on its 
own.  An isolated move by Denmark could not harm the interests of Danish 
agriculture.  'Reports that an isolated entry would have disastrous results for 
our agricultural exports merely betray ignorance of the problems involved. ' 
Denmark's membership of EFTA had not- he added- been of any advantage 
for its agricultural exports. 
On 11  October 1966 Prime Minister Krag held talks in Brussels 
with President Hallstein and some members of the EEC Commission.  The 
following day he gave an address on 'Europe and Denmark' before the 'Institut 
Royal des Relations Internationales'.  He did not feel - he said - that isolated 
Danish entry into the EEC was feasible under present conditions. It would 
neither solve Denmark's problems nor be desirable from the general European 
point of view; nevertheless the deadlock in European policy would have to be 
broken.  Great Britain and France alone held the key to the situation, and an 
initiative by the Nordic countries could have an important bearing on a fresh 
dialogue between Britain and France.  British entry into the Common Market 
was a crucial political problem for Europe. 
A few days following the Swedish-Danish conference held in Copen-
hagen during the latter half of October 1966, and a meeting of the Nordic 
Council in Oslo, there was little evidence of unanimity among the four Nordic 
countries on the questions of the EEC.  Something of a political storm had been 
let loose in the Scandinavian countries by statements made by the Danish 
Prime Minister and Minister of Trade.  Prime Minister Krag had spoken be-
fore the Council of Europe of some sort of joint approach to the EEC by the 
Nordic countries, while indicating that an isolated Danish move towards  as-
sociation was, under prevailing conditions, out of the question. Mr. Dahlgaard, 
- 82  -Minister of Trade, had announced a separate move by Denmark unless EFTA 
shortly took concerted action. 
Mr.  Willoch,  the Norwegian Minister of Trade, retorted in a speech 
delivered before the Storting in Oslo that he could not believe that a Nordic 
country could contemplate breaking up EFTA in this way. It was unthinkable 
that the Nordic countries should consider a link-up with the EEC that excluded 
Britain and the other EFTA countries~ Whether in the Kennedy Round or in the 
Brussels talks,  the Scandinavian countries could negotiate only on a  common 
basis. 
Mr.  Willoch returned to the subject in a radio broad  coast in which 
he said that the Danish appproaches to the EEC were being followed with 
growing anxiety.  Mr.  Dahlgaard, the Danish Minister of Trade and EFTA 
Minister, retorted that Denmark could give no assurance that it would always 
belong to the same trading bloc.  Denmark could not tie itself down for years 
to come but was nevertheless seeking a  joint solution of the problem of the 
European market. 
In July 1967 the Danish Government handed the EEC Commission in 
Brussels a memorandum requesting admission to the Common Market.  The 
Danish application of 1967 differs,  as far as the industrial sector is concerned, 
in an important respect from that of 1961.  In 1961 Denmark had requested a 
transition period for the reduction of duties on a number of products, particu-
larly those of the metal-using industries and leather and rubber goods.  Danish 
industry was now,  however,  no longer asking for any special transition period 
to enable it to adjust to the Common Market.  According to reports from Copen-
hagen,  the Danish Government statement covers in particular the following 
points: 
1) In the industrial sector Denmark can manage with a brief adaptation pe-
riod. 
2)  In the agricultural sector Denmark requires no transition period. 
3}  Denmark wishes to have a reasonable say in any negotiations between 
Britain and the EEC on the adaptation of the British food market. 
4)  Denmark desires consultations on certain aspects of economic union,  in 
particular on the EEC rules on the freedom of establishment. 
- 83  -5)  The special position of Greenland and of the Faroe Islands leads to a re-
servation regarding these two territories for which some arrangement 
will have to be considered on lines similar to those followed in the case 
of certain French Overseas Departments. 
This State - still young and with only 4, 6 00, 000  inhabitants - has 
greatly expanded its external trade since EFTA was founded seven years ago. 
Today the view has come to prevail that the much-vaunted market of 100 mil-
lion consumers would not in the long run make up for the losses feared on the 
170-million-strong Common Market. 
Danish farmers are becoming increasingly sensitive to the EEC's 
protectionist attitude towards agriculture, and is therefore the driving force 
on the question of entering the EEC. At the same time Denmark has long 
ceased to be an agricultural country; the crucial point, however,  is that it is 
very much an exporter of agricultural products.  Its farmers need the foreign 
markets on which they have to dispose of some two-thirds of their total out-
put, and the country itself needs the large amount of foreign exchange earned 
by these exports.  By far the biggest outlets for Danish farm products lie in 
Britain and Germany. 
Danish industry too is now driving deeper into the EEC and has al-
most entirely abandoned its reservations and in particular its fear of compe-
tition from the EEC countries.  This is due to the great success it has had on 
EFTA markets which has inspired a  wide measure of confidence among Danish 
enterprises.  In spite of wage increases such as have been experienced in 
scarcely another European country,  and high interest rates, Danish industry 
has achieved successes in the export sector undreamt of at the time EFTA was 
established.  Yet another fact of crucial importance is that agricultural exports 
were recently overtaken by industrial exports. 
These achievements have encouraged Danish industry to refrain 
from asking for special arrangements for specific branches of industry in the 
event of EEC entry; it is in fact prepared to accept the Rome Treaty and any 
regulations so far issued without exception, all the more so in order not to 
leave itself entirely unprotected against competition from the other EEC coun-
tries.  Farmers want immediately to take full advantage of the chances offered 
by the EEC, without any transition period, in order to be able to win back lost 
markets. 
- 84-3.  Finland 
In November 1966  Mr.  Rafael Paasio, the Prime Minister, pointed 
out that his country could not link up with the European Economic Community. 
Before the Congress of the Social Democratic Party in Helsinki he stated: 'It 
is very difficult for neutral countries to join the EEC since this amounts to 
recognition of a  supranational power of decision. '  His party's foreign policy, 
which set the pattern in the Popular Front Government,  aimed at maintaining 
good relations with all countries, of which those with the Soviet Union were a 
corners  tone. 
4.  Sweden 
With an allusion to ' new EEC shocks  1  the Swedish Association of 
Industries noted that in future Swedish suppliers would have to cope with tar-
iff rises of 2-6 per cent owing to the approximation of the domestic rates of 
the Federal Republic and the Benelux countries to the EEC 's common exter-
nal tariff.  The Association also feared that in 1968 the Federal Republic 
would,  in accordance with general EEC policy,  go over to the value-added tax 
system.  Imports would then - according to the results of the Association's 
investigation - lose the small margin of advantage they had till then enjoyed 
on the German market.  Swedish exports to Germany would have to bear a tax 
of about 10 per cent whereas German goods would,  on crossing the frontier, 
enjoy a corresponding relief because they were not subject to added value tax. 
At the opening of the Jtlnkoping Fair,  Mr.  Tage Erlander, the Swed-
ish Prime Minister, made known his reservations about the moves that were 
being considered, particularly in Denmark, to make a joint Scandinavian ap-
proach to the Common Market, if need be before or without Britain.  Mr.  Er-
lander said that he saw no advantage for Sweden in negotiating separately with 
the EEC.  The same attitude was taken by Mr.  Gunnar  Lange, Swedish Minis-
ter of Trade, in a Swedish radio broadcast on 27  September 1966.  A separate 
approach by Sweden,  Denmark and Norway without Great Britain was - said 
Mr.  Lange - at present ruled out.  Some form of co-operation between the 
two economic blocs other than association would perhaps be conceivable if it 
turned out that the political momentum of the EEC Treaty lost ground to eco-
nomic priorities. 
On 4 October 1966 the Danish and Swedish Heads of Government dis-
cussed policy in Copenhagen.  The talks covered tariff cuts in the Kennedy 
Round and the future pattern of a  common European market.  According to po-
- 85-litical observers the two statesmen failed to reach full agreement on the lines 
along which the market would be likely to develop.  At  all events, the proposal 
of Mr.  Krag, the Danish Prime Minister, that the Scandinavian countries 
should make a direct approach to the EEC  (a suggestion put forward by him 
before the Council of Europe in Strasbourg) met with a measure of scepticism. 
At a dinner Mr.  Erlander remarked: 'I doubt whether the Nordic countries 
ought at the moment to make approaches to the EEC on their own initiative. ' 
Many economic problems of the EEC had recently been solved but considerable 
problems still remained.  The two heads of Government agreed that Denmark, 
Sweden,  Norway and Finland, should adopt a common line in the Kennedy Round. 
Mr.  Gunnar  Lange, the Swedish Minister  of Trade, who presided 
over the EFTA Council during the first six months of 1967,  gave his views on 
integration and tariff problems at a press conference held on 9 February 1967. 
He pointed out that EFTA,  one of whose principal aims was the creation of a 
large West European market, was not an end in itself.  (The same views had 
been expressed by Mr.  Nilsson, the Swedish Foreign Minister, at the opening 
of the international St.  Erik's Fair in September 1966). A long time would have 
to pass before this market could be set up,  and in the meantime co-operation 
between the EFTA States ought to be consolidated.  The London EFTA manifes-
to, which dated back to the summer of 1961, was as valid as ever.  Under its 
provisions, any EFTA State wishing to enter into exploratory talks or negotia-
tions on integration had first to consult its EFTA partners. 
On 28  July 1967 Sweden applied for the opening of negotiations for 
membership of the EEC.  In handing over the application,  Mr.  Lindh. Ambas-
sador to the European Communities, stated that the Swedish Government did 
not exclude any of the formulas provided for in the EEC Treaty for participa-
tion in an enlarged EEC.  Actual membership had already been regarded with 
favour by the Swedish Government in 1961/62. In handing the  letter by Mr. 
Lange, the Minister of Trade, to the President of the Council,  Mr.  Lindh said 
that Sweden hoped for negotiations that would enable it to take part in enlarg-
ing the European Economic Community in a way that was compatible with con-
tinuing Swedish neutrality.  The Swedish Government was also ready and wil-
ling to enter into negotiations with the European Coal and Steel Community and 
Euratom. 
The three Opposition parties,  a number of Ministers of the Social-
ist Government and the Association of Industries had come down firmly in fa-
vour of applying for full membership under Article 237  of the EEC Treaty.The 
current application,  on the other hand,  reflects a  certain hesitation on the 
part of the Swedish Government.  Sweden is not,  in principle, prepared for 
full membership, but does not want to admit this too openly because of the at-
titude of its industry and the criticisms of the anti-Labour Opposition.  Stock-
holm's statement that Sweden  wishes  to play a part, on the broadest possible 
- 86-basis, in an enlarged Economic Community, while hanging on to its policy of 
neutrality,  is regarded as much too vague in the other capitals. While it is 
true that the various parties in Sweden agree that the policy of neutrality must 
be pursued unchanged,  opinion in the Centre and on the Right Wing is that, 
with adequate guarantees from the EEC, this could be reconciled with full 
membership.  The Government has of course made it known that the weakening 
of supranational trends in the EEC appears to make it possible for Sweden to 
become a full member.  The fact remains that the Community's ultimate aims 
are political ones.  These, however - as Mr.  Lange made quite plain - cannot 
and will not be  subscribed to by Sweden.  What Stockholm would like best of 
all would be a  combination of the advantages offered by the Community and ab-
solute independence,  including the right, for example, to conclude unrestrict-
ed trading agreements with third countries. 
(Die Welt, 1 September,  28 and 29N:>vember 1966; 13 January, 21 September 1967; 
(Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,  29September 1966;  9 February, 
15,  24  and 25 July 1967; 
Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,  30 September, 2 December 1966;  12 February, 
17  May,  30 July 1967; 
Industriekurier; 29 October 1966;  25 July 19n7; 
Le Monde,  7 February 1967) 
- 87  -Switzerland 
Switzerland and political integration 
Dr. Schaffner, member of the Federal Council,  informed the press 
on 7 ,July 1967 that the Federal Council had conveyed its views on the problem 
of integration - as announced in the National Council on 27  June - through 
diplomatic channels both to the EEC institutions in Brussels and to the Govern-
ments of the six EEC member States. 
Replying to an oral question (with debate) put by Mr. Weber on the 
Kennedy Round, Dr. Schaffner explained that the positive outcome of these 
negotiations had not finally solved Switzerland's integration problem. The 
senseless division of the European market remained; nevertheless it should 
now be easier to find appropriate solutions. By dismantling its external 
tariffs the EEC had shown that it intended to develop into an outward-looking 
world trader,  and that it took into account the interests of its closest trading 
partners. The deadlock in external trade relations appeared, therefore, to 
have been overcome. 
As ever, Switzerland aimed at the creation of a broad-based, free 
and outward-looking European market. If progress in this direction was to be 
made by enlarging the EEC, then Switzerland was determined to play a part in 
this development. Its central geographical position and the range of its eco-
nomic and cultural relations provided ideal conditions for such acontribution. 
In view of the uncertainty at present prevailing regarding integration, Switzer-
land did not therefore consider it necessary to issue another special statement 
in Brussels, even if other EFT  A countries were to take such a step. It  would 
also be prepared to consider new lines of approach to the problem, provided 
they allowed Switzerland a say in the matter in keeping with its economic 
importance,  and were compatible with Switzerland's constitution. 
In its 75th report on external economic measures and other trade 
policy matters, the Federal Council also expressed its views on developments 
in the EEC. 
The report went on to explain the Swiss position in the drive for 
European integration,  already outlined at the EFTA Conference held in Stock-
holm on 2 and 3 March 1967. This included the following points: since  all 
EFT  A countries continued to share the wish to form part of a large European 
- 88  -market, the freedom of movement already exj·. ·ing in the EFTA market 'must 
be p1·eserved and later incorpor.ated smoothly in a wider Community. Although 
the dogma of neutrality had lost some of its edge,  no fully satisfactory solution 
was in sight to the problems of neutral countries. It was important, therefore, 
in a complex situation of uncertainty and rapid change, to remain as flexible 
as possible and to keep an open mind towards any possible solution of the 
problem of European integration. 
After quoting the EFT  A statement issued in London on 2 8 April1967, 
the section of the report devoted to EFT  A points out that during the first six 
months of 1967 its internal activities were centred on the problems presented 
by non-tariff trade barriers and by the application of the rules of competition 
laid down in the Stockholm agreement. With the abolition on 31December 1966 
of the last duties still levied on industrial products, tariff problems have 
receded into the background. 
In September 1967 the external policy committee and the external 
trade committee of the Council of States held a joint meeting at which inte-
gration policy was discussed. 
Following this meeting, Dr. Schaffner outlined the situation before 
journalists accredited to the Federal Council. He pointed out that no radical 
changes had occurred in the situation since replies had been given to various 
questions involving debate during the spring and June sessions. Following 
Britain, Ireland, Denmark, Norway and Sweden had asked for the opening of 
negotiations last summer without specifying the ways and means. The EEC, 
however, had not issued its comments. The Swiss attitude to integration was 
direct and constant and not subject to day-to-day fluctuations. The Federal 
Council's objectives had been presented seven years previously in the state-
ment on Switzerland's entry into EFTA, which had been designed as only the 
first stage towards the creation of a comprehensive European market. Ever 
since, Switzerland had concerned itself with finding some reasonable way of 
doing away with the absurd division of the European market. 
Federal Councillor Schaffner pointed out that events to date clearly 
showed that Switzerland had neither missed a chance nor harmed other non-
member States in any way through its caution. No one, not even the least 
patient EFT  A country or any other European State, had been able to conclude 
a comprehensive agreement with the EEC. 
Switzerland, on the other hand, had used its influence in a field 
where progress could, under the circumstances, be reasonably expected, 
namely in the Kennedy Round. 
- 89-Before a clear-cut answer could be given to the question as to what 
form Switzerland's relations with the EEC could take, it would be necessary 
to know exactly what possibilities the EEC was considering for regulating its 
external relations. According to Dr. Schaffner it could not be ruled out that 
questions connected with an enlargement of the Community, which preoccu-
pations with the internal consolidation of the J!.;EC  had allowed to recede very 
much into the background, would now have to be more carefully investigated 
in Brussels. The new single Commission of the European Communities had 
been asked to submit a memorandum by the end of September. This would 
presumably start out from the British application for entry and analyse the 
effects which an enlargement of the Community would have on the efficiency 
and mode of operation of the present Community. The attitudes adopted by the 
EEC member States to all these questions would also furnish Switzerland 
with valuable clues for assessing the situation. 
(Neue ZUrcher Zeitung,  9 and 20 July, 30 September 1967) 
- 90  -II.  PARTIES AND  PROMINENT POLITICIANS 
1.  The Left Wing Gaullists and Europe 
The Left Wing of the Fifth Republic comprises several organiza-
tions with allegiances both to the Left and to Gaullism; the Convention of the 
Left is headed by Mr.  Louis Joxe and Mr.  Edgar Pisani.  On 26  Jaimary it 
published a political manifesto in which it stated its attitude to the construc-
tion of Europe. 
'Since the war Europe has been urged along the wrong course by men 
and by parties who have sought to make it a closed unit and who,  out of anti-
Communism, have thrusted towards building a federal system directed against 
the  Eastern Bloc.  This policy did not last long because it was in no way con-
sistent with the hopes of the peoples and because it threatened the identity of 
the individual nations.  European unification must be the work of men who 
stand for progress and reason. It should bring together all those countries 
which belong to the historical and geographical Europe and which accept the 
common regulations established by unanimous agreement. 
It is indeed out of the question for Europe to be  united while certain 
countries in the West are in a position -more often than not intentionally- of 
depending on the United States of America,  constantly calling for the estab-
lishment  of  an  Atlantic Community which would be fatal to Europe. 
As far as Europeans are concerned, the benefits resulting from the 
Common Market cause them to direct their attention to increasingly close co-
ordination, to programmes discussed and carried out together in  the economic, 
scientific, technological, agricultural and social spheres.  The needs of Euro-
pean planning must have priority over the interests and claims of the major 
companies of international capitalism.  Only concerted socialism will give the 
European peoples an awareness of their community of interests and guarantee 
their independence. ' 
The Gaullists of the Left consider that 'The nation is a fundamental 
reality in the political context' and, whatever the circumstances, 'it must re-
tain control over its means of production and equip itself when it can with 
those armaments which are today the only decisive qnes.' 
(Le Monde,  28  January 1967) 
- 91  -2.  The last message of Gaetano Martino 
Mr.  Gaetano Martino, former Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, 
was asked to contribute to a special edition of 'L'Europe en formation' on the 
tenth anniversary of the signing of the Treaties of Rome.  The following are 
extracts from his article which \Vas  entitled: 'The promoters of the Treaty were 
aiming at political unity'. 
'When we look at Europe as it was ten years ago,  it is impossible 
not to see the great, or should I say miraculous, results due to economic and 
social unity.  The Common Market -as the European Economic Community 
has come to be called - has not only accelerated, stimulated and increased 
Europe's economic progress but has also served as a  model and as an exam-
ple to other countries and other continents ••••• 
Having said and established this,  one should, however, point out 
that economic development did not go hand in hand with political development. 
The explicitly political clauses of the Treaties of Rome have not so far been 
applied •••••  There is a tendency at present to be satisfied with the results 
achieved, to restrict one's attention to consolidating these results and to avoid 
taking any further steps forward which might involve dangers,  and creating 
within a much wider context the same conditions as those that bind the national 
economies.  Admittedly, this is not the true course towards political unifica-
tion but this could be its beginning ••••• 
The greatest politicians in Europe, who carry some measure of 
responsibility, are perfectly aware that not only are all the reasons which 
underlay the elaboration of the Treaties of Rome still valid but that they have 
been supplemented by other reasons which should logically quicken the move-
ment towards unity.  I refer in particular to the re-emergence or recrudes-
cence of nationalist myths and to the scientific and technological gap which 
separates Europe from the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Now,  as the Treaties of Rome enter their second decade, I think we 
all need to remind ou.rselves of Robert Schuman's famous comment: "L'Europe 
ne se fera pas d'un coup,  ni dans une construction d'ensemble." We must there-
fore arm ourselves with patience and prudence; we must step up our work 
within the limits of the conditions laid down by this moment in time; we must 
not neglect any favourable opportunity which may help us to overcome the ma-
jor numerous obstacles which we shall meet on the road which we still have 
to travel •••••  1 
(L'Europe en formation,  No.  85, Apri11967) 
- 92  -3.  Several leading French politicians state their views on the accession 
of the United Kingdom to the Common Market 
Mr.  Jean Lecanuet,  President of the Democratic Centre said: 'I am 
extremely pleased at the United Kingdom's decision to apply for membership 
of the Common Market; it is one for which I  have been waiting for a very long 
time. 
It goes without saying that Britain's entry implies that she will ac-
cept the Treaties and subsequent regulations regarding the European economic 
organization and leading to a stage beyond economic unity that is the political 
unity of the  free  Europe. If these conditions are fulfilled,  I trust that the six 
countries of the Common Market and France in particular  ,will favour BrHain's 
entry into the EEC. 
With the United Kingdom,  Europe will be stronger and more demo-
cratic.  Strengthened in this way,  Europe will be able to assert itself both in the 
Atlantic Alliance and in efforts  to achieve a  d~tente with the east. ' 
Mr.  Gaston Deferre, President of the Federation of the Left  Group 
in the National Assembly said: 'The accession of the United Kingdom could 
enable us to restore the balance. If we reject the United Kingdom she will not 
remain alone.  She will join  the American camp.  This will further aggravate 
the imbalance between the Europe of the Six and the Anglo-Saxon world.  Some 
say that Europe will then become the "world's Switzerland''. 
The most recent public opinion poll on this subject shows that more 
than 50 per cent of the French people are in favour of Britain's accession to 
the Common Market. 
It would be inadmissible and it would be to ignore the wishes of a 
majority of the French people to refuse to begin negotiations or to refuse to 
take them to a point where it can be seen whether the vaTious viewpoints are 
reconcilable.' 
Mr.  Jacques Vendrou.x,  President of the Foreign Affairs Committee 
in the National Assembly stated: 'The United Kingdom has thus confirmed,  as 
expected,  its desire to  enter the EEC. 
No  one will doubt that it is our own wish to welcome the United King· 
dom to the EEC.  But how far will London go in its determination to obtain, 
- 93  -from its possible future partners, a re-phrasing of certain Articles in the 
Treaty of Rome?  Is it a question of reaching a compromise on provisions of 
secondary importance or is it, on the contrary, to he a question of changing the 
spirit and the letter of the texts to the point of setting up a real free trade area? 
In the first case France will no doubt have to make its contribution 
in the general interest and to adopt an understanding attitude.  In the latter 
case, the general interest would,  on the contrary, require that France should 
call upon its partners to join with her in carefully safeguarding the Treaties 
which at the present stag;e in their application can no longer be allowed to un-
dergo any change of djrection.' 
Lastly Mr.  Gis card d  1 Estaing, former Finance Minister, told the 
Daily Mail that General de Gaulle 'would not this time  veto Britain's entry 
into Europe: this is quite certa  i.n'. 
During the Congress on Europe which was organised by the Federal 
Trust for Research and Education and the Britain in Europe Group,  Mr.  Gis-
card d'Estaing added: 'We must realize, when we tackle the problems raised 
by Britain's entry into the EEC, that reciprocal interests are involved.  In 
1950,  Europe was already trying to find solutions to past difficulties.  The 
Europe of today is looking towards the future.  We  expect the United Kingdom 
to come and join its voice to that of Europe.' 
(Le Monde,  6 May 1967) 
4.  Mr.  Spaak's attitude to certain European problems 
Mr.  Spaak, former Belgian Foreign Minlster,  has published sever-
al articles in a leading Brussels newspaper stating his views on some current 
European issues,  including,  in partkular, the celebration of the tenth anni-
versary of the Treaties of Rome and the complexes and ,weaknesses of Europe. 
a}  The Tenth Anniversary of the Treaties of Rome 
• Mr.  Spaak was invited by the Italian Government to take paTt in this 
event but he felt that he could not associate himself with the celebration of the 
- 94-signing of the EEC and Euratom Treaties.  He found it regrettable that 'Fran-
ce's partners should give way in the face of an unjustified and unjustifiable 
whim' which consisted in twice thrusting aside Mr.  Hallstein,  President of the 
EEC Commission; France had denied him the right to speak on the occasion of 
:the anniversary of the Treaties celebrated in Rome on 29  May 1967 and had 
had him replaced at the head of the single commission which had resulted from 
the Treaty of 8 April 1965. 
In his opinion 'the German Government is quite as guilty as the 
French Government'.  By agreeing to thrust aside Mr.  Hallstein for reasons 
that had nothing to do with the calibre of the man and the sound operation of 
the organization,  it was creating a  situation which is full of dangers for the 
future. 
By refusing  to lend his support to the scheme that was proposed to 
him,  Mr.  Hallstein rendered the European Community a further service.  But 
this gesture would be in vain if,  in official and responsible quarters the state 
of affait's thus created were accepted without a protest. 
'Will the European Parliament, which has always been asking for 
more rights and more responsibilities, allow to be thrust aside without a pro-
test a man who had its esteem and its confidence? Will it, by saying nothing, 
be the accomplice of a policy that is anti-European, both in its spirit and in 
the way that it is carried out?' 
General de Gaulle's press conference of 16  May did no more than 
confirm Mr.  Spaak'  s  attitude.  'Injustice and ingratitude make me indignant 
whether they relate to a man who has given good service or to a people, the 
greater part of whose difficulties are a  consequence of the efforts that it has 
made for our general benefit. ' 
b)  Europe's complexes and weaknesses 
Mr.  Spaak found that the States of Western Europe had taken refuge 
in a position of weakness, neutrality and egoism.  'At the most recent meeting 
in Luxembourg of the Atlantic Alliance, its fifteen members were agreed that 
they should consult each other about the problems of the Middle East but they 
abandoned the idea of trying to reach an agreement and they even propounded 
the peculiar theory that it might be better if there were certain divergences of 
view between them.  They could not  at  any price  allow it to  be  thought  that 
- 95-the Western States constitued a bloc.  A peculiar modesty,  a peculiar form of 
prudence. As soon as a conflict breaks out, the USSR brings tl1e  Communist 
countries together and endeavours to obtain their agreement with its policy 
and itself takes credit for having done so.  The leaders of the Arab States meet 
to try to reach an agreement.  The African States and those of Latin America 
do not conceal their efforts  to co-ordinate their action and the unaligned coun-
tries are particularly active,  if not particularly successful, in their initiatives. 
There is only one allegiance which it appears necessary to conceal : that of the 
Atlantic Alliance.' 
Mr.  Spaak 'attributed this confusion to the action taken by the 
French Government,  which preferred Europe to play a secondary role in co-
operation with the USSR than for it to be a partner in an alliance with the Unit-
ed States and which, for the same reason, refused to welcome the United King-
dom to the European Community' .  He rejected the argument that the support-
ers of European unification and the Atlantic Alliance had taken up an attitude 
of resignation with respect to the United States.  'Living in fear of the Russians 
and off the charity of the Americans,  it was our desire to recover Europe's 
economic wealth and restore its economic importance.' Lastly, he eA-pressed 
the hope that 'such an economically united Europe would recover the sense of 
its political grandeur and the resolve to play its part'. 
(Le Soir,  18 April,  3, 4 and 5 June,  21 June,  30 and 31 July 1967) 
5.  The attitude adopted by the Independent Republican~ 
Paris  (EU),  Thursday 1 June 1967 - The 'Europe' Study Group of 
the French Independent Republican Party adopted an important report a few 
days before the Rome Summit Conference,  in which it came out 'in favour of a 
re-launching of Europe', laying special stress on the following points: 
1.  Britain's application: The Independent Republicans 'trust that the six Gov-
ernments will adopt a procedure which will enable the Britis1". ']o\·( 1·nmm1t 
to give concrete proof that it is ready to enter the Common Market ·.vith-
out impairing the results achieved and without pJ ejuctic.__  to its ultimate po-
litical objectives'. 
2.  The political Europe: 'The economic achievements of the Common M8rket 
demonstrate the value of its institutional methods.  The very progress of 
the work undertaken will, to an increasing extent,  call for arbitration and 
action that will,  in fact, be political.  The institutional structure of the 
Cammon Market is perfectly adapted to this: it only has  to be used 
- 96 -for this purpose; was it not seen how,  in the Kennerly Round,  it was pos-
sible for the Coun~il of Ministers to indicate to the Commission the broad 
outlines of the action to take and how effectively Europe's single repre-
sentative was able to defend European interests in a  confrontation with 
the Americs.n negotiator. 1  They, therefore, consider it necessary to use 
Lhe  Institutions  'of the Common Market in tackliug the problems arising 
no longer from a purely economic angle but in their political dimension' 
•.•• It is in this way they consider that 'common, or at. least concerted 
ansvvers sh0uld be found' to the three problems which constitute 'a com-
mon challenge' for the Six: the American balance of payments deficit, 
American investmE~nts in Europe and Europe's technological leeway. 
3.  Relations with the East:  'The Common Market Treaty makes provision 
for setting up a  common trading policy and in particular, therefon: , with 
regard to the so-called "popular democracies". It would be a bad thing 
to oppose the definition  of such a policy in the Common Market on the 
grounds that the Common Market Treaty is purely economic: it \VOuld be 
an equally bad thing if this political task were tackled from a purely eco-
nomic angle.' They therefore considered that it would be 'desirable to 
institute a  European policy v i.!:>-a-vis  the East European countries bring-
ing together, within an overall design,  the diplomatic positions, trade, 
long-terms loans,  the cultural presence and the tourist exchanges of l.he 
main Western pmvers'. 
4. Reh.tions with countries in the Mediterranean basin:  A purely mercantile 
approach is  not good  enough. A Mediterranean policy should be  laid 
dmvn  preparing  'the long-term  conditions for  political  and  economic 
stability' . 
5.  The institutions of the Co~nmon Market: The SlJcc:essc3 of the Common 
Market make it imperative 'to go "!Jeyond the purely economic stage and 
to coYJ<>i.cler  European lJroblem:::;  in their pol-itical dimension even if, for 
the r,1omeni,  the commo:r means of action are still mainly economic'. 
'This presupposes a change of attitude with respect to the institutions of 
the Common Market: provided they do not try to take the place of the le-
gitimate national authorities, there is no reason f01·  kee1-dng them on a 
leash. It is, on the contrary, a question of using them, by adapting them, 
to solve the new problems arising.' This implied an immedi.at0 
strengthening of the Institutions.  The Report therefore called upon the 
Council to entrust the Commission with 'a growing number of technical 
dossiers' so that it can itself 'devote itself to the more purely political 
dossjers'; the~,_ again legislative business (a European-type company 
statut-. ,  a  Em·ot_)ean  patent) : ,','Ould  gain by being entrusted rather to the 
Europe  a.!',  1-'::t"  ~.ietY'12nt'. 
6.  The Ministers of the Six: Tile 'techn_ical M.inister:-s'  ;::;HY'-'ld  r-::  U8ed  to 
coming to sit 'togethGr in Brussels as naturally as ti1ey may Elt  ~:1 P'lris 
or Bonn in their national cabinets'.  Then again,  sine"-\  't:tat~on:<l r,1misteTs cannot sit too long in Brussels without inconvenience',  it would be de-
sirable to provide 'a standing political representation vis-a.-vis the Com-
mission of each country, ministers or secretaries of state being appoint-
ed for this purpose and having a special responsibility for European af-
fairs'. 
7.  European Parliament: 'Its work should be concentrated on tasks of a  gen-
eral nature; it should consolidate its responsibilities and a method of 
electing its members should be devised 'so as to strengthen its democrat-
ic legitimacy. 1 
(Agence Europe,  1 June 1967) 
6.  Statements made by Mr.  Fran~s Mitterrand 
a)  at his press conference on 26  May 1967 
1.  ' It would be desirable to give the Europe of the Six,  as it stands 
and taking it as it is, a new economic and social content.  The representatives 
of the workers  and agricultural workers trade unions should play a much 
greater part within the common institutions ••• no measure, exclusive in its 
effect,  can be tolerated with respect to the political parties present in the na-
tional Parliaments.  The trade unions must have access to the Parliament and 
to the Council of Europe in compliance with constitutional rules.  No properly 
representative trade union should be refused membership of the Economic 
Council in Brussels; each one should have a place consistent with its real im-
portance. 
The political groups of the democratic and socialist Left agreed to 
the initial impetus being given to Europe and to its first foundations being con-
structed without any prior definition of its future economic structures; it did 
this because it considered it of paramount importance to begin by breaking up 
the obsolete framework of nationalisms.  But starting from the present con-
struction, it becomes a vital objective to reduce and then eliminate the domi-
nation of the cartels, the trusts and the international pressure groups. 
2.  We  must progress towards multiplying the number of common 
sectors: To the Europe of the agricultural and industrial market and those of 
- 98  -atomic energy, coal and steel, we should add, for example,  the Europe of the 
Plan, that of technology,  that of health and that of currencJ • 
3.  The Europe of today must accept its territorial enlargement 
through the accession to the industrial and agricultural market and to every 
other sphere common to the six countries, of any country  'Which,  like  the 
United Kingdom, wishes to accede to the Treaties which constitute the very char-
ter of tl.e Eui'opean conslruction and which lay down,  subject to provisional ad-· 
justments, the common obligations. 
Against this background,  an  analysis  should be made without delay 
by the European authorities to measure the Common Market's short and medi-
um  -term absorption and enlargement capacity, bearing in mind the economic 
and demographic realities. 
4.  It is impossible to conceive of the success of the Euro1Je that is 
being built if its constituent countries engage in economic competition orir:i-
nating in the case of each one of them in a spirit of national domination.  Eac:1 
country must at the same time secure its own expansion and sec to it t~1at it 
does not disturb the balauce of the new community even if this lJe to its own 
advantage.  The lack of a  common economic policy, hid down awl planned in 
advance,  which would take prececlence over national  i~litiatives spells the fail-
ure of Europe.  The soc1al democrats \v111  therefore never forget,  in the inter-
ests of their twofold community and socialist objective, to strive to1vards the 
ultimate goal of a  common,  polHical, federal power.' 
(Le Monde,  28 and 29 May 1967) 
b)  to the press on 16 August 1967 
1 
••••• \Vhether we like it or not,  France is involved in the European 
process.  Gaullist diplomacy itself, despite the beating about the bush that it 
engaged in,  was compelled by the unshakable nature of the facts eventually to 
sign th~~ agreements whi'2h gave birth to the Common Market. In an undertaking 
on this scale,  ,.L!J.y  nation looking 1)ack will be turned to stone. 
Witl1out Europe,  i 1'a.nce and its five associates would fa11  into tne 
hands of the heg(·mon'les.  Unless it u~;:pands within a Commmlity  w~,JstJ inter-
nal fr::mtiers have b€en abolished,  ~,ranee will fall a  pr~:y t.:;.  ~:s 0\\11  par~:lCr::, 
- 99-Expansion within Europe and through Europe,  in the Common Mm·ket and 
through the Common Market,  is therefore the only prospect for real and hon-
ourable i.nclcpendance open to our country.  We have passed the point of no re-
tm'11.  An;: other policy would pre-suppose the mobilization of the French peo-
ple in  3l' autarchic adventure, the cost of which one hardly dares to imagine. 
It is true that there could he no question of building just any Europe. 
On this point the Federation of the Left has expressed its views clearly: it has 
opted for the Em·ope of the peoples and of universal suffrage,  as against the 
Europe of technu~rats a'1d cartels; similarly it has come out in favour of the 
accession of the United Kingdom in order to be more closely in line with the 
economic,  geographical and historical realities and to give greater weight to 
Europe at the level of \\·orld competition.  In this respect,  it is paradoxical to 
see General de GauHA opposing Britain 
1 s  entry into the Common Market on 
the pretext that it '.vould be desirable first to make the Community of the Six 
effective ar'-i cohesive at a time when he is trying to deprive this very Com-
munity of unity and authority  •••••  1 
(Le :rvronck,  lS August 1967) 
c)  on the position of the French Federation of the Left with regard to 
Europe 
l\Ir. Mitterr:md, French opposition leader, gave an interview to 'L'  Ex-
press' on  lJ September,  He was asked about his relations with the Communist 
Party which shared General de Gaulle's wish to take France out of the Amer-
ican orbit at a time when Mr.  JVlitterrand regarded this as impossible unless 
Europe were organized.  He replied as follows: - 'I would begin by pointing out 
that wbile the  Feder::~tion takes the fullest possible account of the other par-
ties oi the Left,  it intends to make up  its own mind and to propose to the 
French people those aims which its own analysis shows to be reasonable. 
Starting there,  it considers that history will find General de Gaulle guilty of a 
capital error in having barred the way to the construction of Europe.  The Gen-
eral has thus,  in practice, become the ally of the American penetration he has 
denounced in words. 
He has opened the Common Market to the uncontrolled  influx of 
American economic power.  It  would be impossible to take the Left along such a 
course.  I myself would not assume such a  responsibility.  I have told everyone 
this~ including the leaders of the Communist Party. 
- 100 -A rapprochement with the East and an organization of peaceful co-
existence will be neither possible nor lasting unless there is a  European per-
sonality and no longer a  Europe broken up into small and medium-sized States. 
Europe was conceived at a time when the democracies of the West 
were participating in the Cold War on the American side.  I voted in favour of 
the Treaties that were signed. But I can understand that this situation, which 
no longer exists, has left the Communist Party with a reflex of reticence. 
This reflex must be overcome. 
Even so I would say, as I did a moment ago,  that it is in the power 
of no one to oppose the inevitable .... 
Europe is the very undercurrent which will take us out of the Cold 
War away from the rivality between the blocs and the multiple risks of a hot 
war.' 
( L' Express,  11 September 196 7) 
7.  Statement of the European Movement in the Netherlands on the ac-
cession of the United Kingdom to the European Communities 
The European Movement in the Netherlands has taken note with con-
cern of French statements on the United Kingdom's application for admission 
to the European Communities. 
The European Movement feels that the alleged technical arguments 
put forward by France·  against enlarging the European Communities must in 
fact be designed to mask the French Government's political refusal to comply 
with the provision of the Paris and Rome Treaties - to the effect that the Com-
munities are open to all -on which the British Government has based its ap-
plication. 
The problems raised by the entry of Britain and other applicants, 
such as Denmark, Ireland and Norway,  should first be studied in the course 
of negotiations between the six member Governments and the Governments of 
the countries applying for membership, with the EuropeanCommissionplaying 
the rOle assigned to it by the  Treaties. 
- 101 -The French demand for a thorough preliminary study of the question 
will greatly delay the opening of negotiations. The European Movement has put 
up a vigorous stand against this proposal. 
The European Movement confidently awaits the report on the acces-
sion of new members to be submitted by the Commission of the European Com-
munities before the end of September. It hopes that this report will provide a 
new starting-point for the enlargement of the European Communities. It  invites 
the Parliaments and Governments of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Ger-
many, Italy,  Luxembourg and the Netherlands to continue their efforts in this 
direction with determination. 
(Nieuw Europa,  July-August 1967) 
8.  French Communist leader discusses Europe at press conference 
On 6 September, Mr. Waldeck Rochet, Secretary-General of the 
Communist Party gave a press conference on which he broached the problem 
of European unification. 
'The Common Market, which has come into effect,. is today domi-
nated by capitalist cartels  and monopolies. 
We are suggesting to the other parties o{ the Left that we concert 
our efforts to ensure that the institutions governing the Common Market loose 
their technological character and to ensure that the interests of workers in the 
Common Market six countries are safeguarded. 
This predicates in particular that the industrial and agricultural 
trade unions should be represented in the Community institutions and have real 
powers and  that the national Parliaments should be able to exercise real con-
trol over the policy of the Common Market ••••• 
The French Communist Party is in favour of ever closer economic 
and political co-operation between all the European States, provided that na-
tional independence is respected. 
- 102 -We  are opposed to the setting up of a  supranational Government at 
the level of Little Europe because this would bring to an end our national in-
dependence,  place Western Europe under a German hegemony and, at the same 
time, bring it under the tutelage of the USA,  for it is known that West 3-erman 
leaders are in favour of close links between the Europe of the Six and the 
United States. 
Such a political arrangement would ultimately split Europe in two at 
a time when the safety of our peoples and the peace of our continent demand 
that close co-operation be developed between all the European nations, irres-
pective of their social system, whether they are of the East or of the West.' 
After making this preliminary statement,  Mr.  Waldeck Rochet was 
asked about the Communist Party's attitude to the entry of the United Kingdom 
into the Common Market.  He replied as follows: 
11 will answer your question directly. As far as we are concerned, 
the solution for the future does not lie in one of two more countries joining the 
Common Market; on the contrary we think, I  would repeat, that going beyond 
the Common Market, our aim should above all be to develop economic co-
operation between all countries including, of course, the United Kingdom.' 
(L'Humanit~, 7 September 1967) 
9.  Statement by Mr. Piccoli.  Vice-Secr~tary of the Christian Democrat 
Party in connexion with the problem of Austria's association with the 
EEC 
Mr.  Piccoli, Vice-Secretary of the Christian Democrat Party, ex-
pressed his opposition to an article published  in the weekly 'L'Europa' con-
cerning Italian-Austrian relations and problems following Italy's veto to the 
opening of negqtiations for Austria's association with the EEC. Mr.  Piccoli 
wrote the following: 
'Italian and Austrian political leaders have been given the opportu-
nity to put an end to terrorist attacks.  Terrorists may try to continue their 
brutal and absurd acts but will eventually find increasing opposition from pub-
lic opinion in that part of the country.  We  know the obstacles to a solution of 
these difficulties.  Some are of a diplomatic nature and relate above all to our 
sovereignty.  It is clear that the powers of minorities should be under constant 
and strict control by the national authority. It is also certain that the presence 
- 103 -of a multi-racial population does not mean a lessening of Italian sovereignty 
over the Alto Adlge area.  With goodwill these obstacles may be overcome in 
the next few weeks.  The "No" to Austria's association with the Common Mar-
ket, until such tinlE·  as Austria has taken measures to stop terrorism, is a 
firm,  legitimate and fair act.  The Austrian Govc·r~ment cannot fail to' reflect 
on its heavy responsibility and cannot close its eyes to the dangers of an ag-
gravation of the situation.  It is true that in other spheres efforts will be made 
to prevent an honourable solution to the problem.  This ls a mentality of the 
past.  There are men on either side of the border who  <l1'e not prepared "to 
change their skin", who pretend to believe that violeY1ce  is the only answer to 
border problems. I stated in Parliament a month ago and I  repeat it now that 
if we could possibly obtain the opinion of our soldiers who died half a  century 
ago in the First World War (next year \vill be the anniversary of the immense 
sacrifice made by the Italian people for Trento and Trieste) their reply would 
be that peace should be sought and that a patient effort must be made for 
greater understanding and that the difference of culture and language should be 
regarded as a  contribution and not as an obstacle. 
I hope that we shall ultimately reach a peaceful aim and that justice 
will prevail over this long and painful affair.' 
(L' Europa,  no.  2,  22-29 September 19G7) 
10.  An article by  Mr.  Carlo Russo,critical on the idea of a  Europe 
'from the Atlantic to the Urals' 
The idea of a  Europe 'from the Atlantic to the Urals' was analyzed 
by Mr,  Carlo Russo,  a leading figure in the Italian Christian Democrat move-
ment,  in an article published in the review 1 L'  Europa'. 
'No-one will deny,' he wrote,  'that the compass of Europe goes far 
beyond the borders of the present Community,  not only from the geographical 
standpoint but also at the cultural and historic levels; but the idea of trans-
ferring this reality to the political level is today wholly Utopian. While, indeed, 
the Urals represent the geographical extremity of Europe,  they are in the 
centre of the Soviet Union where,  in this post-war period, Asiatic interests 
have grown apprecial.Jly in importance, for economic as well as for political 
reasons. If the term "Europe to the Uralsn is to have any meaning,  it can only 
mean a Soviet disengagement from Asia and although this might be in line with 
the Chinese objective of nAsia for the Asians",  it would certainly not be in line 
with the :hltentions of the Soviet leaders, nor would it serve the cause of peace 
and international balance. ' 
- 104 -Mr.  Russo then pointed out that thL idea conflicted with the French 
objections to the accession to the Communities of the United Kingdom and other 
countri.:.'s,  allegedly for fear that an undue enlargement of the Community 
would change its nature and deprive it of its political content.  He  continued: 
'To explain how it is possjble to reconcile the "No" to Britain with a  Europe 
extending to the Urals would be going beyond the limits of human comprehen-
sion and justify the suspicion that the French President's proposal is a classic 
example of"retreating forwards". If, on the other hand,  Europe from the At-
lantic to the Urals means that Community Europe should realize that Lenin-
grad and Warsaw,  Prague and Budapest are a living and integral part of Euro-
pean history and culture and therefore that the "Little Europe" should pursue 
an understanding and outward-looking policy, not as a  closed citadel but as a 
part of a wider and more attractive reality, there could not but be full agree-
ment.' 
Referring to the accession of the United Kingdom to the Common 
Market,  Mr.  Russo recalled that from time to time it was proposed, as a reac-
tion against France's stubborn opposition to Britain's  ·.wcession to the Euro-
pean Community and against the probability of a further veto,  that the Five 
should together make an agreement with the United Kingdom.  He  went on to 
say: 'It is difficult to assess whether this proposal is regarded by its advo-
cates as valid in itself or whether it was devised as a way of exerting pressure 
to overcome unjustified opposition.  In both cases it is groundless because the 
United Kingdom itself rejected it.' Mr.  Russo drew attention to the great prog-
ress made by the British in reaching the stage of applying for entry into the 
Community and he pointed out that the British choice was 'in favour of Europe 
as it exists today,  including France, because Europe without France would be 
void of substance and cease to have any attraction for the United Kingdom'. 
(L'  Europa,  26  September - 6 October, no.  3) 
- 105 -III.  ORGANIZATIONS AND  GROUPINGS 
1.  Views of Dutch industry on transport and energy policies 
In its annual report on the year 1966 the Association of Dutch Em-
ployers outlines the vie\vs of Dutch industry on the common transport policy. 
The Association dwells on the need for flexible transport arrange-
ments.  Transport must be able to move freely throughout the market.  The 
Association therefore rejects any proposal that aims too directly at protect-
ing domestic carriers.  It advocates the introduction of highly flexible proce-
dun:;s for ratemaking and control of capacity; facilities for special freight 
agreements between shippers and carriers within the laid-down limits; liber-
alization of cross-frorrtier traffic; sounder management of railways; standard-
ization of freight documents and conditions of carriage; the abolition of the 
system of cargo division practised by shipping exchanges; and modification  of 
!'eturn freights also in other EEC countries. 
The Association calls for an open energy market capable of supply-
ing energy at minimum prices and in which goods are absolutely free to circu-
late.  In principle such a  market should be based on free competition between 
energy sources with a  view in the long run to reducing energy prices to a mini-
mum.  This will necessitate minimum intervention by the  au~horities and as 
uniform rules of competition as possible for all the energy products concerned. 
(Handels- en Transport Courant,  15  June 1967) 
2.  Views of the Council of Dutch Employers'  Organizations on Euro-
pean integration 
The Council of Dutch Employers' Organizations contacted the offi-
cial responsible for preparing the ground for the formation of the new Govern-
ment,  following the Dutch elections of February 1967,  to draw his attention to 
a number of problems and to acquaint him with thejr requirements in the eco-
nomic and social policy sectors. 
- 107  -On European integration the Council made the following comments : 
'As the customs union is due for completion on  1 July 1968-in itself 
a desirable thing - the removal of technical and administrative obstacles to 
intra-Community trade and the adjustment of monopolies ought to be speeded 
up. The maintenance of the current rules on temporary importation for pro-
cessing is particularly important for the Dutch economy. 
Steps should be taken to facilitate the concentration of undertakings 
in the EEC so as to make them more competitive. 
Liberalization of capital movements,  abolition of discrimination, 
and harmonization of domestic provisions governing the capital market, should 
be completed as soon as possible. 
Measures taken at national level to overcome difficulties in certain 
sectors or areas,  while sometimes necessary,  are likely to slow down inte-
gration.  Member States should therefore coordinate their efforts in this 
sphere. 
The progress made in introducing a common market in agricultural 
products - already at an advanced stage following the issue of regulations on 
various products - should not be jeopardized by grants - now or in the future -
of national aid. 
The EEC should forthwith bring into force a common commercial 
policy and ensure that the Kennedy Round negotiations lead to positive results. 
Moreover,  steps should be taken to prevent non-tariff or quasi-tariff obstacles 
from standing in the way of new export possibilities. 
It is essential to co-ordinate the Community's policy on developing 
countries.  All European countries operating a free market economy are in-
tended to become full members of the EEC,  and steps should be taken to faci-
litate their entry.  In -certain special cases,  a mere association could be con-
sidered. 
Close co-ordination of external economic relations at official level 
is desirable. ' 
( De Katholieke Werkgever ,  No.  5,  1 March 1967) 
- 108-DEVELOPMENT OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 
I.  GOVERNMENTS 
1.  Statements of the attitudes of the Foreign Ministers of the six 
member States of the Community 
During a television programme,  Mr.  Maurice Ferro, representing 
the French Radio and Television Corporation, put thefollowing questions to the 
Foreign Ministers of the Common Market countries: 'Is the Economic Commu-
nity an end in itself? Do the six Ministers not think that it should be comple-
mented by  institutions of a political nature? If so, which?' From their replies 
it emerged that they were all advocates of the political union of Europe but 
that they did not think that it was necessary to create new institutions. 
Mr. Joseph Luns (Netherlands),  who is regarded as the most enthusi-
astic advocate of an integrated Europe, gave the most negative reply.  'Contrary to 
what you think, my reply is negative. The Economic Community has no need to be 
controlled by political institutions. The existing institutions, the Council and the 
Commission,  are perfectly able to carry out their task as laid down by the Treaty. 
It  might even be dangerous to complement the Common Market  by political insti-
tutions. There is a danger that the Community bodies would thereby be weakened.' 
Mr. Maurice Couve de Murville (France) expressed an almost 
identical opinion: 'The Common Market,  as it as at present, already comprises 
political institutions. Both the Council of Ministe1·s in Brussels and the Com-
mission are political institutions. The question is whether what has been under-
taken in the economic sphere between the six countries of the Common Market 
can and must be pursued in the political sphere. 
There is no doubt that in the minds of the authors of the Treaty and 
in the minds of those who have put it into effect,' he added, 'the reply would be 
in the affirmative. That is to say that, normally speaking, what has been 
initiated at the economic level should be developed at the political level.' 
Mr. Willy Brandt (Federal Republic of Germany) would like to see 
a secretariat or a commission set up which would help to bring the policies of 
the six Governments closer into line with each other. 'From the German point 
- 109-of view,  we have always considered that co-operation in .terms of economic 
policy ought to be complemented by political integr::rtion in the strict sense of 
the \vord. But I have got out of the habit of thinking in terms of plans and 
Drojects .....  ' 
Mr. Amintore F anfani (Italy) considered that there could be no doubt 
as to the ultimate objective which was 'the political unity of the Six' but this 
1vas still a long way off. This 1vas why,  he said, 'the Italian Government has 
addressed to the Governments of the  other Common Market countries a..'l  in  vi-
tation to a summit meeting in Rome with a view to resuming a constructive 
discussion between leaders on the occasion of the celebration of the tenth 
anniversary of the Treaty of Rome.' 
Mr. Pierre Harmel (Belgium) stated: 'I think we should first of all 
remember that the Common Market is already a political institution. Unifying 
soci.al legislation immediately after fiscal legislation and then trade legislation, 
perhaps culminating in monetary unification,  will be covering more than half 
and perhaps the major part of the action of the States with regard to merging 
them one 1vith another.  Consequently we are patient and we believe that the 
progress made is irreversible.'  He also thought that with a  common defence 
and a  common policy the unification of Europe would be complete. 
Lastly, Mr. Pierre Gr~goire (Luxembourg) was in favour of a poli-
tical Europe but without technocratic institutions equipped with automatic 
machinery. 
(Le Monde,  13 April1967) 
2.  The Rome Summit on 29 and 30  May 1967 
The Heads of States and Governments of the Comn1tmity co" ·1tries 
met in Rome on 29 and 30  May 1967 to celebrate the  tenth a...'-niversa  ... y  :)f the 
signing of the EEC and Euratom Treaties. 
At a meeting held at the Farnesina Palace on 30  May by the Fe?c1s 
of State and Governments and Foreign Ministers, the President of the Italian 
Council,  Mr.  Moro,  stated the following : 
- 110-'Increases in the gross national product, individual output and trade. 
both within and without the EEC, have exceeded to a very large extent those 
recorded in the same sectors and within the same period of time by other 
countries outside the Community and also enjoying a high economic potential. 
This means that the progress achieved cannot only be ascribed to the favourable 
internationsl situation but that it is largely due to co-operation and solidarity, 
i.e. the result of the gradual integration of the different national economies. 
I should like to add that the value of our system proved correct on various 
instances. We now know that the opening of markets made it  possible to counter-
act effectively the negative effects of internal imbalances arising in the single 
States. This experience and these results should encourage us to continue the 
work begun until it is completed ........•..••.•..........••............... 
The economic progress achieved so far and still to be completed will remain 
void of any human significance if we do not succeed in fully extending it to all 
the categories of the Community's population,  if we do not succeed in carrying 
out a fair and appropriate distribution of wealth.  Particularly apposite in this 
respect would be the preferential principles to be adopted for Community 
workers in connexion with the revision of the European Social Fund whose 
operation was not found to meet, in every respect, the conditions for which it 
was created ..........................................................••. 
As for Euratom - basic instrument of the Community's technological 
progress - it is essential to increase its powers and effectiveness so that the 
scientific and technical results achieved by it should be of equal benefit to all 
the member countries. This applies, in particular, to the more general duties 
that will have  to be discharged by a single Community in the technological 
field in order to sustain normal competition from outside. 
With regard to cultural co-operation, we hope that further consider-
ation will be given to the question of a European University in Florence which 
should become the prime mover for close co-operation between our countries, 
above all in the technological field,  where Europe must, with all the means at 
its disposal, fill the gap that separates it from the more advanced countries. 
I refer to those initiatives which the Italian Government has recorded as 
necessary and significant .................••.....•....................... 
Finally, I am convinced that as a result of our ten-year experience 
and in view of future prospects,  a unified European force,  increasingly aware 
of its potentialities and its responsibilities,  may find its place in the system of 
balance between East and West with an authoritative voice in the politicalfield 
and with the necessary vigour in the economic field. This is why we are in 
favour of further contacts between the Foreign Ministers for these willfoster 
and extend co-operation and gradually create conditions for a common denomi-
nation in all matters where a European stand is particularly necessary and 
where it could prove a factor of world stability.' ............................  . 
- 111-This statement by President Moro was followed by a statement by 
General de Gaulle/dealing with Britain's proposed accession totheCommunity, 
'There is no doubt that we have to determine whether we can remain 
what we are. It is necessary for the Community to consider in the fullest 
possible way where all this may lead up to before accepting external negotia-
tions. We believe that our Governments should consider together in Brussels, 
and with all the time required, the consequences of this application for a<!,Cession. 
It is desirable that an extensive examination of the matter should be made 
among the Six in view of the vastness of the problem and differences of opinion 
among us. The way in which such a negotiation should be conducted is provided 
for by the Rome Treaty, under Article 237. We therefore agree that the 
Ministers should look into this matter. The Council of Ministers will study the 
position when it meets in Brussels andit will take a unanimous decision. We 
also agree that the Council should request the Commission's opinion.' 
Referring subsequently to possible periodical meetings of Foreign 
Ministers, the French President said: 
'You know that France has always felt it necessary that there should 
be contacts between the Six. We have made proposals to this effect in the past. 
We believe that for "a European Europe" these contacts would be useful. Ifthe 
Six wish to proceed towards a political Europe,  as they have gone towards an 
economic Europe, then we hope that periodical meetings will be held.' 
At the close of the Summit meeting, the following  communiqu~ was 
released: 
a.  On 20  and 30  May at the invitation of the President of the Italian Council, 
Mr. Aldo Moro,  a meeting was held in Rome between the Presid~nt of 
the French Republic, General de Gaulle, the President of the French 
Council of Ministers,  Mr. Pompidou, the President of the Belgian 
Council of Ministers,  Mr. Vanden Boeynants,  the Chancellor of the 
Federal RcpublicofGerD1any,  Mr. Kiesinger. f1,ePresidentof the Luxem-
bourg Council of Ministers,  Mr. Werner, the President of the Nether-
lands Council of Ministers,  Mr. DeJong; they were accompanied by 
their respective Foreign Secretaries, Messrs. F anfani,  Couve ri.e 
Murville, Harmel, Brandt,  Gr~goire, Luns and the Belgian Minister for 
European Affairs, Mr. Van Elslande. 
The Heads of State or Governments of the Six countries took part on 
29 May at the Campidoglio in the celebration of the tenth anniversary of 
- 112-the signing of the Rome Treaties setting up the European Economic 
Community and  the European Atomic Energy Commtmity under the 
chairmanship of Mr. Giuseppe Saragat, Presidentofthe ItalianRcpublic. 
The celebration was also attended by representatives of the institutions 
and organizations of  the  European Communities as well as by repre-
sentatives of associated countries and signatories to the Rome Treaties. 
The celebration of this historical event constituted further and solemn 
evidence of the solidarity  of the member States and of their will to 
continue on the path opened by the Rome Treaties • 
b.  On 30 May the Heads of State or Governments and their Foreign Ministers 
were presented with an introductory report by President Moro on the 
ba$iS of which they exchanged views on the Community's development. 
They agreed that the results hitherto obtained proved_ the success of the 
new spirit of co-operation created between the member countries which 
has made it possible tc reconcile their own interests with higher common 
interests. With the approval of the Parliaments and public opinion in th8 
respective countries, the Heads of State or Governments resolved to 
pursue the necessary efforts with a view to reaching the fins! aims  o~ 
the Rome Treaties. 
c.  The Heads of State or Governments expressed their intention to enforce, 
from 1 July 1967, the Treaty of 8 April 1965 on the merger of the insti-
tutions of the three Communities. They emphasized, on this occasion, 
the importance of that decision which constitutes a further stage towards 
the merger of the three Communities. 
d.  The Heads of State or Governments exchanged views on the applicg.tions 
for accession receiverl from the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark 
and agreed that, in accordance with the Treaties, these should be 
examined by the Council of Ministe"!."s  of the Community. 
e.  The States taking part in the conference agreed to look into the possibi-
lity of gradually resolving their political differences by means and 
methods based on experience and circumstances. The Foreign Ministers 
accepted responsibility for pursuing the examination of that problem. 
f.  Th , p·  ...  ,;or(_;  ')_;  '  ate ')l' Governments agreed to meet again,  presumably in 
the com·se of the current ye  .< r. g.  The Heads of State or Governments also agreed to give further consider-
ation to the project submitted to the Joint Conference on 18 July 1961 in 
connexion with the setting up of a European University in Florence. 
(Le Monde,  1 June 1967; H.elazioni Internazionali, no.  23,  10 June 1967) 
- 1H-\  _-
il.  THE COMMUNITY EXECUTIVE
1.  Mr. Copp6 on European technologX
Speaking in Rotterdam  on 13 April 1966-Professor  Copp6, as Vice-
President  of the High Authorit5r,  launched  a plea in favour of a European  tech-
nology.
According  to Mr. Copp6, if Europe  was to catch up with the United
States in the technological  sector it would have to adopt American methods.
It was not enough for the Community to lower customs barriers and co-ordi-
nate the economic  policies of its member States. It must rthink bigf not only
in the economic  field but also in others, particularly  in the field of defence.
Mr.Copp6thenspecifiedthethreemainsectorshehad.inmind.
First, scientific  and technological  research needed  a market of a continental  '-- 
.:
scale. Secondly, the entire industrial set+p would have to be adapted to the  , 
,
new enlarged market; this in turn meant bringing the policy on industrial con-  .-' '.i.
centration  and the capital market up to a European  scale. Finally it had to be  I  'l'
borne in mind that in-the field of research the State, as well as the universi-  , ;
ties and enterprises,  had a r0le to play. The State ought to stepinintwocases:  '  ' -.
when prices were too high or the risks too great to be borne by individuals or  '  -:
private institutions.  .,.
In drawing up its research programmes the Community had to con-
sider two possibilities.  The first lay in choosing priority sectors, e.g. nu-
clear science, space research,  aviation or electronics; the second, in putting
the emphasis  on new sectors, such as techniques  for improving facilities in
the social, transport and educational sectors.
Technical  research  was called upon to play a crucial r01e in the
economic expansion of Europe, If it was to maintain  a reasonable-arurual  rate
of grou'th of 3 to 4 per cent, Europe could not afford to neglect technology. If
it did l:ct wish to becorne an economic satellite, it would have to carry out
resea::ch for its ovln accolrnt  and not on the basis of licences granted by third
countries"
i;.,
- 115 -l\Ir.  Copp~ hoped that Euratom would rapidly become in the techno-
logical sector what the ECSC has long been for the Community in the economic 
sectors that is,  a prototype community which would have three objectives: 
a)  to enable the Si.x  to compete with non  -member countries; 
b)  to breo_t11e  new life into weak or vulnerable economic sectors, particu-
larly key-sectors on which a number of other industries and occupations 
depended; 
c)  to forecast the broad lines of future trends - according to some experts, 
in 1976 40 per cent of American industrial production would consist of 
products that had not yet been discovered. 
Mr.  Copp~ wound up by saying that it would be enough to amend,  at 
the most,  two articles of the Rome Treaty to enable a united scientific Europe 
to be established. 
(Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant,  14 April 1967) 
2.  Exclusive interview with Mr.  Jean Rey, new President of the Euro-
pean Commission 
After his election as President of the single European Commission, 
Mr.  -J.  Rey gave an exclusive interview to a  Belgian nmvspaper. 
The first question put to Mr.  Rey concerned the various applications 
for membership of the Community which constituted proof of its attraction but 
which also occasioned concern.  Indeed Mr.  Rey was in agreement that 'the 
Community wlll be less manageable if the number of its members increases. 
The more men1bers there are, the more unwieldy it will be • . • • .  It is clear 
that this will make the machine slightly more cumbersome.  Should this  occa-
sion anxiety? We,  European Commissioners, have always replied that this 
depends on the institutions and that if the institutions were weakened, it would 
indeed be a very sorry state of affairs; in that eventuality the accession of a 
certain number of States to the Community might actually paralyse it; this 
might not be their intention,  but it would,  none the less, be the result; but if 
on the other hand, the Community institutions retain their full authority and 
vigour,  then the whole apparatus will be able to function equally well with a 
larger number of member States.  Mr.  Harold Wilson and Mr.  George Brown, 
were told this by nearly everybody during the talks they had between January 
- 116 -and March with the European Ministers.  The majority vote system, which 
must be able to operate on the Council,  must remain unimpaired and the pow-
ers of the Parliaments must be strengthened.  The British were very impress-
ed by this demonstration which was made to them'. 
The new President then wept on to refute the theory that the merger 
of the Executives might be liable to hamper the current examination of ne\v 
applications.  'I believe that these two processes can go  forward together.  The 
revision of the three European Treaties, with a  view to unifying them,  must 
be done on the basis of the setting-up of the single Commission.  But this revi-
sion is going to take three years.  It is therefore a long-term undertaking 
which must be done calmly and which will, I hope,  go through without too 
many difficulties.  There will be some, but they do not appear to be related to 
the problem of enlarging the existing Communities by the accession of new 
members.' 
He was then asked to comment on the current chances for political 
union;  'What is certain, 1 he said, 'is that it is necessary and that everybody 
realizes it is necessary.  This was recognized in May at the Rome summit 
meeting but events in the Middle East made it abundantly clear that Europe 
had to begin to have a real political authority and to speak with some measure 
of unity on foreign policy •..•• Neither the Russians nor the Americans can 
become economically associated with the Israelis and the Arabs. Only we can 
do this .•••• Since discussions have been going on at great length for years 
without agreement being reached on what form political union should take,  on 
how it should be achieved and on what powers a body,  speaking for the six 
countries,  should have,  it would seem to me that the best way to demonstrate 
movement would be by going forward. If we were to harness ourselves to a 
European undertaking  such as this, the problems would gradually solve them-
selves. 
To achieve political union,  Europeans could do nothing more effec-
tive than to apply themselves to a practical task and to endeavour to carry it 
through. 
1 
The example of the Middle East is a clear illustration of a case 
where the Six Governments were unable to adopt a  common position.  'It is ob-
vious, 1  he said,  'that the Six could have taken a more pragmatic view of the 
construction of Europe,  instead of engaging in theoretical discussions as to 
whether one should begin with Six or Seven and as to what machinery and what 
authorities should be employed.  If, on the other hand,  the Six had said: nwe 
all agree that something must be done,  let us tackle these problems, let us 
see how we  can solve themn,  then the institutions already in existence could 
have done this.  The Common Market Commission would be in a better position 
- 117  -to engage in negotiations - if the Ministers so decided - with Israel and with 
the Arab States ••••• We do not ask as much of these institutions as we do for 8-
common resolve.  It is the lack of a  common reso!>.'f~ that we should endeavour 
to remedy.' 
Mr.  Jean Rey was then asked whether plans ior a united Europe 
were liable to be pandysed by France's position. 
He replied: 'I will not comment on the policies of the member States. 
I consider that it is our function to reconcile them and not to judge them ..••• 
If ever we do pass judgements, I believe that good sense demands that \Ve 
should keep these to ourselves; we should,  on the contrary, try with constant 
patience to find points of agreement . • • • •  Our function is rather one of trying 
to find the means, the formulae,  the transitions, the procedures which will 
give the initial impetus to negotiations which are not getting under  way,  and, 
consequently,  to make compromises.  I believe that that is our job.  This does 
not prevent us,  quite apart from this conciliatory rble, from endeavouring to 
get things moving by indicating the course which,  in our opinion,  should be 
followed and the things that ought to be done.  In this respect, I have often told 
my colleagues and I say it again,  that we cannot be content to be the clergy of 
Europe; we must also remain its prophets.' 
All in all,  Mr.  J.  Rey was optimistic about Britain's entry: 'I am 
quite  convinced  that things will sort themselves out •.••. In my opinion, the 
force which is impelling the British towards the Continent and which is impel-
ling the Continent to unite is an irresistible one; it is a  reflection of so deeply-
felt a  need that while it may on occasion be hampered or paralysed, it can 
never be stopped for good by the vagaries of politics.' 
He was asked if he expected one day to see Europe talking to the 
United States as an equal partner.  'Europe is doing so already' he replied.  'At 
the Kennedy Round we were talking as equals with the United States and we 
were no more than the Community ...  ~ .  From a military, financial and industrial 
point of view,  they are much more powerful than we are.  In the field of trade 
we are their equals.  The Community's trade is equal if not greater in volume 
and in value than that of the United States.  We are the largest purchasers of 
industrial and agricultural goods in the whole world. We buy more of these 
than the Americans.  For this to be the case in other fields,  depends on our 
union.  Obviously we are a long way behind but leeways  can  be made good. 
If the Europeans, of whom there are 180m.  in the Community,  could succeed 
in bringing in the British, the Scandinavians and the Swiss, for example and 
form a Community of 250m.  people, with all the industrial power and produc-
tion capability that this would involve, we would genuinely be a partner to 
whom the Americans would speak as one equal to another. 1 
- 118 -In the next question,  reference was made to Mr.  Rey's reputed 'At-
lanticism'.  He  recognized,  in fact,  that 'the whole Commission - this was the 
case under the guidance of Mr.  Hallstein - has never concealed firstly, that 
Europe had to be constructed; secondly, that Europe had to play its part in the 
world,  in agreement with,  and not in opposition to, the United States and,  con-
sequently, that co-operation in every field betvveen a united Europe,  on the one 
hand,  and the United States on the other hand was essential . . . . .  However, if 
I am asked if I am or not a supporter of a  single Community embracing the 
United States and Europe,  I do not remember having argued in favour of such 
an idea which does not seem to me to be sound ..... We  wish to become the 
United States of Europe,  we have no wish at all to become the United States of 
Africa,  America or the World.' 
In conclusion,  Mr.Rey was asked on what in his opinion,  the future 
of Europe depended.  'Primarily on its union,' he said,  'I see no reason for 
being pessimistic;  Europe has made so much progress .•••• We are complet-
ing our customs union; we are beginning to form a common policy; we have 
hammered out the agricultural policy; we have overcome the violent political 
crisis of 1965-66 to the point of having been able to celebrate the tenth anni-
versary of the Treaty  of Rome together.  We have succeeded in creating that 
balance which was so strongly demanded in the Community: to build,  on the 
one hand,  a  common agricultural policy and on the other (tnrough the Kennedy 
Round) to liberate external trade.  Under these conditions, I consider that 
Europe's affairs are not going badly at all. It is at the political level that 
Europe is still much too weak and I believe that the efforts in thenexttenyears 
will really be to go forward to further stages in that area.  This appears to be 
quite possible. 1 
(Le Soir,  11  July 1967) 
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PROMJNENT FIGURES 
1,  The European Left and the accession of the United Kingdom to the EEC 
The Congress of the European Left which was held in Paris on  4 and 
5 February 1967 adopted a resolution in which it 'noted with satisfaction the 
resolve of the Labour Government to apply for British entry into the European 
Economic Community and to become a full member of a wider Europe - are-
solve which was again emphasized recently by Mr. Harold Wilson, British 
Prime Minister'.  Mr. Mitterrand,  Mr. Karl Mommer and Mr. Mario Zagari 
attended the Congress at which Sir Geoffrey de Freitas took the Chair. 
'The European Left is convinced that Britain's accession to the EEC 
will represent a valuable contribution in every respect, particularly in the 
scientific and technical spheres. 
The European Left has decided to rely on British traditions in sup-
port of efforts to democratize the Communities, which must culminate in a 
genuine United States of Europe. 
The European Left formally declares that since the United Kingdom 
accepts the Treaty of Rome and its implications for the future political unifi-
cation of Europe, the main condition of its accession has been met and that 
therefore nothing further should stand in the way of its entry into the Com-
munity.' 
(Courrier socialiste europ~en, No,  2,  1967) 
2.  The European Movement defines Europe's responsibilities with 
respect to Europe itself 
This was indeed the theme of a conference held by the European 
Movement in Bad Godesberg from 21  to 22  April 1967.  The following resolu-
tion was passed : 
- 121  -'The European Movement, advocating the creation of a united Europe 
based on maintaining and developing democracy,  on economic expansion and on 
social  justice ..... 
Unanimously emphasizes the contribution towards a united Europe 
that would be constituted by the entry of the United Kingdom and other demo-
cratic,  European countries into the EEC whose democratic capital,  economic, 
financial and technical resources and ability to play a decisive part in the 
world towards easing tension and in the field of co-operation would receive a 
new impetus. 
Recommends accession,  the special conditions attaching to which 
should be reduced to a transitional period of adjustment. 
Stresses the urgency of a new effort in the field of research and in 
the advanced technological industries and the major contribution that the ac-
cession of the United Kingdom and other European countries would represent 
in this connexion. 
Requests that the European Executive and the European financial 
institutions be entrusted with the task of developing joint research and contri-
buting towards financing the development of new industries ..... 
Stresses the need to adopt a  more active policy in the economic and 
social fields to promote full employment,  accelerated expansion,  monetary 
stability,  regional development and the improvement of the living standards 
and security of workers. 
Re-emphasizes that these objectives predicate strengthening the 
Community institutions and a strict respect for the spirit and letter of the 
Treaties of  Rome. 
Asks that decisions be taken on setting up the single Commission 
and that the initiatives of the single Executives should be wide-ranging and 
attract encouragement,  that closer, contacts be established with representa-
tives of the Economic and Social Committee and with the European Parliament 
whose powers should be increased. 
Asks that the idea of the  political union of Europe should be re-
examined mainly in order to achieve a  common foreign policy which,  in turn, 
would lead to a pooling of defence capabilities. 
- 122  -Declares,  however,  that periodical meetings between Governments 
could not be regarded as an adequate arrangement for shaping a policy or for 
bringing about a progressive co-ordination : a  Community body responsible 
for keeping a  continuous watch on developments,  for working out solutions and 
calling meetings as and when problems arise,  is a  minimal condition without 
which there could be no  meeting of wills and without which unity would not be 
possible. 
As economic,  technical and political tasks come up which can only 
be tackled at the European level,  it is increasingly essential to strengthen 
democratic control by an assembly elected by the direct suffrage of the peo-
ples,  ensuring that the people participate more directly in the decisions 
governing their everyday life,  by a decentralization of power and by a renas-
cence of the autonomy,  the means and the cultural life in the local collectivi-
ties.' 
3.  The Fourth Conference of the Agricultural Workers Trade Unions 
in the EEC 
On  25  and 26  May the EEC Agricultural Workers Trade Unions 
(CISL)  held their Fourth Conference in Narbonne; several resolutions were 
passed. 
The first resolution concerned trade union integration.  The confe-
rence : 'expresses its satisfaction at the accelerated realization of the agri-
cultural common market in the EEC and confirms the determination of the 
affiliated organizations to ensure that economic and social integration go hand 
in hand with trade union integration  and a  common policy of the agricultural 
workers trade unions and to take  anticipatory steps with a view to this econo-
mic and social integration'. 
With reference to the applications for accession from the United 
Kingdom,  Denmark and Ireland,  the Conference 'expects the responsible 
bodies of the EEC to make an immediate and positive examination of these 
applications.  It considers that the entry of these countries would constitute 
a positive factor for the political unification of Europe.  It expects to see this 
accession consolidate the democratization of a wider Community,  both through 
the allocation of much wider powers and supervisory rights to the European 
Parliament and by the co-operation which the powerful free trade union  orga-
nizations of these countries will bring to the preparation and application of 
Community policy at every level'. 
- 123 -Lastly,  in its general resolution,  the conference : 'notes with regret 
the lack of the essential development - which was to have gone hand in hand 
with the markets and prices policy - of a  common policy for structures and a 
common social policy in agriculture.  The lack of decisive progress in these 
spheres means that the common agricultural policy is still incomplete and 
lacking in balance .•..•  '. 
'The conference calls for a wider participation on the part of the 
professional organizations of agricultural workers and operators in the prepa-
ration and execution of Community measures in the matter of markets and 
prices policy,  trade policy,  structure policy and social policy.  In this con-
nexion,  it recalls the inadequacy of the work done by and the powers given to, 
the consultative committees for individual products and the consultative com-
mittee for problems of agricultural structural policy. ' 
4,  The 20th  economic congress of the Benelux countries 
On  26 May the Benelux Committee of the Grand Duchy organized a 
congress in Luxemburg under the chairmanship of Mr.  A.  Weicker.  In his 
opening address,  he drew attention to the lack of cohesion between the three 
Benelux countries within the European Community.  It was in his opinion more 
essential than ever for the three countries to co-ordinate their economic, financial 
and social policies and to work within the Benelux group towards a common view-
point on all the questions raised in the wider context of the EEC. 
Mr.  V.  Lee  mans laid emphasis on the institutional aspect which,  he 
felt,  should lead to a  consolidation of policy co-ordination between the three 
States.  In this connexion,  he quoted a basic  text which was taken from the 
report on the realization and the operation of the Benelux Economic Union and 
relating to 1965-1966 : 'realizing the special responsibility of each of the 
Benelux countries in this matter, the three Governments have decided during 
the coming year to concert their efforts in terms of future co-operation be-
hveen the Benelux countries.  The Gove_rnments are also considering whether 
intergovernmental consultations are suitable with regard to a tightening of 
collaboration between the partner countries and  even extending this to other 
fields while bearing in mind that the Benelux Economic Union should be ap-
praised in the light of world events,  the political and social pattern of which 
has undergone profound changes since 1958,  the year in which the Benelux 
Treaty was signed4 • 
- 124 -Following these statements, the Congress passed a  resolution in 
which it 
'  a)  stresses the growing urgency of joint action by the Benelux coun-
tries within the Common Market ; 
b)  draws attention to the need to spell out the economic and social 
problems which have  priority claims in the context of such action; 
c)  calls upon the Governments, for this purpose and in order to achieve 
closer collaboration  between the  three countries,  to set up an 
executive body endowed with adequate powers within the frame\vork 
of the Benelux Treaty; 
d)  urges that the intergovernmental institutions should become more 
effective  decision-taking  bodies,  subject to adequate parliamentary 
control,  with regard to matters within the terms of reference of the 
union. ' 
The Congress also heard a report by Mr.  H. J. de Koster, a member 
of the Dutch Parliament,  on the position of the Benelux countries in the 
economic and social development of the EEC.  After this,  the  Congress pass-
ed a  second resolution in which it stated its view that the completion of the 
economic union would bring the three countries closer together economically, 
which necessarily implied considering the economies of these countries as a 
single unit.  Consequently,  it asked that medium-term programmes, which 
are at present being drawn up separately by each of the countries,  should be 
collated in a single Benelux-Programme.  Lastly,  it suggested that regional 
programmes should be drawn up with respect to the frontier areas between 
the three countries and including a  common policy for ports and a common 
"Delta" programme. 
(Notes by an observer) 
-- 125  -5.  Pope Paul VI again stresses the Church's interest in building a 
united Europe 
On 30  May,  Pope Paul VI received the members of the EEC and 
Euratom Commissions in special audience.  He  expressed the satisfaction he 
shared with them at the excellent work done towards achieving European 
unity  ' ••.•  which many right-thinking people now consjder not only desirable 
but urgently necessary,  above all at the economic level and,  if this be possi-
ble - while naturally respecting the diversity fashioned by history - at the 
political level. .. ',  He stated :  ' ..•  the Church is following everything connec-
ted with building Europe with very close attention.  The statements made in 
this context by our predecessors - whether by Pope Pius XII or by Pope John 
XXIII- were given a wide diffusion and are known to you.  And you know that 
we too have,  more than 'once,  given encouragement,  insofar as we have been 
able to do so,  to those whose action has been directed towards European unity. 
Is this,  on the part of a  spiritual power such as the Church,  a  politi~al objec-
tive?  Indeed.  But there is harmony and there is a  meeting point between a 
great political objective and the general principles concerning man and society 
of \vhich the Church is the designated guardian,  endeavouring with all its might 
to foster these principles for the good of mankind'. 
You are working for peace,' Pope Paul VI continued,  'the 
Church,  too,  is working for peace.  This is our meeting point.  And if the 
Church acts in this way by virtue of higher principles and following methods 
that are appropriate to a  society whose nature is spiritual,  it considers that in 
the order of things in this world,  the means which you use are among the most 
suitable for achieving the desired end. . .  You and your predecessors have, 
day by day,  created and  perfected a practical network of relationships no lon-
ger based on the predominance of the strongest but on common interests, lead-
ing to the conclusion of agreements and to the exchange of services.  By re-
moving barriers and antagonisms,  you aim to ensure a lasting order in west-
ern Europe and to make it impossible in fact - and this time there are grounds 
for such hope - for any further European war to break out.  And by building 
peace in this way on one continent,  you are helping to consolidate peace in the 
rest of the world.  This is why the Church approves and encourages you,  This 
is why it offers you the wholehearted support of its moral principles and its 
spiritual strength and,  in building the Europe that is under construction, these 
are a factor for cohesion of the greatest importance. 
The importance which the Church attaches to the European unifica-
tion movement was again underlined by Pope Paul VI on 31  May on the occasion 
of General de Gaulle's official visit to the Vatican.  Mter praising the contri-
bution made by France ' ••. to the ausp~cious emergence of the European Com-
munity',  the Pope stated,  however,  that this could only be ' ...  one stage on the 
road to peace and a true brotherhood between all the peoples of the world'. He 
- 126 -continued :  'We  need  to  look further,  to widen  our  horizons to the dimen-
sions of the world.  This is what we  wished to recall in our recent encyclical 
on !!development",  which is "the new name for peace" in our century.  Our 
sons in France have fully grasped the implications of this act of our ministry 
and we  remind Your Excellency of this the more willingly because we  know 
how much Your Excellency personally shares our concerns and hopes in this 
field....  This is a wisely realistic attitude and well worth stressing.  Who  is 
there who does not indeed realize that only by means of an active and coura-
geous solidarity will the economic divergencies between people be attenuated 
and a  solid and lasting peace be established in justice and freedom? This 
peace,  Your Excellency knows,  is the subject of our constant concern as it 
was for our two predecessors,  Pope Pius XII and Pope John XXIII,  whom 
Your Excellency also visited. ' 
6.  The Eighth States General of the Council of European local autho-
rities and European unification 
The Eighth States General of the Council of the European local 
authorities held a  session in Berlin from 8 to 10 June,  1967. This was attended 
by about  4, 000 mayors and other officials of local authorities in the six EEC 
countries and other European States. 
The proceedings were presided over by Mr.  Cravatte,  Vice Presi-
dent of the Council of Ministers of Luxembourg,  and the speakers included 
the German Foreign Minister,  Mr.  Willy Brandt,  and the President of the 
European Parliament,  Mr.  Alain Po  her. 
At the close of the Conference,  a resolution was passed.  This read, 
in part as follows : 
'The Eighth States General of the local authorities of Europe which 
comprises 4, 000 elected administrators respresenting 50, 000 local authori-
ties,  provinces and other local communities,  find that the commemoration of 
the tenth anniversary of the Rome Treaties could not conceal the difficulties 
that are slowing down and,  in fact,  hampering the construction of an authentic 
political Europe; pointing out that the results hitherto obtained in the economic 
field are due to the European institutions and in particular, to the Executive Com-
mission of the EEC; that the existence and the part played by a  Community 
organization,  independent from the States,  is essential for resolving the pro-
blems and making it possible to complete the construction of Europe; fear that 
- 127  -the spirit that moved the merg·er of the three European Executives would 
weaken the authority and independence of the Community body at a time when 
the latter needs reinforcing; aware of the fact that a political authority is ne-
cessary for taking major decisions which are essential to Europe for dealing 
on an equal footing with the major powers; find that owing to the lack of a 
common political authority,  Europe's weakness in connexion with the Middle 
East leaves once again the political and diplomatic initiative to the two world 
powers on matters that jeopardize the maintenance of peace in respect of the 
rights of the people and in particular the right of the State of Israel to a nor-
mal existence; Declares:  1)  that the accession of the United Kingdom to the 
European Economic Community would be an i111portant contribution to the eco-
nomic and political status of Europe;  2)  that the only means of finding out 
whether the Government of the United Kingdom accepts the Rome Treaty is to 
initiate negotiations between the Six and the United Kingdom; Hopes that a 
united Europe will be a  link between east and west and contributes to closer 
relations between the nations and the maintenance of peace in the world.' 
7.  St2.tement by the Marmet Committee of its attitude on the major 
European problems 
Taking its cue from the international crisis which erupted following 
the Israeli-Arab conflict the Action Committee for the United States of Europe 
issued a  communique on 15  June in which it deplored Europe.'s inefficiency at 
a time so crucial for world peace . and again drew attention to the need for 
decisive steps towards unification; 
The communique  stated in particular : 
'Europe will only be able to play the essential part which is its due, 
particularly in organizing peace between East and  West,  if it is organized 
and if it intervenes with a  single voice on international issues,  as it recently 
did with success at the Kennedy Round.  At the present stage Europe could 
create ne\v conditions which would enable it,  in a practical way,  to tackle 
(1)  the political and democratic unity of Europe,  (2)  the democratization of 
the existing European institutions,  (3)  the organization of peace and,  t_n_ter~ 
~lia 1  (4)  the solution of the German question by welcoming the United King-
dom,  becoming economically strong and united,  establishing an equal-footing 
relationship with the United States and initiating economic co-operation with 
the Soviet Union and the East European countries.  In pursuing these objec-
tives,  we should change the context in which the difficulties concerning  foreign 
policy and defence arise and where at present the problems are insoluble. 
- 128 -With regard  to these questions,  the Committee  has  therefore 
adopted the following  resolutions which  the member  political  parties have 
decided to submit for approval to their respective parliaments in the near 
future : 
a)  Accession of the United Kingdom to the European Community 
In response to the application for accession submitted by the United 
Kingdom in compliance with Article 237  of the Treaty of Rome,  the Assembly 
is in favour of initiating and speedily concluding negotiations,  on the te.rms to 
be agreed, for Britain's accession to the European Economic Community in 
its present form,  with the same rights and obligations as the six countries 
which are already members.  The Assembly is in favour of the accession of 
the other democratic countries of the European Free Trade Area which agree 
to enter and belong to the EEC in its present form with the same rights  and 
obligations as the six countries which are already members and,  should this 
not prove possible,  to arrange some suitable form of association or agreement 
with these countries. 
b)  Organization of the technological development of the European 
Community 
The Assembly calls upon the Governments to request  the EEC 
institutions : 
1.  To take the necessary measures for creating aEuropean-type com-
pany which would,  inter  __ :~li_~,  remove the fiscal difficulties  that 
stand in the way of mergers, and to do so before 31 December 1968; 
the rights granted to workers under existing legislation  should not 
be impaired; 
2.  To organi.ze a European financial market; 
3.  To establish without delay the technological areas which are  to be 
regarded as essential to Europe's future,  particularly with a view 
to the entry of the United Kingdom; 
4.  To draw up,  as soon as possible,  a European technological develop-
ment programme in these areas, laying down the aims to be achieved 
and the joint funds needed to finance it and establishing  which  joint 
bodies should have executive powers-to be decided upon beforehand. 
- 129-c)  Establishment of equal-footing relations with the United States 
The Assembly requests that,  as European unification goes forward, 
the organization of an equal-footing relationship between the United States and 
a Europe in the process of becoming united should be negotiated without delay. 
The Assembly expresses satisfaction at the success of the Kennedy Round 
which proved that Europe can negotiate on an equal-footing with the United 
States; it requests that the setting-up of a "Liaison Committee" should be ne-
gotiated as of now between the United States and the European Economic Com-
munity; this should comprise representatives of the common institutions and 
the American Government in equal numbers.  The function of this Committee 
would be to enable the Community and the United States -before taking deci-
sions  - to explore and, possibly, to discuss the American and European view-
points on important issues of mutual interest,  such as the international mone-
tary system, the balance of  payments,  American investments,  technological 
exchanges and assistance to developing countries. 
d)  Co-operation between the European Economic Community and the 
USSR  and the East European countries 
The Assembly calls upon the Governments to ask the EEC institu-
tions to make the necessary approach to the USSR  and East European coun-
tries with a view to setting-up a  co-operation committee,  whose function 
would be to allow for standing consultations on economic and cultural ques-
tions of mutual interest.  The first aim of such consultations would be to seek 
an expansi  an of trade, particularly by means of multi  -·lateral arrangements, 
to look into the possibilities of credit and to step up the exchange of technolo-
gical knowledge.  Such a widening of the material basis of relations with the 
East would facilitate a growing co-operation between East and West in other 
spheres and would,  above all,  contribute towards settling the issues which at 
present divide them.' 
(Relazioni Internazionali,  24 June 1967,  No.  25) 
- 130-8.  The attitude of the Atlantic Treaty Association (ATA)  to the pro-
blems of European unification 
The Atlantic Treaty Association held its XIIIth General Assembly in 
Luxembourg from 11 to 15 September under the chairmanship of Mr.  Paul-
Henri Spaak. 
ATA's attitude concerning European unification problems is illus-
trated by the following two paragraphs from the resolution which was passed 
unanimously :  'The most suitable framework within which to pursue European 
unification is the Common Market.  We  therefore urge the Governments forth-
with to initiate negotiations in earnest between the Six and the United Kingdom 
which has accepted the provisions of the Rome Treaty and its political objec-
tives.  Such negotiations should likewise be pursued with Denmark,  Norway 
and any other country which has given the same undertakings as the United 
Kingdom.  Failing this,  the hope of European unity would vanish and the Atlan-
tic Alliance would inevitably be weakened....  It must be stressed that Europe 
cannot and will not be confined by the River Elbe and the frontiers of the Com-
munist States.  On the contrary,  we urge all European Governments in the 
West and East alike to become more conscious of the civilization we have in-
herited,  and of the riches of our common history and culture.  We  also urge 
them to realize what efforts have to be made to maintain peace through co-
operation and to foster economic progress throughout Europe.' 
(Relazioni Internationali,  No.  38,  23  September 1967) 
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